The Argument from Moral Experience

It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and talking about morality, has a certain objective-seeming character to it, and that this supports a presumption in favor of objectivist theories (according to which morality is a realm of facts or truths) and against anti-objectivist theories like Mackie’s error theory (according to which it is not). In this paper, I argue that our experience of morality does not support objectivist moral theories in this way. I begin by arguing that our moral experience does not have the uniformly objective-seeming character it is typically claimed to have. I go on to argue that even if moral experience were to presuppose or display morality as a realm of fact, we would still need a reason for taking that to support theories according to which it is such a realm. I consider what I take to be the four most promising ways of attempting to supply such a reason: (A) inference to the best explanation, (B) epistemic conservatism, (C) the Principle of Credulity, and (D) the method of wide reflective equilibrium. In each case, I argue, the strategy in question does not support a presumption in favor of objectivist moral theories.

Interactivism: A manifesto

The interactivist model has grown over the last several decades from a narrower initial beginning into an evolving systematic theory and underlying philosophy. It has been induced to do so because the underlying assumptions that framed the beginnings of the model were fundamentally different from those that are dominant throughout psychology, cognitive science, and philosophy. Consequently, the model faced multiple instances of attempting to integrate with literature in neighboring fields, discovering that such integration was not possible because the basic assumptions were not compatible, and having to either give up on the model thus far constructed, or else extend it in a way consistent with those assumptions into those neighboring (and foundational) domains. This manifesto outlines the resultant interactivist framework, presents some of the arguments for its underlying assumptions, and argues that these avoid problems that are fatal for many standard approaches in the literature.     

Clients’ in-session acceptance and cognitive defusion behaviors in acceptance-based treatment of tinnitus distress

Cognitive-behavioral treatment (CBT) is considered to be an effective treatment of distress associated with tinnitus (perception of internal noises without any outer auditory stimulation), but the processes by which the therapy works remain unclear. Mindfulness and acceptance is receiving increased attention in the treatment literature for chronic medical conditions. However, few studies have examined these and related processes with behavioral or observer measures. In the present study 57 videotapes (a total of 1710 min) from 19 clients who participated in a controlled trial of an acceptance-based treatment for tinnitus distress, were coded for frequency and peak level of verbal behaviors expressing either acceptance or cognitive defusion. Frequency of cognitive defusion behaviors and peak level of cognitive defusion as well as peak level of acceptance rated in Session 2, predicted symptom reduction 6 month following treatment. These relationships were not accounted for by the improvement that had occurred prior to the measurement point of the process variables. Moreover, prior symptom changes could not predict process variables rated later in therapy (after most of the improvement in therapy had occurred). Thus, clients’ in-session acceptance and cognitive defusion behaviors appear to play an important role in the reduction of negative impact of tinnitus.     

Précis of <Emphasis Type="Italic">A Virtue Epistemology</Emphasis> (Oxford University Press, 2007)

This is a summary of A Virtue Epistemology, the book that is the subject of this book symposium.     

Replies to commentators on <Emphasis Type="Italic">A Virtue Epistemology</Emphasis> (Oxford University Press, 2007)

Paul Boghossian discusses critically my account of intuition as a source of epistemic status. Stewart Cohen takes up my views on skepticism, on dreams, and on epistemic competence and competences and their relation to human knowledge. Hilary Kornblith focuses on my animal/reflective distinction, and, along with Cohen, on my comparison between how dreams might mislead us and how other bad epistemic contexts can do so. In this paper I offer replies to my three critics.

