Is motor knowledge part and parcel of the concepts of manipulable artifacts? Clues from a case of upper limb aplasia

The sensory-motor theory of conceptual representations assumes that motor knowledge of how an artifact is manipulated is constitutive of its conceptual representation. Accordingly, if we assume that the richer the conceptual representation of an object is, the easier that object is identified, manipulable artifacts that are associated with motor knowledge should be identified more accurately and/or faster than manipulable artifacts that are not (everything else being equal). In this study, we tested this prediction by investigating the identification of manipulable artifacts in an individual, DC, who was totally deprived of hand motor experience due to upper limb aplasia. This condition prevents him from interacting with most manipulable artifacts, for which he thus has no motor knowledge at all. However, he had motor knowledge for some of them, which he routinely uses with his feet. We contrasted DC’s performance in a timed picture naming task for manipulable artifacts for which he had motor knowledge versus those for which he had no motor knowledge. No detectable advantage on DC’s naming performance was found for artifacts for which he had motor knowledge compared to those for which he did not. This finding suggests that motor knowledge is not part of the concepts of manipulable artifacts.     

Hypothetical identities: Explanatory problems for the explanatory argument

Recently, several philosophers have defended an explanatory argument that supposedly provides novel empirical grounds for accepting the type identity theory of phenomenal consciousness. They claim that we are justified in believing that the type identity thesis is true because it provides the best explanation for the correlations between physical properties and phenomenal properties. In this paper, I examine the actual role identities play in science and point out crucial shortcomings in the explanatory argument. I show that the supporters of the argument have failed to show that the identity thesis provides a satisfactory explanation for the correlations between physical and phenomenal properties. Hence, the explanatory argument, as it stands, does not provide new grounds for accepting the type identity theory.     

研究生入学考试写作评分的概化理论研究与多面Rasch分析

为了评价和改进硕士研究生入学考试一般能力测试的写作评分,研究者采用概化理论和多面Rasch分析对113位考生的写作样本的评分误差来源、评分信度等进行了探讨.概化理论研究显示,评分者和题目对评分准确性影响不大,以两道写作题的考试设计而言,评分者为2人即可保证评分信度在0.75以上.多面Rasch分析显示,评分者宽严度的估计值及其误差均在可接受的范围内,评分者之间在宽严度上不存在显著差异,且评分者自身在评分时总体上比较稳定.但个别评分者在特定考生特定题目上表现出特殊偏向.概化理论和多面Rasch分析丰富了写作评分研究的量化指标,证实了硕士研究生入学考试一般能力测试的写作评分具有较高的信度.     

作为人性科学的心理学

确立心理学的学科属性是审查该学科发展状况的基础。心理学作为一门人性科学,却没有按照人的本质属性来发展适合自身独特对象的研究方法而直接照搬探究物的自然科学的客观实验方法。因此,人作为心理学的主题和对象逐渐迷失在大量的经验研究中,以至于当人们读完心理学的著作之后,根本不能回答"人是什么"这个促使近代心理学诞生的古老哲学问题,甚至没有意识到这是一个问题。要使心理学健康发展,就必须认识到本学科旨在探究人性的历史使命,必须意识到心理学作为人性科学这个基本前提。只有在这个基础上,才可能建立起符合人性本身的方法论、学科观、价值观,进而发展出具有独特学科价值的心理学。     

L’intention comportementale dans les pratiques ménagères : faire soi-même son produit ménager pour moins polluer

Partly due to everyday products discharge, the presence of micropollutants in the sewage system highly concerns the public authorities and water stakeholders. Our study is focused on the measurement of the intention to substitute usual household products by a “homemade” product more eco-friendly. 304 questionnaires were completed by the inhabitants of the Strasbourg Eurometropole and were analyzed by using the theory of planned behavior (TPB). The results show that TPB explains 35 % of intention to use the “homemade” product. It seems that the respondents have a positive attitude toward this “homemade” product. It also appears that there is a strong capacity constraint of this product in terms of disinfection although this parameter is essential when choosing a household product.     

