文学阅读如何影响读者的心理理论

文学阅读不但能提高读者的文学修养, 还能影响其心理状态。然而, 文学阅读经验是否一定能提高读者的心理理论仍然存有争议。近年来有关文学阅读与心理理论关系的实验性探讨不断增加。鉴于此, 作者从文本体裁、测量手段和个体差异角度分析了争议产生的原因。在此基础之上, 归纳了文学阅读影响心理理论的潜在机制, 即镜像神经系统和默认网络很可能是文学阅读促进心理理论提高的重要神经基础。     

Toward a social psychophysiology of vagally mediated heart rate variability: Concepts and methods in self‐regulation,emotion, and interpersonal processes

Theory and research on self‐regulation, emotional adjustment, and interpersonal processes focus increasingly on parasympathetic functioning, using measures of vagally mediated heart rate variability (vmHRV) or respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA). This review describes models of vmHRV in these areas, and issues in measurement and analysis. We propose a framework organizing theory and research as examining (a) vmHRV as an individual difference or a situational response, and (b) resting, reactive, or recovery levels. Evidence supports interpretation of individual differences in resting vmHRV as a broad biomarker for adaptive functioning, but its specificity and underlying mechanisms require elaboration. Individual differences in vagal reactivity (i.e., trait‐like differences in vmHRV decreases during challenge or stress) are less commonly studied in adults and results are mixed. Many stressors and challenges evoke temporary decreases in vmHRV, and in some research self‐regulatory effort evokes increases. In a smaller literature, positive interpersonal experiences and some restorative processes increase resting vmHRV, whereas depletion of self‐regulatory capacity through related effort decreases it. Greater attention to conceptual distinctions regarding vmHRV constructs and several methodological issues will strengthen future research. Importantly, researchers should exercise caution in equating vmHRV with specific psychosocial constructs, especially in the absence of converging assessments and precise experimental manipulations.     

A cognitive model of insomnia

Insomnia is one of the most prevalent psychological disorders, causing sufferers severe distress as well as social, interpersonal, and occupational impairment. Drawing on well-validated cognitive models of the anxiety disorders as well as on theoretical and empirical work highlighting the contribution of cognitive processes to insomnia, this paper presents a new cognitive model of the maintenance of insomnia. It is suggested that individuals who suffer from insomnia tend to be overly worried about their sleep and about the daytime consequences of not getting enough sleep. This excessive negatively toned cognitive activity triggers both autonomic arousal and emotional distress. It is proposed that this anxious state triggers selective attention towards and monitoring of internal and external sleep-related threat cues. Together, the anxious state and the attentional processes triggered by it tricks the individual into overestimating the extent of the perceived deficit in sleep and daytime performance. It is suggested that the excessive negatively toned cognitive activity will be fuelled if a sleep-related threat is detected or a deficit perceived. Counterproductive safety behaviours (including thought control, imagery control, emotional inhibition, and difficulty problem solving) and erroneous beliefs about sleep and the benefits of worry are highlighted as exacerbating factors. The unfortunate consequence of this sequence of events is that the excessive and escalating anxiety may culminate in a real deficit in sleep and daytime functioning. The literature providing preliminary support for the model is reviewed and the clinical implications and limitations discussed.     

What do you think I think you think?: Strategic reasoning in matrix games

In reasoning about strategic interpersonal situations, such as in playing games, an individual's representation of the situation often includes not only information about the goals and rules of the game, but also a mental model of other minds. Often such mental models involve a hierarchy of reflexive reasoning commonly employed in social situations ("What do you think I think you think..."), and may be related to the developmental notion of 'theory of mind'. In two experiments, the authors formally investigate such interpersonal recursive reasoning in college-age adults within the context of matrix games. Participants are asked to predict the moves of another player (experimenter's confederate) in a two-choice, sequential-move game that may terminate at various stages with different payoffs for each player. Participants are also asked to decide optimally on their own moves based on the prediction made. Errors concerning the prediction, or translation of those predictions into decisions about one's action, were recorded. Results demonstrate the existence of a "default" mental model about the other player in the game context that is dynamically modified as new evidence is accumulated. Predictions about this other player's behavior are, in general, used consistently in decision-making, though the opponent tends to be modeled, by default, to behave in a myopic fashion not anticipating the participant's own action.     

