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21.
Robert John Russell 《Theology & Science》2013,11(4):339-341
AbstractThis article discusses the noteworthy approach of a twentieth-century Muslim scholar, Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (1877–1960), to the issue of Qur'an and science. Nursi points out the “problem of authoritarianism” in both religious and secularist discourses, arguing that many of the clashes between faith and reason result from a misunderstanding of spheres of expertise. Nursi also argues that even at the height of scientific and technological development, the Qur'an remains indispensable in humankind interpreting the world around them. Nursi's case illustrates that the task of relating the modern science and the Qur'an requires attention to their interpretive dimensions. 相似文献
22.
Ted Peters 《Dialog》2013,52(3):244-250
The new Copenhagen School of Deep Incarnation posits that, in Jesus Christ, God has become incarnate and therefore present “in, with, and under” all physical and biological processes. This claim raises the issue of “compatibilism,” according to which divine action and creaturely action are compatible, and “incompatibilism,” according to which divine action must be absent to allow for free creaturely action. Niels Henrik Gregersen, representing the Copenhagen School, affirms both compatibilism at the quantum level of physical activity and incompatibilism at the level of nature's self‐organization. This article points out the incoherence of this position along with the positions proffered by process theologians and kenotic theologians. 相似文献
23.
Lisa Warenski 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(3):403-426
This paper argues that a priori justification is, in principle, compatible with naturalism—if the a priori is understood in
a way that is free of the inessential properties that, historically, have been associated with the concept. I argue that empirical
indefeasibility is essential to the primary notion of the a priori; however, the indefeasibility requirement should be interpreted
in such a way that we can be fallibilist about apriori-justified claims. This fallibilist notion of the a priori accords with
the naturalist’s commitment to scientific methodology in that it allows for apriori-justified claims to be sensitive to further
conceptual developments and the expansion of evidence. The fallibilist apriorist allows that an a priori claim is revisable
in only a purely epistemic sense. This modal claim is weaker than what is required for a revisability thesis to establish
empiricism, so fallibilist apriorism represents a distinct position.
相似文献
Lisa WarenskiEmail: |
24.
John Fennell 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(3):261-292
This paper concerns Quine's stance on the issue of meaning normativity. I argue that three distinct and not obviously compatible positions on meaning normativity can be extracted from his philosophy of language - eliminative ]naturalism (Quine I), deflationary pragmatism (Quine II), and (restricted) strong normativism (Quine III) - which result from Quine's failure to separate adequately four different questions that surround the issue: the reality, source, sense, and scope of the normative dimension. In addition to the incompatibility of the views taken together, I argue on the basis of considerations due to Wittgenstein, Dummett, and Davidson that each view taken separately has self-standing problems. The first two fail to appreciate the ineliminability of the strong normativity of logic and so face a dilemma: they either smuggle it in illicitly, or insofar as they do not, fail to give an account of anything like a language. The third position's mixture of a universalism about logical concepts with a thorough-going relativism about non-logical concepts can be challenged once a distinction is drawn between the universalist and contextualist readings of strong normativity, a distinction inspired by Wittgenstein's distinction between grammatical and empirical judgements. 相似文献
25.
Johanne Stubbe Teglbjærg 《Theology & Science》2013,11(1):19-38
Abstract Through an interpretation of Wolfhart Pannenberg's trinitarian methodology, this article presents the argument that theology and naturalism are ambiguously intertwined and that we once again have to determine how to methodologically address the relationship between theology and science. This study contends that Pannenberg's theology is important for our conception of the dialog between theology and science. However, I wish to offer a fundamentally new interpretation of Pannenberg which locates the ambiguous character of his methodology primarily in the substantive issue with which it deals. This redirects the dialogue between theology and science through Pannenberg's hermeneutic of history towards the contemporary phenomenology of the body and ultimately to the suggestion of a trinitarian-phenomenological approach beyond the methodology of Pannenberg. 相似文献
26.
Dermot Moran 《Continental Philosophy Review》2008,41(4):401-425
Throughout his career, Husserl identifies naturalism as the greatest threat to both the sciences and philosophy. In this paper, I explicate Husserl’s overall diagnosis and critique
of naturalism and then examine the specific transcendental aspect of his critique. Husserl agreed with the Neo-Kantians in rejecting naturalism. He has three major critiques of naturalism:
First, it (like psychologism and for the same reasons) is ‘countersensical’ in that it denies the very ideal laws that it needs for its own justification.
Second, naturalism essentially misconstrues consciousness by treating it as a part of the world. Third, naturalism is the
inevitable consequence of a certain rigidification of the ‘natural attitude’ into what Husserl calls the ‘naturalistic attitude’.
This naturalistic attitude ‘reifies’ and it ‘absolutizes’ the world such that it is treated as taken-for-granted and ‘obvious’.
Husserl’s transcendental phenomenological analysis, however, discloses that the natural attitude is, despite its omnipresence
in everyday life, not primary, but in fact is relative to the ‘absolute’ transcendental attitude. The mature Husserl’s critique
of naturalism is therefore based on his acceptance of the absolute priority of the transcendental attitude. The paradox remains that we must start from and, in a sense, return to the natural attitude, while, at the same time, restricting
this attitude through the on-going transcendental vigilance of the universal epoché.
相似文献
Dermot MoranEmail: |
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28.
Mark T. Nelson 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(3):265-281
I begin by asking the meta-epistemological question, 'What is justification?', analogous to the meta-ethical question, 'What is rightness?' I introduce the possibility of non-cognitivist, naturalist, non-naturalist, and eliminativist answers in meta-epistemology,corresponding to those in meta-ethics. I devote special attention to the naturalistic hypothesis that epistemic justification is identical to probability, showing its antecedent plausibility. I argue that despite this plausibility, justification cannot be identical with probability, under the standard interpretation of the probability calculus, for the simple reason that justification can increase indefinitely but probability cannot. I then propose an alternative model for prima facie justification, based on an analogy with Ross's account of prima facie obligation, arguing that this model illuminates the differences between justification and probability and, given the plausible assumption of epistemic pluralism, explains them as well. 相似文献
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30.
Don Garrett 《Synthese》2006,152(3):301-319
Hume is a naturalist in many different respects and about many different topics; this paper argues that he is also a naturalist about intentionality and representation. It does so in the course of answering four questions about his theory of mental representation: (1) Which perceptions represent? (2) What can perceptions represent? (3) Why do perceptions represent at all? (4) Howdo perceptions represent what they do? It appears that, for Hume, all perceptions except passions can represent; and they can represent bodies, minds, and persons, with their various qualities. In addition, ideas can represent impressions and other ideas. However, he explicitly rejects the view that ideas are inherently representational, and he implicitly adopts a view according to which things (whether mental or non-mental) represent in virtue of playing, through the production of mental effects and dispositions, a significant part of the causal and/or functional role of what they represent. It is in virtue of their particular functional roles that qualitatively identical ideas are capable of representing particulars or general kinds; substances or modes; relations; past, present, or future; and individuals or compounds. 相似文献