Theory‐of‐Mind development and early sibling relationships after the birth of a sibling: Parental discipline matters

This study investigated relations among children's Theory‐of‐Mind (ToM) development, early sibling interactions, and parental discipline strategies during the transition to siblinghood. Using a sample of firstborn children and their parents (N = 208), we assessed children's ToM before the birth of a sibling and 12 months after the birth, and sibling interactions (i.e., positive engagement and antagonism) and parental discipline strategies (i.e., child‐centred and parent‐centred discipline) at 4 and 8 months in the first year of siblinghood. Structural equation modelling analyses revealed that children's ToM before the birth of the sibling predicted children's positive engagement with the infant sibling, whereas children's antagonistic behaviours towards the infant sibling negatively predicted children's ToM at 12 months, but only when mothers used low levels of child‐centred discipline. These findings emphasize the role of parents in the development of young children's social‐cognitive understanding in the context of early sibling interactions.

Highlights

• This study investigated relations among firstborns' Theory‐of‐Mind (ToM), early sibling relationships, and parental discipline during the first year of siblinghood.
• Multigroup analyses showed that ToM predicted higher sibling positive engagement, and early sibling antagonism predicted poorer ToM when mothers used low child‐centred discipline.
• Parental discipline plays an important role in the development of young children's social understanding and sibling relationships as early as the first year of siblinghood.

     

生存和死亡启动对自我参照加工的影响：ERP证据

死亡想法凸显会抑制个体的自我加工,而生存启动是否会对自我加工产生相似或是不同的影响尚不可知。本研究采用事件相关电位技术,以人格特质词自我判断任务为研究范式,探究死亡和生存启动对自我参照加工的影响。结果发现死亡启动时,自我加工所诱发的后期正成分（LPC）显著小于褒贬加工;生存启动时,自我加工的LPC成分显著大于褒贬加工。即死亡想法抑制自我加工,而生存想法促进自我加工。     

高中英语阅读测验中题组模型的选择与应用

本研究通过高中英语阅读测验实测数据,对比分析双参数逻辑斯蒂克模型 (2PL-IRT)和加入不同数量题组的双参数逻辑斯蒂克模型 (2PL-TRT), 探究题组数量对参数估计及模型拟合的影响。结果表明：(1) 2PL-IRT模型对能力介于-1.50到0.50的被试,能力参数估计偏差较大;(2)将题组效应大于0.50的题组作为局部独立题目纳入模型,会导致部分题目区分度参数的低估和大部分题目难度参数的高估;(3)题组效应越大,将其当作局部独立题目纳入模型估计项目参数的偏差越大。     

Letting Go: Conceptualizing Intervention De‐implementation in Public Health and Social Service Settings

The discontinuation of interventions that should be stopped, or de‐implementation, has emerged as a novel line of inquiry within dissemination and implementation science. As this area grows in human services research, like public health and social work, theory is needed to help guide scientific endeavors. Given the infancy of de‐implementation, this conceptual narrative provides a definition and criteria for determining if an intervention should be de‐implemented. We identify three criteria for identifying interventions appropriate for de‐implementation: (a) interventions that are not effective or harmful, (b) interventions that are not the most effective or efficient to provide, and (c) interventions that are no longer necessary. Detailed, well‐documented examples illustrate each of the criteria. We describe de‐implementation frameworks, but also demonstrate how other existing implementation frameworks might be applied to de‐implementation research as a supplement. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of de‐implementation in the context of other stages of implementation, like sustainability and adoption; next steps for de‐implementation research, especially identifying interventions appropriate for de‐implementation in a systematic manner; and highlight special ethical considerations to advance the field of de‐implementation research.     

Reflecting rules: A note on generalizing the deduction theorem

The purpose of this brief note is to prove a limitative theorem for a generalization of the deduction theorem. I discuss the relationship between the deduction theorem and rules of inference. Often when the deduction theorem is claimed to fail, particularly in the case of normal modal logics, it is the result of a confusion over what the deduction theorem is trying to show. The classic deduction theorem is trying to show that all so-called ‘derivable rules’ can be encoded into the object language using the material conditional. The deduction theorem can be generalized in the sense that one can attempt to encode all types of rules into the object language. When a rule is encoded in this way I say that it is reflected in the object language. What I show, however, is that certain logics which reflect a certain kind of rule must be trivial. Therefore, my generalization of the deduction theorem does fail where the classic deduction theorem didn't.