Patterns of Response Times and Response Choices to Science Questions: The Influence of Relative Processing Time

We report on five experiments investigating response choices and response times to simple science questions that evoke student “misconceptions,” and we construct a simple model to explain the patterns of response choices. Physics students were asked to compare a physical quantity represented by the slope, such as speed, on simple physics graphs. We found that response times of incorrect answers, resulting from comparing heights, were faster than response times of correct answers comparing slopes. This result alone might be explained by the fact that height was typically processed faster than slope for this kind of task, which we confirmed in a separate experiment. However, we hypothesize that the difference in response time is an indicator of the cause (rather than the result) of the response choice. To support this, we found that imposing a 3‐s delay in responding increased the number of students comparing slopes (answering correctly) on the task. Additionally a significant proportion of students recognized the correct written rule (compare slope), but on the graph task they incorrectly compared heights. Finally, training either with repetitive examples or providing a general rule both improved scores, but only repetitive examples had a large effect on response times, thus providing evidence of dual paths or processes to a solution. Considering models of heuristics, information accumulation models, and models relevant to the Stroop effect, we construct a simple relative processing time model that could be viewed as a kind of fluency heuristic. The results suggest that misconception‐like patterns of answers to some science questions commonly found on tests may be explained in part by automatic processes that involve the relative processing time of considered dimensions and a priority to answer quickly.     

The mathematics of sharing / Las matemáticas que realizan los niños al compartir

Abstract

The purpose of sharing is to construct equivalent sets, making it an ideal context for analysing important quantitative concepts such as counting, equivalence and cardinality. Two studies analysed how four- and five-year-olds shared blocks in equal sharing and reciprocity conditions and their number inferences about one set after counting the other. The researcher asked children to share double and single blocks between two characters. They succeeded more in building equivalent shares in an equal sharing than reciprocity condition. Most children who shared correctly also made appropriate number inferences. To examine whether perceptual cues helped children share the blocks, a second study used Canadian $1 and $2 coins. A double block is twice the size of a single, whereas there is no visual cue about the value relation between coins because they are the same size. Unexpectedly, children shared equally well with blocks and coins, and most children made number inferences.     

GLOCALIZATION: RELIGION AND SCIENCE AROUND THE WORLD

This essay explains the rationale behind a series of reviews on interactions between knowledge and values, science and religion, in different countries or regions around the world. The series will run in Zygon for the whole of 2015 and beyond. In the literature, it may seem that discussions in the United States and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom are typical of the issues, but they need not be. David Livingstone showed that the reception of evolution differed, even among Calvinists in different countries. Thus, rather than an export model, we should take time to learn from scholars rooted in different contexts how in their situation issues on knowledge and values arise and are dealt with. In this interplay of global processes and local contexts, indicated with the term glocalization, we should be alert to the migration of concepts and the transformations that ideas undergo.     

Differences in object sharing between infants at risk for autism and typically developing infants from 9 to 15 months of age

Object sharing abilities of infants at risk for autism (AR infants) and typically developing (TD) infants were compared from 9 to 15 months of age. Specifically, we examined the effects of infants’ locomotor abilities on their object sharing skills. 16 TD infants and 16 AR infants were observed during an “object sharing” paradigm at crawling and walking ages. Overall, AR walking infants demonstrated lower rates of object sharing with caregivers compared to TD walking infants. Specifically, AR walking infants had lower rates of giving and approaches toward caregivers compared to TD walking infants. AR walking infants also had lower step rates toward task-appropriate targets, i.e. caregivers and objects compared to TD walking infants. No group differences in object sharing were observed at crawling ages. Object sharing could be a valuable context for early identification of delays in infants at risk for developing Autism spectrum disorder.     

Do phenomenal concepts misrepresent?

Many contemporary physicalists concede to dualists that conscious subjects have distinctive “phenomenal concepts” of the phenomenal qualities of their experiences. Indeed, they contend that idiosyncratic characteristics of these concepts facilitate responses to influential anti-physicalist arguments. Like some some other critics of this approach, James Tartaglia (2013 Tartaglia, J. (2013). Conceptualizing physical consciousness. Philosophical Psychology, 26(6), 817–838.[Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) maintains that phenomenal concepts express contents that conflict with physicalism, but as a physicalist, the moral he distinctively draws from this is that phenomenal concepts misrepresent. He contends further that the contemporary physicalists’ account cannot accommodate this feature, and that in consequence, physicalists should abandon phenomenal concepts and return to the identity theory championed by Place and Smart in the 1950s. I respond to Tartaglia by identifying lacunae in his interpretation of contemporary physicalism and arguing that phenomenal concepts as conceived by the contemporary physicalists do not express contents that support either dualist or physicalist metaphysics: they are “metaphysically neutral.”     

