汉语发展性阅读障碍儿童视觉同时性加工技能子成分的发展及其与阅读的关系

通过分别以高频汉字(实验1)和图形非言语材料(实验2)为刺激的两个联合视觉注意任务, 并采用基于Budensen视觉注意理论的参数估计方法, 系统地探查小学三~六年级汉语发展性阅读障碍儿童的视觉同时性加工技能缺陷的内在机制。以43名汉语发展性阅读障碍儿童和46名生理年龄匹配典型发展儿童为被试, 每类被试均被分为小学中年级组(三、四年级)和高年级组(五、六年级)。两个实验均发现不同年级组的阅读障碍儿童在知觉加工速度参数上显著小于控制组儿童。在空间注意分布权重参数上, 实验1的结果显示, 不同于控制组儿童向左侧化发展的注意分布模式, 两个年级组的阅读障碍儿童均表现为无偏的注意分布; 而实验2未发现显著组别差异。且这两种同时性加工子技能分别与不同水平的汉语阅读技能密切相关。结果表明, 汉语阅读障碍儿童在同时加工多个视觉刺激时存在持续的知觉加工速度缓慢的问题, 在同时加工言语类刺激时还表现出异常的空间注意分布模式。本研究有助于从基础认知层面揭示汉语发展性阅读障碍儿童的缺陷机理, 为进一步设计相关的提高阅读效率的干预方案提供理论依据。     

The Role of Executive Function and Theory of Mind in Pragmatic Computations

In sentences such as “Some dogs are mammals,” the literal semantic meaning (“Some and possibly all dogs are mammals”) conflicts with the pragmatic meaning (“Not all dogs are mammals,” known as a scalar implicature). Prior work has shown that adults vary widely in the extent to which they adopt the semantic or pragmatic meaning of such utterances, yet the underlying reason for this variation is unknown. Drawing on theoretical models of scalar implicature derivation, we explore the hypothesis that the cognitive abilities of executive function (EF) and theory of mind (ToM) contribute to this observed variation. In Experiment 1, we show that individuals with better ToM are more likely to compute a scalar implicature and adopt the pragmatic meaning of an utterance; however, EF makes no unique contribution to scalar implicature comprehension after accounting for ToM. In Experiment 2, we replicate this finding and assess whether it generalizes to the comprehension of other pragmatic phenomena such as indirect requests (e.g., “It's hot in here” uttered to ask for something to be done) and metaphor (e.g., “to harvest courage”). This is the first evidence that differences in ToM are associated with pragmatic competence in neurotypical adults across distinct pragmatic phenomena.     

Neurodualism: People Assume that the Brain Affects the Mind more than the Mind Affects the Brain

People commonly think of the mind and the brain as distinct entities that interact, a view known as dualism. At the same time, the public widely acknowledges that science attributes all mental phenomena to the workings of a material brain, a view at odds with dualism. How do people reconcile these conflicting perspectives? We propose that people distort claims about the brain from the wider culture to fit their dualist belief that minds and brains are distinct, interacting entities: Exposure to cultural discourse about the brain as the physical basis for the mind prompts people to posit that mind–brain interactions are asymmetric, such that the brain is able to affect the mind more than vice versa. We term this hybrid intuitive theory neurodualism. Five studies involving both thought experiments and naturalistic scenarios provided evidence of neurodualism among laypeople and, to some extent, even practicing psychotherapists. For example, lay participants reported that “a change in a person's brain” is accompanied by “a change in the person's mind” more often than vice versa. Similarly, when asked to imagine that “future scientists were able to alter exactly 25% of a person's brain,” participants reported larger corresponding changes in the person's mind than in the opposite direction. Participants also showed a similarly asymmetric pattern favoring the brain over the mind in naturalistic scenarios. By uncovering people's intuitive theories of the mind–brain relation, the results provide insights into societal phenomena such as the allure of neuroscience and common misperceptions of mental health treatments.     

