Literature,Ethics, and Richard Rorty’s Pragmatist Theory of Interpretation

This article considers the validity and strength of Richard Rorty’s pragmatist theory of interpretation in the light of two ethical issues related to literature and interpretation. Rorty’s theory is rejected on two grounds. First, it is argued that his unrestrained account of interpretation is incompatible with the distinctive moral concerns that have been seen to restrict the scope and nature of valid approaches to artworks. The second part of the paper claims that there is no indispensable relationship between supporting Rorty’s pragmatist theory of interpretation and the important place that is attached to literature in the liberal society outlined by him. A reading of Donald Davidson’s texts on literary language and interpretation implies that an intentionalist theory of interpretation can accommodate those features that Rorty values in literature as well.

Optimism and pessimism as predictors of physical and psychological health among grandmothers raising their grandchildren

This study examines the role of personality in predicting psychological and physical health among grandmothers who are coping with a non-normative non-traumatic stressor, i.e. serving as primary caregivers for their grandchildren. Using the Life Orientation Test-Revised (LOT-R), a measure of personality disposition, we examine the contributions of both optimism and pessimism to health outcomes. ANOVAs and regression analyses of the LOT-R and self reports of health in 67 African American and Latino grandmothers revealed psychological (obsessive compulsive symptoms, depression, hostility) and physical (sleep disorder, hypertension) health outcomes are differentially predicted by optimism and pessimism among older and younger age-groups of grandmothers. Implications for grandmothers’ response to caregiving stress and for future studies of personality’s relation to health are discussed.     

Acquired flavour preferences: contextual control of adaptation-level effects

This experiment investigated the role of context in the expression of conditioned flavour preferences. Rats were trained on a mixture of almond and sucrose and were then given intermixed exposures to almond in one context (Context A) and to sucrose in a second context (Context S). Finally, choice tests were given in both contexts, with one group given almond-versus-water tests and the other almond + sucrose-versus-sucrose tests. Preference for almond over water was greater in Context A than in Context S. Conversely, preference for almond + sucrose over sucrose was greater in Context S than in Context A. These results suggest that the perceived sweetness of a flavour depends on the context in which it is presented and confirm that expression of a flavour preference depends on the type of test employed.     

The Role of the Humanities and Social Sciences in Nanotechnology Research and Development

The experience with genetically modified foods has been prominent in motivating science, industry and regulatory bodies to address the social and ethical dimensions of nanotechnology. The overall objective is to gain the general public’s acceptance of nanotechnology in order not to provoke a consumer boycott as it happened with genetically modified foods. It is stated implicitly in reports on nanotechnology research and development that this acceptance depends on the public’s confidence in the technology and that the confidence is created on the basis of information, education, openness and debate about scientific and technological developments. Hence, it is assumed that informing and educating the public will create trust, which will consequently lead to an acceptance of nanotechnology. Thus, the humanities and social sciences are seen as tools to achieve public acceptance. In this paper, the author argues that this is a narrow apprehension of the role of the humanities and social sciences. The humanities and social sciences have a critical function asking fundamental questions and informing the public about these reflections. This may lead to scepticism, however, the motivation for addressing the social and ethical dimensions of nanotechnology should not be public acceptance but informed judgement. The author illustrates this critical function by discussing the role, motivation and contribution of ethics as an example. Lastly, the author shows that a possible strategy for incorporating the humanities and the social sciences into nanotechnology research and development is Real-Time Technology Assessment, where the purpose is to integrate natural science and engineering investigations with ethical, legal and social science from the outset.

How Should We Do Nanoethics? A Network Approach for Discerning Ethical Issues in Nanotechnology

There is no agreement on how nanoethics should proceed. In this article I focus on approaches for discerning ethical issues in nanotechnology, which is as of yet one of the most difficult and urging tasks for nanoethics. I discuss and criticize two existing approaches for discerning ethical issues in nanotechnology and propose a network approach as alternative. I discuss debates in nanoethics about the desirable role of ethics in nanotechnological development and about the newness of ethical issues in nanotechnology. On basis of a critical analysis of both debates, I formulate a number of desiderata for a method for discerning ethical issues in nanotechnology and argue that the network approach that my colleagues and I have developed for ethical issues in research and development networks is also appropriate in nanotechnology.

Risk Management Principles for Nanotechnology

Risk management of nanotechnology is challenged by the enormous uncertainties about the risks, benefits, properties, and future direction of nanotechnology applications. Because of these uncertainties, traditional risk management principles such as acceptable risk, cost–benefit analysis, and feasibility are unworkable, as is the newest risk management principle, the precautionary principle. Yet, simply waiting for these uncertainties to be resolved before undertaking risk management efforts would not be prudent, in part because of the growing public concerns about nanotechnology driven by risk perception heuristics such as affect and availability. A more reflexive, incremental, and cooperative risk management approach is required, which not only will help manage emerging risks from nanotechnology applications, but will also create a new risk management model for managing future emerging technologies.     

