Conscious thoughts from reflex-like processes: A new experimental paradigm for consciousness research

The contents of our conscious mind can seem unpredictable, whimsical, and free from external control. When instructed to attend to a stimulus in a work setting, for example, one might find oneself thinking about household chores. Conscious content thus appears different in nature from reflex action. Under the appropriate conditions, reflexes occur predictably, reliably, and via external control. Despite these intuitions, theorists have proposed that, under certain conditions, conscious content resembles reflexes and arises reliably via external control. We introduce the Reflexive Imagery Task, a paradigm in which, as a function of external control, conscious content is triggered reliably and unintentionally: When instructed to not subvocalize the name of a stimulus object, participants reliably failed to suppress the set-related imagery. This stimulus-elicited content is considered ‘high-level’ content and, in terms of stages of processing, occurs late in the processing stream. We discuss the implications of this paradigm for consciousness research.     

Prioritizing emergency shelter areas using hybrid multi‐criteria decision approach: A case study

Every year, more than 400 natural disasters affect global population. Adopting a resilient approach strengthens communities to survive and recover well from destabilizing events. Disasters destroy or damage houses and infrastructure, which calls for arrangement of temporary establishments to provide immediate evacuation and shelter to affected population. These sites are vital for an effective relief and must be strategically planned. Communities living in disaster‐prone areas should prepare themselves well in advance for any future catastrophic event. This study adopts a hybrid group decision support approach for emergency shelter site selection problem. Initially, relevant factors for locating potential sites are identified by reviewing extant literature and through consultation from a panel of disaster management experts. Next, fuzzy analytic hierarchy process theory and technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution have been used to prioritize identified criteria and to evaluate potential locations for displacement sites. A case study of the recent Nepal earthquake has been used to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed model. The model offers a resilience building approach to prepare communities for any future contingency by proposing and prioritizing a set of planned displacement sites.     

Rough Sets and 3-Valued Logics

In the paper we explore the idea of describing Pawlak’s rough sets using three-valued logic, whereby the value t corresponds to the positive region of a set, the value f — to the negative region, and the undefined value u — to the border of the set. Due to the properties of the above regions in rough set theory, the semantics of the logic is described using a non-deterministic matrix (Nmatrix). With the strong semantics, where only the value t is treated as designated, the above logic is a “common denominator” for Kleene and Łukasiewicz 3-valued logics, which represent its two different “determinizations”. In turn, the weak semantics—where both t and u are treated as designated—represents such a “common denominator” for two major 3-valued paraconsistent logics. We give sound and complete, cut-free sequent calculi for both versions of the logic generated by the rough set Nmatrix. Then we derive from these calculi sequent calculi with the same properties for the various “determinizations” of those two versions of the logic (including Łukasiewicz 3-valued logic). Finally, we show how to embed the four above-mentioned determinizations in extensions of the basic rough set logics obtained by adding to those logics a special two-valued “definedness” or “crispness” operator.     

Exploring the rabbit hole of possibilities by myself or with my group: The benefits and liabilities of activating counterfactual mind‐sets for information sharing and group coordination

The current experiment explored the effect of activating a counterfactual mind‐set on the discussion of unique information and group judgment accuracy. Evidence suggests that a counterfactual mind‐set is characterized by a focused, analytic mental state and, when activated at the group level, improves group judgment accuracy in the murder mystery paradigm (a hidden profile task). We hypothesized that the beneficial effect of the counterfactual mind‐set would only help group problem‐solving tasks if the mind‐set had been activated at the group level, allowing the analytical mind‐set to play out in an atmosphere of synergistic coordination. In contrast, if this highly focused mental state is activated at the individual level, it could impair group judgment quality because inwardly focused analytical individuals may fail to coordinate their behavior with other group members. Consistent with our hypothesis, activating a counterfactual mind‐set at the individual level had a debilitating effect on the group judgment task, whereas activating a counterfactual mind‐set at the group level had a facilitative effect, increasing information sharing, synergistic coordination and judgment accuracy. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mathematical foundations of consciousness

We employ the Zermelo–Fränkel Axioms that characterize sets as mathematical primitives. The Anti-foundation Axiom plays a significant role in our development, since among other of its features, its replacement for the Axiom of Foundation in the Zermelo–Fränkel Axioms motivates Platonic interpretations. These interpretations also depend on such allied notions for sets as pictures, graphs, decorations, labelings and various mappings that we use. A syntax and semantics of operators acting on sets is developed. Such features enable construction of a theory of non-well-founded sets that we use to frame mathematical foundations of consciousness. To do this we introduce a supplementary axiomatic system that characterizes experience and consciousness as primitives. The new axioms proceed through characterization of so-called consciousness operators. The Russell operator plays a central role and is shown to be one example of a consciousness operator. Neural networks supply striking examples of non-well-founded graphs the decorations of which generate associated sets, each with a Platonic aspect. Employing our foundations, we show how the supervening of consciousness on its neural correlates in the brain enables the framing of a theory of consciousness by applying appropriate consciousness operators to the generated sets in question.     

The Comparative Set Fallacy

This paper argues for the validity of inferences that take the form of: A is more X than B; therefore A and B are both X. After considering representative counterexamples, it is claimed that these inferences are valid if and only if the comparative terms in the inference are taken from no more than one comparative set, where a comparative set is understood to be comprised of a positive, comparative, and superlative, represented as {X, more X than, most X}. In all instances where arguments appearing to be of this form are invalid, it is the case that the argument has fallaciously taken terms from more than one comparative set. The fallacy of appealing to more than one comparative set in an inference involving comparative terms is shown to be analogous to the fallacy of equivocation in argumentation. The paper concludes by suggesting a conflation of logical issues with grammatical issues is the core difficulty leading some to consider inferences in the form of A is more X than B; therefore A and B are X to be invalid.     

False and veridical collaborative recognition

Participants who witness an event and later receive post-event information that omits a critical scene are less likely to recall and to recognise that scene than are participants who receive no post-event information (Wright, Loftus, & Hall, 2001). The present study used the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, in which participants study lists of semantic associates (e.g., hot, snow, warm, winter) that commonly elicit false memories of critical non-presented words (e.g., cold), to determine whether omitting information from a second presentation decreases memory for both presented and non-presented information. Participants were presented with a list of the semantic associates of six non-presented words. For half the participants, this list was presented a second time with the semantic associates of one of the non-presented words omitted. As expected, participants were less likely to recall and to recognise the presented words when they had been omitted from the second presentation. Omission also decreased the rate at which non-presented words were recalled, although false recognition of these words was not reduced. These results suggest that false recognition may be particularly difficult to attenuate and that post-event omission may be more detrimental to memory accuracy than previously thought.     

Help or hinder? When recommendation signage expands consideration sets and heightens decision difficulty

This research examines whether recommendation signage helps or hinders the consumer when faced with choosing from large product assortments. In spite of frequent usage and retailer intuition suggesting that providing recommendation signs (e.g., “Best Seller,” “Award Winner”) should help consumers in the choice process, we propose that signs can hinder choice for consumers with more developed preferences by adding to the complexity and difficulty of the decision process. In three experiments using horizontally differentiated products in multiple categories, we provide evidence that recommendation signs create preference conflict for consumers with more developed preferences, leading these consumers to form larger consideration sets and ultimately experience more difficulty from the decision-making process. In addition, we show that these effects are mitigated for consumers with less developed preferences and when the choice is from a small assortment. The results suggest that recommendation signage may not be an effective tool for aiding choice from large assortments; instead signage can exacerbate the difficulties associated with having too many choices, with implications on purchase quantity.