社交媒体使用与错失焦虑的关系：一项元分析

社交媒体使用与错失焦虑均是当下生活中较为常见的现象, 诸多研究探讨了两者间的内在联系, 但研究结果却存在很大差异。为明确两者之间的整体关系, 以及产生分歧的原因, 对检索后获得的65项研究(70个独立样本)使用随机效应模型进行了元分析。结果发现：社交媒体使用与错失焦虑存在显著正相关(r = 0.38, 95% CI [0.34, 0.41]); 二者的相关强度受社交媒体使用测量指标和社交媒体类型的调节, 但不受性别、年龄、错失焦虑测量工具和个体主义指数的调节。结果一定程度上澄清了大众传播的社会认知理论和数字恰到好处假说的争论, 表明社交媒体使用程度越高的人往往也会伴随着较高水平的错失焦虑。防止社交媒体过度使用, 尤其是引导大众合理使用以图像为中心并且开放度较高的社交媒体有助于错失焦虑的缓解。     

Choosing what to choose from: Preference for inclusion over exclusion when constructing consideration sets from large choice sets

Decision making is a two‐stage process, consisting of, first, consideration set construction and then final choice. Decision makers can form a consideration set from a choice set using one of two strategies: including the options they wish to further consider or excluding those they do not wish to further consider. The authors propose that decision makers have a relative preference for an inclusion (vs. exclusion) strategy when choosing from large choice sets and that this preference is driven primarily by a lay belief that inclusion requires less effort than exclusion, particularly in large choice sets. Study 1 demonstrates that decision makers prefer using an inclusion (vs. exclusion) strategy when faced with large choice sets. Study 2 replicates the effect of choice set size on preference for consideration set construction strategy and demonstrates that the belief that exclusion is more effortful mediates the relative preference for inclusion in large choice sets. Studies 3 and 4 further support the importance of perceived effort, demonstrating a greater preference for inclusion in large choice sets when decision makers are primed to think about effort (vs. accuracy; Study 3) and when the choice set is perceived as requiring more effort because of more information being presented about each alternative (vs. more alternatives in the choice set; Study 4). Finally, Study 5 manipulates consideration set construction strategy, showing that using inclusion (vs. exclusion) in large choice sets leads to smaller consideration sets, greater confidence in the decision process, and a higher quality consideration set.     

What is philosophy as a way of life? Why philosophy as a way of life?

Despite a recent surge of interest in philosophy as a way of life, it is not clear what it might mean for philosophy to guide one's life, or how a “philosophical” way of life might differ from a life guided by religion, tradition, or some other source. We argue against John Cooper that spiritual exercises figure crucially in the idea of philosophy as a way of life—not just in the ancient world but also today, at least if the idea is to be viable. In order to make the case we attempt to clarify the nature of spiritual exercises, and to explore a number of fundamental questions, such as “What role does reason have in helping us to live well?” Here we distinguish between the discerning and motivational powers of reason, and argue that both elements have limitations as guides to living well.     

Intersections of personal vs. collective trauma during the COVID-19 pandemic: the hijacking of the human imagination

This paper explores how the deadly shadow of COVID-19 passing over the Earth constitutes a collective trauma that frequently opens up or ‘triggers’ un-remembered personal trauma, and it provides clinical examples of these intersections. The paper further explores how the human imagination, which we normally utilize to make meaning out of traumatic experience, can be hijacked by fear – leading to avoidance of suffering and to illusory formulations and alternative realities such as conspiracy theories. Alternatively, the imagination can be employed in more realistic and creative ways – leading through conscious suffering to healing and wholeness. Which path the imagination takes is shown to depend on the capacity of individuals to feel the full reality of the human condition in general and the exquisite vulnerability of our existence as fragile human beings at this moment in history. Ernest Becker’s analysis of our ‘denial of death’ and his urgency to embrace our common human vulnerability is explored in relation to Jung’s early tendency to deny the body. The author proposes that the more creative uses of the imagination, connected to a more humble and realistic apprehension of our common destiny, may be seen in the ‘Black Lives Matter’ movement that swept the world in the aftermath of the COVID-19 outbreak.