Nanotechnology, Enhancement, and Human Nature

Is nanotechnology-based human enhancement morally permissible? One reason to question such enhancement stems from a concern for preserving our species. It is harder than one might think, however, to explain what could be wrong with altering our own species. One possibility is to turn to the environmental ethics literature. Perhaps some of the arguments for preserving other species can be applied against nanotechnology-based human enhancements that alter human nature. This paper critically examines the case for using two of the strongest arguments in the environmental ethics literature to show that nanotechnology-based human enhancements are impermissible: 1) Our species, like many other naturally occurring species, has aesthetic value. So, nanotechnology-based human enhancements that alter our species should be prohibited. 2) Our species plays valuable ecological roles. Nanotechnology-based human enhancements that alter our species are likely to interfere with our species playing our ecologically valuable roles. So, such enhancements should be prohibited. Neither argument, ultimately, proves conclusive. The paper concludes, however, that considerations underlying both arguments may show us that some nanotechnology-based human enhancements are impermissible.     

Is language necessary for human spatial reorientation? Reconsidering evidence from dual task paradigms

Being able to reorient to the spatial environment after disorientation is a basic adaptive challenge. There is clear evidence that reorientation uses geometric information about the shape of the surrounding space. However, there has been controversy concerning whether use of geometry is a modular function, and whether use of features is dependent on human language. A key argument for the role of language comes from shadowing findings where adults engaged in a linguistic task during reorientation ignored a colored wall feature and only used geometric information to reorient [Hermer-Vazquez, L., Spelke, E., & Katsnelson, A. (1999). Sources of flexibility in human cognition: Dual task studies of space and language. Cognitive Psychology, 39, 3-36]. We report three studies showing: (a) that the results of Hermer-Vazques et al. [Hermer-Vazquez, L., Spelke, E., & Katsnelson, A. (1999). Sources of flexibility in human cognition: Dual task studies of space and language. Cognitive Psychology, 39, 3-36] are obtained in incidental learning but not with explicit instructions, (b) that a spatial task impedes use of features at least as much as a verbal shadowing task, and (c) that neither secondary task impedes use of features in a room larger than that used by Hermer-Vazquez et al. These results suggest that language is not necessary for successful use of features in reorientation. In fact, whether or not there is an encapsulated geometric module is currently unsettled. The current findings support an alternative to modularity; the adaptive combination view hypothesizes that geometric and featural information are utilized in varying degrees, dependent upon the certainty and variance with which the two kinds of information are encoded, along with their salience and perceived usefulness.     

The psychology of meta-ethics: exploring objectivism

How do lay individuals think about the objectivity of their ethical beliefs? Do they regard them as factual and objective, or as more subjective and opinion-based, and what might predict such differences? In three experiments, we set out a methodology for assessing the perceived objectivity of ethical beliefs, and use it to document several novel findings. Experiment 1 showed that individuals tend to regard ethical statements as clearly more objective than social conventions and tastes, and almost as objective as scientific facts. Yet, there was considerable variation in objectivism, both across different ethical statements, and across individuals. The extent to which individuals treat ethical beliefs as objective was predicted by the way they grounded their ethical systems. Groundings which emphasize the religious, pragmatic, and self-identity underpinnings of ethical belief each independently predicted greater ethical objectivity. Experiment 2 replicated and extended these findings with a refined measure of ethical objectivism. Experiment 3 demonstrated the robustness of the religious grounding of ethics, and differentiates it from mere religious belief and from political orientation. The results shed light on the nature of ethical belief, and have implications for the resolution of ethical disputes.     

Frames of reference for the light-from-above prior in visual search and shape judgements

Faced with highly complex and ambiguous visual input, human observers must rely on prior knowledge and assumptions to efficiently determine the structure of their surroundings. One of these assumptions is the 'light-from-above' prior. In the absence of explicit light-source information, the visual system assumes that the light-source is roughly overhead. A simple, low-cost strategy would place this 'light-from-above' prior in a retinal frame of reference. A more complex, but optimal strategy would be to assume that the light-source is gravitationally up, and compensate for observer orientation. Evidence to support one or other strategy from psychophysics and neurophysiology has been mixed. This paper pits the gravitational and retinal frames against each other in two different visual tasks that relate to the light-from-above prior. In the first task, observers had to report the presence or absence of a target where distractors and target were defined purely by shading. In the second task, observers made explicit shape judgements of similar stimuli. The orientation of the stimuli varied across trials and the observer's head was fixed at 0, +/-45 or +/-60 degrees . In both tasks the retinal frame of reference dominated. Visual search behaviour with shape-from-shading stimuli (SFS) was modulated purely by stimulus orientation relative to the retina. However, the gravitational frame of reference had a significant effect on shape judgements, with a 30% correction for observer orientation. In other words, shading information is processed quite differently depending on the demands of the current task. When a 'quick and dirty' representation is required to drive fast, efficient search, that is what the visual system provides. In contrast, when the task is to explicitly estimate shape, extra processing to compensate for head orientation precedes the perceptual judgment. These results are consistent with current neurophysiological data on SFS if we re-frame compensation for observer orientation as a cue-combination problem.