Conceiving of entities as objects and as stuff

What is the difference between conceiving of an entity as an object of some kind and conceiving of it as an amount of solid stuff? We propose that the difference lies in how one thinks about the entity's structure. Object construals require thinking of the structure as being nonarbitrary, whereas substance construals require thinking of the structure as being arbitrary. We report six experiments that provide empirical support for this proposal. Regularity of structure, repetition of structure, and the existence of structure-dependent functions, all of which provide reasons to consider the structure of an entity to be nonarbitrary, were shown to bias participants towards object construals. We also discuss how the proposed account of what it means to construe an entity as an object or as some stuff can account for a range of findings in the literature on lexical development. These include the relation between cohesiveness and ontological category, shape and ontological category, and complexity of shape and ontological category. Finally, we discuss the nature of construals and the relation of object and substance construals to the physical, design, and intentional stances.     

从以孝为核心看家庭伦理与社会国家伦理的一体性

“孝”是传统伦理的核心。“孝”的意义不仅在于维系家庭,更在于安定社会国家,二者的统一是社会评价的根本标准。作为传统伦理的主干,“五伦”有平行(夫妇)和上下(父子)关系的不同类型,但是,随着孝道的进一步贯彻,却主要体现为父子有亲而夫妻不爱。淡化夫妇而强化父子所引出的,是社会国家迫切需要的维持上下尊卑的“忠”的原则。“孝”与事功和事业相关,忠孝不二是为至善。传统孝道的负面的意义应当予以正视,变上下尊卑为平等相爱。     

Simulationist models of face-based emotion recognition

Recent studies of emotion mindreading reveal that for three emotions, fear, disgust, and anger, deficits in face-based recognition are paired with deficits in the production of the same emotion. What type of mindreading process would explain this pattern of paired deficits? The simulation approach and the theorizing approach are examined to determine their compatibility with the existing evidence. We conclude that the simulation approach offers the best explanation of the data. What computational steps might be used, however, in simulation-style emotion detection? Four alternative models are explored: a generate-and-test model, a reverse simulation model, a variant of the reverse simulation model that employs an "as if" loop, and an unmediated resonance model.     

Infants' formation and use of categories to segregate objects

Four- and-a-half-month-old infants' (N = 100) category formation and use was studied in a series of five experiments. For each experiment, the test events featured a display composed of a cylinder and a box. Previous research showed that this display is not clearly parsed as a single unit or as two separate units by infants of this age. Immediately prior to testing, infants were shown a set of category exemplars. Knowledge about this category could help infants disambiguate the test display, which contained a novel exemplar of this category. Clear interpretation of the test display as composed of two separate units (as indicated by infants' longer looking at the move-together than at the move-apart test event) was taken as evidence of category formation and use. In Experiments 1 and 5, infants' prior experience with a set of three different boxes that were similar to the test box facilitated their segregation of the test display. Experiment 2 showed that three different exemplars are necessary: prior experience with any two of the three boxes used in Experiment 1 did not facilitate infants' segregation of the test display. Experiment 3 showed that variability in the exemplar set is necessary: prior experience with three identical boxes did not facilitate infants' segregation of the test display. Experiment 4 showed that under these conditions of very brief prior exposure, similarity between the exemplar set and test box is necessary: prior experience with three different boxes that were not very similar to the test box did not facilitate infants' segregation of the test display. Together, these findings suggest that: (a) number of exemplars, variability, and similarity in the exemplar set are important for infants' category formation, and (b) infants use their category knowledge to determine the boundaries of the objects in a display.     

Young infants' expectations about hidden objects

Infants aged 3-5 months (mean of approximately 4 months) were given a novel anticipatory looking task to test object permanence understanding. They were trained to expect an experimenter to retrieve an object from behind a transparent screen upon hearing a cue ("Doors up, here comes the hand"). The experimenter then hid the object behind one of two opaque screens and after either 2 or 8s gave the "doors up" cue. Infants looked to the correct location after the two-second delay, but not after the eight-second delay. This indicates a brief memory that the object is present behind the occluder. The study provides converging evidence that infants grasp object permanence by a young age. The novel anticipatory looking paradigm helps rule out counter-explanations applied to violation-of-expectation tasks.     

A secret agent? How infants learn about the identity of objects in a causal scene

Four experiments examined the role of correlations between dynamic and static parts on 12- to 16-month-olds' ability to learn the identity of agents and recipients in a simple causal event. Infants were habituated to events in which objects with a dynamic or static part acted as an agent or a recipient and then were tested with an event in which the part-causal role relations were switched. Experiment 1 revealed that 16-month-olds, but not 12-month-olds, associate a dynamic part with the role of agent and a static part with the role of recipient. Experiment 2 showed that 12- and 16-month-olds do not associate a static part with the role of agent or a dynamic part with the role of recipient. Experiment 3 demonstrated that 14-month-olds will learn the relations presented in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. Experiment 4 revealed that 12-month-olds were able to discriminate the two geometric figures in the events. The results are discussed with respect to infants' developing ability to attend to correlations between dynamic and static cues and the mechanism underlying early object concept acquisition.