Motion and edge sensitivity in perception of object unity

Although much evidence indicates that young infants perceive unitary objects by analyzing patterns of motion, infants' abilities to perceive object unity by analyzing Gestalt properties and by integrating distinct views of an object over time are in dispute. To address these controversies, four experiments investigated adults' and infants' perception of the unity of a center-occluded, moving rod with misaligned visible edges. Both alignment information and depth information affected adults' and infants' perception of object unity in similar ways, and infants perceived object unity by integrating information about object features over time. However, infants perceived a moving, misaligned, three-dimensional object as indeterminate in its connectedness, whereas adults perceived it as connected behind the occluder. These findings indicate that the effectiveness of common motion in specifying unified surfaces across an occluder is reduced by misalignment of edges. Alignment information enhances perception of object unity either by serving directly as information for unity or by optimizing the detectability of motion-carried information for unity. In addition, young infants are able to retain information about edge orientation over short intervals in determining connectedness via a process of spatiotemporal integration.     

Cognitive development in object manipulation by infant chimpanzees

This study focuses on the development of spontaneous object manipulation in three infant chimpanzees during their first 2 years of life. The three infants were raised by their biological mothers who lived among a group of chimpanzees. A human tester conducted a series of cognitive tests in a triadic situation where mothers collaborated with the researcher during the testing of the infants. Four tasks were presented, taken from normative studies of cognitive development of Japanese infants: inserting objects into corresponding holes in a box, seriating nesting cups, inserting variously shaped objects into corresponding holes in a template, and stacking up wooden blocks. The mothers had already acquired skills to perform these manipulation tasks. The infants were free to observe the mothers' manipulative behavior from immediately after birth. We focused on object–object combinations that were made spontaneously by the infant chimpanzees, without providing food reinforcement for any specific behavior that the infants performed. The three main findings can be summarized as follows. First, there was precocious appearance of object–object combination in infant chimpanzees: the age of onset (8–11 months) was comparable to that in humans (around 10 months old).Second, object–object combinations in chimpanzees remained at a low frequency between 11 and 16 months, then increased dramatically at the age of approximately 1.5 years. At the same time, the accuracy of these object–object combinations also increased. Third, chimpanzee infants showed inserting behavior frequently and from an early age but they did not exhibit stacking behavior during their first 2 years of life, in clear contrast to human data.     

Object recognition with severe spatial deficits in Williams syndrome: sparing and breakdown

Williams syndrome (WS) is a rare genetic disorder that results in severe visual-spatial cognitive deficits coupled with relative sparing in language, face recognition, and certain aspects of motion processing. Here, we look for evidence for sparing or impairment in another cognitive system-object recognition. Children with WS, normal mental-age (MA) and chronological age-matched (CA) children, and normal adults viewed pictures of a large range of objects briefly presented under various conditions of degradation, including canonical and unusual orientations, and clear or blurred contours. Objects were shown as either full-color views (Experiment 1) or line drawings (Experiment 2). Across both experiments, WS and MA children performed similarly in all conditions while CA children performed better than both WS group and MA groups with unusual views. This advantage, however, was eliminated when images were also blurred. The error types and relative difficulty of different objects were similar across all participant groups. The results indicate selective sparing of basic mechanisms of object recognition in WS, together with developmental delay or arrest in recognition of objects from unusual viewpoints. These findings are consistent with the growing literature on brain abnormalities in WS which points to selective impairment in the parietal areas of the brain. As a whole, the results lend further support to the growing literature on the functional separability of object recognition mechanisms from other spatial functions, and raise intriguing questions about the link between genetic deficits and cognition.     

Is motion extrapolation employed in multiple object tracking? Tracking as a low-level, non-predictive function

In a series of five experiments, we investigated whether visual tracking mechanisms utilize prediction when recovering multiple reappearing objects. When all objects abruptly disappeared and reappeared mid-trajectory, it was found that (a) subjects tracked better when objects reappeared at their loci of disappearance than when they reappeared in their extrapolated trajectories, (b) disappearance episodes ranging from 150 to 900 ms had virtually no differential effect on performance, (c) tracking deteriorated monotonically as a function of displacement magnitude during disappearance, and (d) tracking did not depend on whether objects moved in predictable paths. Even objects that reappeared backward in their trajectories were tracked dramatically better than objects that reappeared in their extrapolated trajectories. When all objects disappeared and reappeared in ways that implicated the presence of an occluder (i.e., with occlusion and disocclusion cues along fixed contours), tracking again was not predictive, and performance deteriorated with increased displacement. When objects reappeared predictably in 75% of trials, they were still tracked better when they reappeared at their points of disappearance. Theoretical implications of a non-predictive multiple object tracking mechanism are discussed.     

