How the Eyes Tell Lies: Social Gaze During a Preference Task

Social attention is thought to require detecting the eyes of others and following their gaze. To be effective, observers must also be able to infer the person's thoughts and feelings about what he or she is looking at, but this has only rarely been investigated in laboratory studies. In this study, participants' eye movements were recorded while they chose which of four patterns they preferred. New observers were subsequently able to reliably guess the preference response by watching a replay of the fixations. Moreover, when asked to mislead the person guessing, participants changed their looking behavior and guessing success was reduced. In a second experiment, naïve participants could also guess the preference of the original observers but were unable to identify trials which were lies. These results confirm that people can spontaneously use the gaze of others to infer their judgments, but also that these inferences are open to deception.     

On Direct Social Perception

Direct Social Perception (DSP) is the idea that we can non-inferentially perceive others’ mental states. In this paper, I argue that the standard way of framing DSP leaves the debate at an impasse. I suggest two alternative interpretations of the idea that we see others’ mental states: others’ mental states are represented in the content of our perception, and we have basic perceptual beliefs about others’ mental states. I argue that the latter interpretation of DSP is more promising and examine the kinds of mental states that plausibly could satisfy this version of DSP.     

A Duet for one

This paper considers communication in terms of inference about the behaviour of others (and our own behaviour). It is based on the premise that our sensations are largely generated by other agents like ourselves. This means, we are trying to infer how our sensations are caused by others, while they are trying to infer our behaviour: for example, in the dialogue between two speakers. We suggest that the infinite regress induced by modelling another agent – who is modelling you – can be finessed if you both possess the same model. In other words, the sensations caused by others and oneself are generated by the same process. This leads to a view of communication based upon a narrative that is shared by agents who are exchanging sensory signals. Crucially, this narrative transcends agency – and simply involves intermittently attending to and attenuating sensory input. Attending to sensations enables the shared narrative to predict the sensations generated by another (i.e. to listen), while attenuating sensory input enables one to articulate the narrative (i.e. to speak). This produces a reciprocal exchange of sensory signals that, formally, induces a generalised synchrony between internal (neuronal) brain states generating predictions in both agents. We develop the arguments behind this perspective, using an active (Bayesian) inference framework and offer some simulations (of birdsong) as proof of principle.     

Children's Theory of Mind,Self‐Perceptions,and Peer Relations: A Longitudinal Study

This longitudinal study explored Theory of Mind (ToM), self‐perceptions, and teacher ratings of peer relations of 91 children (52 females, ages 6–8 years) drawn from two schools situated in a mainly Euro‐Canadian, middle socioeconomic status, semi‐rural central Canadian context. ToM, self‐perceptions, and teacher ratings of peer relations were assessed at Time 1 (T1, M = 6 y 2 m) and 2 years later at Time 2 (T2, M = 8 y 5 m). Findings showed that ToM scores and perceptions of global self‐worth and physical appearance significantly increased with time across both genders. Positive longitudinal associations were found between teacher ratings of sociable peer relations at T1 and children's T2 moral self‐perceptions. A positive longitudinal correlation was found between T1 ToM and T2 teacher ratings of anxious/fearful peer relations. Individual variation in ToM at age 6 predicted teacher ratings of anxious and fearful behaviours in 8 year olds. In contrast, teacher ratings at age 6 did not predict ToM ability in 8 year olds. Educational implications for social and emotional competencies are discussed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Measuring work styles: Towards an understanding of the dynamic components of the theory of work adjustment

Work styles are an important yet largely unexplored component of the theory of work adjustment (TWA), describing a dynamic component of how individuals maintain and adjust fit with their work environment. The active work style (AWS) scale is the first attempt to develop a specific self-report measure of work styles suitable for longitudinal research. Results from three studies support Dawis and Lofquist's (1984) proposed four factor structure, but these factors are related through a second-order factor describing a person's generalised level of work activity and effort across time. The AWS scale demonstrated good evidence for reliability and validity, and strong measurement invariance across time signifying its suitability for longitudinal research. In line with expectations, overall work style was positively related to conscientiousness and work engagement yet unrelated to stress. When controlling for these variables, AWS was positively related to demands–abilities fit, but not needs–supplies fit. Limitations and possibilities for future research are also discussed.     

