From world hunger to food sovereignty: food ethics and human development

The role of Amartya Sen's early work on famine notwithstanding, food security is generally seen as but one capability among many for scholars writing in development ethics. The early literature on the ethics of hunger is summarized to show how Sen's Poverty and Famines was written in response to debates of past decades, and a brief discussion of food security as a capability follows. However, Sen's characterization of smallholder food security also supports the development of agency in both a political and an economic sense. Economic agency is discussed and tied to longstanding literatures on the moral significance of farming within political economy. Finally, while the newly emergent literature on food sovereignty includes many themes, it is shown to be re-articulating arguments that stress smallholder's economic agency as a development goal. This pattern of argument thus provides a way to reconcile at least some of the claims being advanced under the banner of food sovereignty with the human development approach, while also restoring food ethics to a more central place in the overall discourse of development ethics.     

市场经济、道德权利与产权伦理

产权伦理是现代市场经济的一个根本性的精神基础,是建立有效的产权制度及其运行机制的重要条件;同时,它是人类道德体系的核心价值理念之一,是基于权利,义务与道德的内在逻辑构建起来的。产权伦理的研究具有重要的理论价值和现实意义,可以构成一门具有特殊的学科特质,研究方法和理论内容的伦理学学科。     

Prospective and retrospective evaluations of experiences: how you evaluate an experience depends on when you evaluate it

Prior research (cf. Soman & Shi, 2001 ) has shown that obstacles and periods of low progress in an experience reduce the evaluation of that experience. In this research, we propose that the temporal distance between the obstacle and the time of making the evaluation moderates the effect of the obstacle. Consequently, an early (late) obstacle reduces prospective (retrospective) evaluation more significantly than a late (early) obstacle. In two experiments, we find support for this temporal proximity hypothesis. Further, differences between prospective and retrospective evaluations disappeared when the data were analyzed in terms of temporal distance, suggesting that the judgment policies underlying prospective and retrospective evaluations were the same. We also show that it is possible to create pairs of paths such that one of the two paths would be preferred when viewed in prospect, but the other path might be preferred in retrospect. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

卫生行政强制与相对人自主权行使的道德缓冲

从卫生行政强制保护公共卫生利益与相对人自主权行使存在的矛盾出发,讨论建立道德缓冲机制解决两者间矛盾的必要性、可能性。阐述卫生行政执法者通过职业道德建设与人文精神关怀,以缓冲执法违法;相对人以道德约束缓冲自主权滥用。     

Getting it Right

In addition to noting significant differences of interpretation between me and Kristopher Norris on understanding classic just war thought and judging its importance, this Comment flags errors of fact and faulty logic in the Norris essay.     

JUST WAR THEORY,HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION,AND THE NEED FOR A DEMOCRATIC FEDERATION

The primary purpose of government is to secure public goods that cannot be achieved by free markets. The Coordination Principle tells us to consolidate sovereign power in a single institution to overcome collective action problems that otherwise prevent secure provision of the relevant public goods. There are several public goods that require such coordination at the global level, chief among them being basic human rights. The claim that human rights require global coordination is supported in three main steps. First, I consider Pogge's and Habermas's analyses as alternatives to Hobbesian conceptions of justice. Second, I consider the core conventions of international law, which are in tension with the primacy of state sovereignty in the UN system. Third, I argue that the just war tradition does not limit just causes for war to self‐defense; it supports saving innocent third parties from crimes against humanity as a just reason for war. While classical authors focused less on this issue, the point is especially clear in twentieth‐century just war theories, such as those offered by the American Catholic bishops, Jean Elshtain, Brian Orend, and Michael Walzer. Against Walzer, I argue that we add intractable military tyranny to the list of horrors meriting intervention if other ad bellum conditions are met. But these results require us to reexamine the “just authority” of first resort to govern such interventions. The Coordination Principle implies that we should create a transnational federation with consolidated powers in place of a treaty organization requiring near‐unanimity. But to be legitimate, such a global institution must also be directly answerable to the citizens of its member states. While the UN Security Council is inadequate on both counts, a federation of democracies with a directly elected executive and legislature could meet both conditions.     

JUST LIES: Finding Augustine's Ethics of Public Lying in His Treatments of Lying and Killing

Augustine famously defends the justice of killing in certain public contexts such as just wars. He also claims that private citizens who intentionally kill are guilty of murder, regardless of their reasons. Just as famously, Augustine seems to prohibit lying categorically. Analyzing these features of his thought and their connections, I argue that Augustine is best understood as endorsing the justice of lying in certain public contexts, even though he does not explicitly do so. Specifically, I show that parallels between his treatments of killing and lying along with his “agent (auctor)–instrument (minister)” distinction, in which God is the true agent or “author” of certain acts and humans are merely God's instruments, together imply that he would regard certain instances of public lying as permissible and even obligatory. I buttress my argument by examining several key but neglected passages and by responding to various objections and rival interpretations. Throughout, I challenge standard interpretations of Augustine's ethics of killing and lying and seek to deepen our overall understanding of these dimensions of his thought. In so doing, I contribute to ongoing discussions of public and private lying and to the task of relating Augustine's thought to contemporary debate and deliberation on war, killing, and lying.     

Authorization and The Morality of War

Why does it matter that those who fight wars be authorized by the communities on whose behalf they claim to fight? I argue that lacking authorization generates a moral cost, which counts against a war's proportionality, and that having authorization allows the transfer of reasons from the members of the community to those who fight, which makes the war more likely to be proportionate. If democratic states are better able than non-democratic states and sub-state groups to gain their community's authorization, this means that some wars will be proportionate if fought by democracies, disproportionate if not.     

Synchronistic mind‐matter correlations in therapeutic practice: a commentary on Connolly (2015)

This commentary adds some ideas and refinements to the inspiring discussion in a recent paper by Connolly ( 2015 ) that makes use of a dual‐aspect framework developed by us earlier. One key point is that exceptional experiences (of which synchronicities are a special case) cannot in general be identified with experiences of non‐categorial or acategorial mental states. In fact, most exceptional experiences reported in the literature are experiences of categorial states. Conversely, there are non‐categorial and acategorial states whose experience is not exceptional. Moreover, the psychodynamics of a synchronistic experience contain a subtle mesh of interacting processes pertaining to categorial, non‐categorial and acategorial domains. We outline how this mesh may be addressed in particular cases of synchronicity described by Connolly.