Top-down predictions in the cognitive brain

The human brain is not a passive organ simply waiting to be activated by external stimuli. Instead, we propose that the brain continuously employs memory of past experiences to interpret sensory information and predict the immediately relevant future. The basic elements of this proposal include analogical mapping, associative representations and the generation of predictions. This review concentrates on visual recognition as the model system for developing and testing ideas about the role and mechanisms of top-down predictions in the brain. We cover relevant behavioral, computational and neural aspects, explore links to emotion and action preparation, and consider clinical implications for schizophrenia and dyslexia. We then discuss the extension of the general principles of this proposal to other cognitive domains.     

How iconic gestures enhance communication: an ERP study

EEG was recorded as adults watched short segments of spontaneous discourse in which the speaker's gestures and utterances contained complementary information. Videos were followed by one of four types of picture probes: cross-modal related probes were congruent with both speech and gestures; speech-only related probes were congruent with information in the speech, but not the gesture; and two sorts of unrelated probes were created by pairing each related probe with a different discourse prime. Event-related potentials (ERPs) elicited by picture probes were measured within the time windows of the N300 (250-350 ms post-stimulus) and N400 (350-550 ms post-stimulus). Cross-modal related probes elicited smaller N300 and N400 than speech-only related ones, indicating that pictures were easier to interpret when they corresponded with gestures. N300 and N400 effects were not due to differences in the visual complexity of each probe type, since the same cross-modal and speech-only picture probes elicited N300 and N400 with similar amplitudes when they appeared as unrelated items. These findings extend previous research on gesture comprehension by revealing how iconic co-speech gestures modulate conceptualization, enabling listeners to better represent visuo-spatial aspects of the speaker's meaning.     

Memory for object locations: Priority effect and sex differences in associative spatial learning

This paper reports two experiments conducted to examine priority effects and sex differences in object location memory. A new task of paired position-learning was designed, based on the A–B A–C paradigm, which was used in paired word learning. There were three different paired position-learning conditions: (1) positions of several different objects (B-objects and C-objects) around referent objects (A-objects) were learned in the A–B A–C position-learning condition, (2) positions of several different objects with no referent objects were learned in the 0–B 0–C position-learning condition, and (3) positions of identical objects (stars) with no referent objects were learned in the 0-star 0-star position-only condition. The results revealed a significant priority effect on performance in the A–B A–C and the 0–B 0–C position-learning conditions but not in the 0-star 0-star position-only condition. Contradictory results were obtained with respect to the sex variable: a female superiority effect on paired position learning was significant in Experiment 1, but this effect was not replicated in Experiment 2. In addition, an articulatory suppression task used in Experiment 2 had a significant effect on recall of different object positions but no effect on recall of identical object positions. This suggested that verbal encoding was not necessary for learning of positions of identical objects.     

Perception and its objects

Early modern empiricists thought that the nature of perceptual experience is given by citing the object presented to the mind in that experience. Hallucination and illusion suggest that this requires untenable mind-dependent objects. Current orthodoxy replaces the appeal to direct objects with the claim that perceptual experience is characterized instead by its representational content. This paper argues that the move to content is problematic, and reclaims the early modern empiricist insight as perfectly consistent, even in cases of illusion, with the realist contention that these direct objects of perception are the persisting mind-independent physical objects we all know and love.

Influence of object size on baseline identification, priming, and explicit memory

We investigated the influence of size on identification, priming, and explicit memory for color photos of common objects. Participants studied objects displayed in small, medium, and large sizes and memory was assessed with both implicit identification and explicit recognition tests. Overall, large objects were easier to identify than small objects and study-to-test changes in object size impeded performance on explicit but not implicit memory tests. In contrast to previous findings with line-drawings of objects but consistent with predictions from the distance-as-filtering hypothesis, we found that study-test size manipulations had large effects on old/new recognition memory test for objects displayed in large size at test but not for objects displayed small or medium at test. Our findings add to the growing body of literature showing that the findings obtained using line-drawings of objects do not necessarily generalize to color photos of common objects. We discuss implications of our findings for theories of object perception, memory, and eyewitness identification accuracy for objects.     