Too much anticipation? Large anticipatory adjustments of grasping movements to minimal object manipulations

When humans grasp objects, the grasps foreshadow the intended object manipulation. It has been suggested that grasps are selected that lead to medial arm postures, which facilitate movement speed and precision, during critical phases of the object manipulation. In Experiment 1, it has been tested whether grasp selections lead to medial postures during rotations of a dial. Participants twisted their arms considerably before grasping the dial, even when the upcoming dial rotation was minimal (5°). Participants neither assumed a medial posture at any point during a short rotation, nor did they assume any of the postures involved in short rotations in the opposite direction. Thus, grasp selections did not necessarily lead to specific postures at any point of the object manipulation. Experiment 2 examined the effect of various grasps on the speed of dial rotations. A medial initial grasp resulted in the fastest dial rotations for most rotation angles. Spontaneously selected grasps were more excursed than necessary to maximize dial rotation speed. This apparent overshot might be explained by participants’ sensitive to the variability of their grasps and is in line with the assumption that grasps facilitate control over the grasped object.     

Sleep deprivation impairs object recognition in mice

Many studies in animals and humans suggest that sleep facilitates learning, memory consolidation, and retrieval. Moreover, sleep deprivation (SD) incurred after learning, impaired memory in humans, mice, rats, and hamsters. We investigated the importance of sleep and its timing in an object recognition task in OF1 mice subjected to 6h SD either immediately after the acquisition phase (0-6 SD) or 6h later (7-12 SD), and in corresponding undisturbed controls. Motor activity was continuously recorded with infrared sensors. All groups explored two familiar, previously encountered objects to a similar extent, both at the end of the acquisition phase and 24h later during the test phase, indicating intact familiarity detection. During the test phase 0-6 SD mice failed to discriminate between the single novel and the two familiar objects. In contrast, the 7-12 SD group and the two control groups explored the novel object significantly longer than the two familiar objects. Plasma corticosterone levels determined after SD did not differ from time-matched undisturbed controls, but were significantly below the level measured after learning alone. ACTH did not differ between the groups. Therefore, it is unlikely that stress contributed to the memory impairment. We conclude that the loss of sleep and the activities the mice engaged in during the SD, impaired recognition memory retrieval, when they occurred immediately after acquisition. The delayed SD enabled memory consolidation during the 6h when the mice were allowed to sleep, and had no detrimental effect on memory. Neither SD schedule impaired object familiarity processing, suggesting that only specific cognitive abilities were sensitive to the intervention. Sleep may either actively promote memory formation, or alternatively, sleep may provide optimal conditions of non-interference for consolidation.     

Do chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) understand single invisible displacement?

Previous research suggests that chimpanzees understand single invisible displacement. However, this Piagetian task may be solvable through the use of simple search strategies rather than through mentally representing the past trajectory of an object. Four control conditions were thus administered to two chimpanzees in order to separate associative search strategies from performance based on mental representation. Strategies involving experimenter cue-use, search at the last or first box visited by the displacement device, and search at boxes adjacent to the displacement device were systematically controlled for. Chimpanzees showed no indications of utilizing these simple strategies, suggesting that their capacity to mentally represent single invisible displacements is comparable to that of 18-24-month-old children.     

Infants' ability to use luminance information to individuate objects

Recent research indicates that infants first use form and then surface features as the basis for individuating objects. However, very little is known about the underlying basis for infants' differential sensitivity to form than surface features. The present research assessed infants' sensitivity to luminance differences. Like other surface properties, luminance information typically reveals little about an object. Unlike other surface properties (e.g. pattern, color), the visual system can detect luminance differences at birth. The outcome of two experiments indicated that 11.5-month-olds, but not 7.5-month-olds, used luminance differences to individuate objects. These results suggest that it is not the age at which infants can detect a feature, but the nature of the information carried by the feature, that determines infants' capacity to individuate objects.