The human first hypothesis: identification of conspecifics and individuation of objects in the young infant

How do infants individuate and track objects, and among them objects belonging to their species, when they can only rely on information about the properties of those objects? We propose the Human First Hypothesis (HFH), which posits that infants possess information about their conspecifics and use it to identify and count objects. F. Xu and S. Carey [Cognitive Psychology, 30(2), 111-153, 1996] argued that before the age of 1 year, infants fail to use property information. To explain their results, Xu and Carey proposed the Object First Hypothesis (OFH), according to which infants under 1 year of age have only the general concept of physical object to identify and count objects. We show that infants have a more extensive knowledge of sortals than that claimed by the OFH. When 10-month-olds see one humanlike and one non-humanlike object, they successfully identify and count them by using the contrast in their properties, as predicted by the HFH. We also show that infants succeed even when they make a decision based on differences between two close basic-level categories such as humanlike objects and doglike objects, but fail when they have to use differences within the human category. Thus, infants treat "human" as a basic sortal, as predicted by the HFH. We argue that our results cannot be accounted for by general purpose mechanisms. Neither the strong version of the OFH and its explanation in terms of object indexing mechanisms [A. M. Leslie, F. Xu, P. Tremoulet, & B. J. Scholl, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2(1), 10-18, 1998] nor explanations in terms of task demands [T. Wilcox & R. Baillargeon, Cognitive Psychology, 37(2), 97-155, 1998] are sufficient to explain our results.     

Object individuation using property/kind information in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta)

Around 1 year of age, infants develop the ability to individuate objects in the absence of spatiotemporal information. Some have proposed that this capacity relies on the emergence of language and, in particular, that comprehending an object's label is required to individuate it as a particular kind. One approach to testing this hypothesis is to conduct experiments on pre-linguistic human infants. A second is to test non-linguistic animals. We followed the second approach, exploring whether semi-free-ranging rhesus macaques can individuate objects using property/kind information. To make the results most directly comparable, we adapted a reaching paradigm used to examine property/kind individuation in infants. Results from three experiments demonstrate that, like 12-month-old infants, adult rhesus macaques can use both spatiotemporal and property/kind information to individuate food objects. In a fourth experiment designed to examine which properties are used to individuate food objects, results revealed that rhesus use color, but not shape. These results, together with experiments involving different procedures, provide support for the conclusion that in the absence of linguistic abilities, some non-human primates spontaneously use property/kind information to individuate objects.     

Beyond stop consonants: Consonantal specificity in early lexical acquisition

Previous research has shown that 20-month-old infants can simultaneously learn two words that only differ by one of their consonants, but fail to do so when the words differ only by one of their vowels. This asymmetry was interpreted as developmental evidence for the proposal that consonants play a more important role than vowels in lexical specification. However, the consonant/vowel distinction was confounded with another distinction, that of the continuous status of the phonemes used (discontinuous stop consonants versus continuous vowels). The present study investigated 20-month-olds’ use of phonetic specificity while simultaneously learning two words that differ by a continuous consonant. The results obtained parallel those previously found for stop consonants, confirming the original claim of an asymmetry between the roles of consonants and vowels at the lexical level.     

Viewpoint costs occur during consolidation: evidence from the attentional blink

Do the viewpoint costs incurred when naming rotated familiar objects arise during initial identification or during consolidation? To answer this question we employed an attentional blink (AB) task where two target objects appeared amongst a rapid stream of distractor objects. Our assumption was that while both targets and distractors undergo initial identification only targets are consolidated in a form that allows overt report. We presented line drawings of objects with a usual upright canonical orientation, and separately manipulated the orientation of targets and distractors. In two experiments, targets were defined by colour, whereas in a third experiment they were defined by semantic category. Target 1 orientation influenced the AB, with objects rotated by 90 degrees causing a larger second target deficit than upright and upside-down objects. However, distractor orientation did not affect the magnitude of the second target deficit, regardless of whether targets were defined by colour or semantic category. Taken together, these findings suggest that the visual representations involved in the preliminary recognition of familiar objects are viewpoint-invariant and that viewpoint costs are incurred when these objects are consolidated for report.     

Differences in object sharing between infants at risk for autism and typically developing infants from 9 to 15 months of age

Object sharing abilities of infants at risk for autism (AR infants) and typically developing (TD) infants were compared from 9 to 15 months of age. Specifically, we examined the effects of infants’ locomotor abilities on their object sharing skills. 16 TD infants and 16 AR infants were observed during an “object sharing” paradigm at crawling and walking ages. Overall, AR walking infants demonstrated lower rates of object sharing with caregivers compared to TD walking infants. Specifically, AR walking infants had lower rates of giving and approaches toward caregivers compared to TD walking infants. AR walking infants also had lower step rates toward task-appropriate targets, i.e. caregivers and objects compared to TD walking infants. No group differences in object sharing were observed at crawling ages. Object sharing could be a valuable context for early identification of delays in infants at risk for developing Autism spectrum disorder.