Habit outweighs planning in grasp selection for object manipulation

Object-directed grasping movements are adapted to intended interactions with an object. We address whether adjusting the grasp for object manipulation is controlled habitually, based on past experiences, or by goal-directed planning, based on an evaluation of the expected action outcomes. Therefore, we asked participants to grasp and rotate a dial. In such tasks, participants typically grasp the dial with an excursed, uncomfortable arm posture, which then allows to complete the dial rotation in a comfortable end-state. We extended this task by manipulating the contingency between the orientation of the grasp and the resulting end-state of the arm. A one-step (control) group rotated the dial to a single target. A two-step group rotated the dial to an initial target and then in the opposite direction. A three-step group rotated the dial to the initial target, then in the opposite direction, and then back to the initial target. During practice, the two-step and three-step groups reduced the excursion of their grasps, thus avoiding overly excursed arm postures after the second rotation. When the two-step and three-step groups were asked to execute one-step rotations, their grasps resembled those that were acquired during the two-step and three-step rotations, respectively. However, the carry-over was not complete. This suggests that adjusting grasps for forthcoming object manipulations is controlled by a mixture of habitual and goal-directed processes. In the present experiment, the former contributed approximately twice as much to grasp selection than the latter.     

The impact of object type on the spatial analogies in Korean preschoolers

We tested young children’s spatial reasoning in a match-to-sample task, manipulating the objects in the task (abstract geometric shapes, line drawings of realistic objects, or both). Korean 4- and 5-year-old children (N = 161) generalized the target spatial configuration (i.e., on, in, above) more easily when the sample used geometric shapes and the choices used realistic objects than the reverse (i.e., realistic-object sample to geometric-shape choices). With within-type stimuli (i.e., sample and choices were both geometric shapes or both realistic objects), 5-year-old, but not 4-year-old, children generalized the spatial relations more easily with geometric shapes than realistic objects. In addition, children who knew more locative terms (e.g., “in”, “on”) performed better on the task, suggesting a link to children’s spatial vocabulary. The results demonstrate an advantage of geometric shapes over realistic objects in facilitating young children’s performance on a match-to-sample spatial reasoning task.     

Soul in the world: symbolic culture as the medium for psyche

Whilst the loss of a sense of living connection with the material world is mainly associated with the scientific revolution in seventeenth century Europe, it can be traced back to Plato's introduction of a hierarchy between soul and body. Jung's attempted solution to this – esse in anima – is ingenious but maintains the Cartesian split by which the aliveness of the world is reduced to a projection of psychic forces (the archetypes). An alternative approach is proposed, rooted in the Aristotelean emphasis on practical activity that sees the soul as a function of our way of being in the world. Human cognition is extended and distributed by our social and material engagement with the world, especially via collective representations whose symbolic character is constitutive of the reality of the world in which we live. Despite the dominance of ‘scientific Cartesian’ representations in the modern Western world, there remain numerous instances of participation mystique that cannot be captured by the Cartesian notion of projection. These indicate an opening to ways of being in the world that may lead us out of the impasse of the Cartesian matrix.     

Decreased attention to object size information in scale errors performers

Young children sometimes make serious attempts to perform impossible actions on miniature objects as if they were full-size objects. The existing explanations of these curious action errors assume (but never explicitly tested) children's decreased attention to object size information. This study investigated the attention to object size information in scale errors performers. Two groups of children aged 18–25 months (N = 52) and 48–60 months (N = 23) were tested in two consecutive tasks: an action task that replicated the original scale errors elicitation situation, and a looking task that involved watching on a computer screen actions performed with adequate to inadequate size object. Our key finding – that children performing scale errors in the action task subsequently pay less attention to size changes than non-scale errors performers in the looking task – suggests that the origins of scale errors in childhood operate already at the perceptual level, and not at the action level.