Concept Creep: Psychology's Expanding Concepts of Harm and Pathology

Many of psychology's concepts have undergone semantic shifts in recent years. These conceptual changes follow a consistent trend. Concepts that refer to the negative aspects of human experience and behavior have expanded their meanings so that they now encompass a much broader range of phenomena than before. This expansion takes “horizontal” and “vertical” forms: concepts extend outward to capture qualitatively new phenomena and downward to capture quantitatively less extreme phenomena. The concepts of abuse, bullying, trauma, mental disorder, addiction, and prejudice are examined to illustrate these historical changes. In each case, the concept's boundary has stretched and its meaning has dilated. A variety of explanations for this pattern of “concept creep” are considered and its implications are explored. I contend that the expansion primarily reflects an ever-increasing sensitivity to harm, reflecting a liberal moral agenda. Its implications are ambivalent, however. Although conceptual change is inevitable and often well motivated, concept creep runs the risk of pathologizing everyday experience and encouraging a sense of virtuous but impotent victimhood.     

Children’s scale errors and object processing: Early evidence for cross-cultural differences

Scale errors are observed when young children make mistakes by attempting to put their bodies into miniature versions of everyday objects. Such errors have been argued to arise from children’s insufficient integration of size into their object representations. The current study investigated whether Japanese and UK children’s (18–24 months old, N = 80) visual exploration in a categorization task related to their scale error production. UK children who showed greater local processing made more scale errors, whereas Japanese children, who overall showed greater global processing, showed no such relationship. These results raise the possibility that children’s suppression of scale errors emerges not from attention to size per se, but from a critical integration of global (i.e., size) and local (i.e., object features) information during object processing, and provide evidence that this mechanism differs cross-culturally.     

The role of redundant verbal labels in 8- and 10-month-olds’ working memory

Verbal labels have been shown to help preverbal infants’ performance on various cognitive tasks, such as categorization. Redundant labels also aid adults’ visual working memory (WM), but it is not known if this linguistic benefit extends to preverbal infants’ WM. In two eye-tracking studies, we tested whether 8- and 10-month-old infants’ WM performance would improve with the presence of redundant labels in a Delayed Match Retrieval (DMR) paradigm that tested infants’ WM for object-location bindings. Findings demonstrated that infants at both ages were unable to remember two object-location bindings when co-presented with labels at encoding. Moreover, infants who encoded the object-location bindings with labels were not significantly better than those who did so in silence. These findings are discussed in the context of label advantages in cognition and auditory dominance.     

Distorting Face Representations in Newborn Brains

What role does experience play in the development of face recognition? A growing body of evidence indicates that newborn brains need slowly changing visual experiences to develop accurate visual recognition abilities. All of the work supporting this “slowness constraint” on visual development comes from studies testing basic-level object recognition. Here, we present the results of controlled-rearing experiments that provide evidence for a slowness constraint on the development of face recognition, a prototypical subordinate-level object recognition task. We found that (1) newborn chicks can rapidly develop view-invariant face recognition and (2) the development of this ability relies on experience with slowly moving faces. When chicks were reared with quickly moving faces, they built distorted face representations that largely lacked invariance to viewpoint changes, effectively “breaking” their face recognition abilities. These results provide causal evidence that slowly changing visual experiences play a critical role in the development of face recognition, akin to basic-level object recognition. Thus, face recognition is not a hardwired property of vision but is learned rapidly as the visual system adapts to the temporal structure of the animal's visual environment.     

Powerful Qualities,Phenomenal Concepts,and the New Challenge to Physicalism

Defenders of the phenomenal concept strategy have to explain how both physical and phenomenal concepts provide a substantive grasp on the nature of their referents, whilst referring to the very same experience. This is the ‘new challenge’ to physicalism. In this paper, I argue that if the physicalist adopts the powerful qualities ontology of properties then a new and powerful version of the phenomenal concept strategy can be developed, which answers the new challenge.