A process-based model for an interactive ontology

The paper proposes a process-based model for an ontology that encompasses the emergence of process systems generated by increasingly complex levels of organization. Starting with a division of processes into those that are persistent and those that are fleeting, the model builds through a series of exclusive and exhaustive disjunctions. The crucial distinction is between those persistent and cohesive systems that are energy wells, and those that are far-from-equilibrium. The latter are necessarily open; they can persist only by interaction with their environments. Further distinctions, developed by means of the notions of self-maintenance and error detection, lead to the identification of complex biological organisms that are flexible learners, some of which are self-conscious and form themselves into social institutions. This model provides a non-reductive model for understanding human beings as both embodied and yet emergent. In particular, it provides a way of characterizing action as ‘metaphysically deep’, not an ontological embarrassment within an otherwise physicalist world.     

Collaborative Helping: A Practice Framework for Family-Centered Services

This article offers a framework for collaborative family-centered practice that can reinvigorate our work with families who have not responded to more traditional approaches. Collaborative Helping is grounded in family-centered principles that include: striving for cultural curiosity, believing in resourcefulness, working in partnership, and making our work more accountable to the clients we serve. The article introduces collaborative inquiry as an organizing metaphor for clinical practice and offers a five-step practice framework with clinical illustrations and sample questions. The framework draws from appreciative inquiry, motivational interviewing, the signs of safety approach to child protection work, and solution-focused and narrative therapies.     

Synchronicity and moments of meeting

Abstract :  The paper ¹ considers the role of synchronicity in the establishment of meaning in analysis, and links it to the notion of moments of meeting proposed by the Boston Process of Change Study Group. In so doing, the paper proposed to view synchronicity as an element in developmental processes, wherein attributions of meaningfulness are made in relation to patterns of action that do not have intrinsic meaning, but which have evolved in an environment of meaning, thereby bootstrapping the infant into the world of meaning. Jung's paradigmatic example of synchronicity—the scarab beetle event—is examined in this context and the argument is made that the event was primarily meaningful for Jung and carried with it important countertransference implications that Jung did not consider. The paper concludes with some suggestions for further investigation into the relationship between synchronicity and clinical practice.     

The many faces of the Still-Face Paradigm: A review and meta-analysis

The Still-Face Paradigm (SFP) designed by Tronick, Als, Adamson, Wise, and Brazelton (Tronick, E., Als, H., Adamson, L., Wise, S., & Brazelton, T. B. (1978). Infants response to entrapment between contradictory messages in face-to-face interaction. Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 17, 1–13) has been used for many different purposes in over 80 empirical studies. In the current paper, the nature and correlates of infant behavior in the SFP were examined in a systematic narrative review and a series of meta-analyses. The results of the meta-analyses confirmed the classic still-face effect of reduced positive affect and gaze, and increased negative affect, as well as a partial carry-over effect into the reunion episode consisting of lower positive and higher negative affect compared to baseline. The still-face effect is very robust as it was found regardless of most sample variations such as infant gender and risk status, and regardless of most procedural variations, such as the length of the SFP episodes and the use of intervals between episodes. The few moderator effects that were found in the meta-analyses tended to put findings from the narrative review in a new perspective. Additional meta-analyses confirmed the narrative review in finding that higher maternal sensitivity predicted more infant positive affect during the still-face. Infants’ higher positive affect and lower negative affect during the still-face were predictive of secure attachment at age 1 year. The meta-analytic results for maternal depression were equivocal. Implications for future research include a need for studies testing the role of the adults’ identity (parent versus stranger, mother versus father) to elucidate the relationship-specificity of the still-face effect. Also, the role of maternal sensitivity and temperament as potential moderators of the still-face effect need to be examined further. On a procedural level, the effects of the timing of the still-face and of the duration of the reunion on infant responses deserve future research attention.     

No Time, No Wholes: A Temporal and Causal-Oriented Approach to the Ontology of Wholes

What distinguishes a whole from an arbitrary sum of elements? I suggest a temporal and causal oriented approach. I defend two connected claims. The former is that existence is, by every means, coextensive with being the cause of a causal process. The latter is that a whole is the cause of a causal process with a joint effect. Thus, a whole is something that takes place in time. The approach endorses an unambiguous version of Restricted Composition that suits most commonsensical intuitions about wholes.