Parent-report measure of Theory of Mind: Adaptation to Polish of the Children’s Social Understanding Scale

The main aim of the study was to investigate whether the Children’s Social Understanding Scale (CSUS), a parent report technique, is a valid and reliable measure of Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities in Polish-speaking children. Additionally, the role of language abilities in ToM development was explored. A group of 225 parents of approximately 3.5-year-old Polish children was tested using the Polish version of the CSUS. Their children were tested with a word comprehension test and five behavioural ToM tasks. Satisfactory psychometric properties of the Polish CSUS were observed and positive correlations between the CSUS and behavioural ToM tasks were found. A two-factor structure was found in the CSUS: Mental State Talk (MST) and Mental State Comprehension. The MST factor was significantly related to word comprehension. The utility of the Polish version of the CSUS for future cross-cultural research with this population is discussed.     

Plans or Outcomes: How Do We Attribute Intelligence to Others?

Humans routinely make inferences about both the contents and the workings of other minds based on observed actions. People consider what others want or know, but also how intelligent, rational, or attentive they might be. Here, we introduce a new methodology for quantitatively studying the mechanisms people use to attribute intelligence to others based on their behavior. We focus on two key judgments previously proposed in the literature: judgments based on observed outcomes (you're smart if you won the game) and judgments based on evaluating the quality of an agent's planning that led to their outcomes (you're smart if you made the right choice, even if you didn't succeed). We present a novel task, the maze search task (MST), in which participants rate the intelligence of agents searching a maze for a hidden goal. We model outcome-based attributions based on the observed utility of the agent upon achieving a goal, with higher utilities indicating higher intelligence, and model planning-based attributions by measuring the proximity of the observed actions to an ideal planner, such that agents who produce closer approximations of optimal plans are seen as more intelligent. We examine human attributions of intelligence in three experiments that use MST and find that participants used both outcome and planning as indicators of intelligence. However, observing the outcome was not necessary, and participants still made planning-based attributions of intelligence when the outcome was not observed. We also found that the weights individuals placed on plans and on outcome correlated with an individual's ability to engage in cognitive reflection. Our results suggest that people attribute intelligence based on plans given sufficient context and cognitive resources and rely on the outcome when computational resources or context are limited.     

A developmental shift in processes underlying successful belief-desire reasoning

Young children's failures in reasoning about beliefs and desires, and especially about false beliefs, have been much studied. However, there are few accounts of successful belief-desire reasoning in older children or adults. An exception to this is a model in which belief attribution is treated as a process wherein an inhibitory system selects the most likely content for the belief to be attributed from amongst several competing contents [Leslie, A. M., & Polizzi, P. (1998). Developmental Science, 1, 247-254]. We tested this model with an ‘avoidance false belief task’ in which subjects predict the behavior of a character, who wants to avoid an object but who is mistaken about which of three locations it is in. The task has two equally correct answers—in seeking to avoid the location where she mistakenly believes the object to be, the character might equally go to the location where the object actually is, or to the remaining empty location. However, the model predicts that subjects will prefer one of these answers, selecting the object's actual location over the empty location. This bias was confirmed in a series of five experiments with children aged between 4 and 8 years of age. A sixth experiment ruled out two rival explanations for children's biased responding. Two further experiments found the opposite bias in adults. These findings support one selection model as an account of belief-desire reasoning in children, and suggest that a different model is needed for adults. The process of selecting contents for mental state attributions shows a developmental shift between 8 years of age and adulthood.     

Children’s attributions of beliefs to humans and God: cross-cultural evidence

The capacity to attribute beliefs to others in order to understand action is one of the mainstays of human cognition. Yet it is debatable whether children attribute beliefs in the same way to all agents. In this paper, we present the results of a false-belief task concerning humans and God run with a sample of Maya children aged 4-7, and place them in the context of several psychological theories of cognitive development. Children were found to attribute beliefs in different ways to humans and God. The evidence also speaks to the debate concerning the universality and uniformity of the development of folk-psychological reasoning.     

Creative Moments in Relational-Cultural Therapy

SUMMARY

Creative moments in therapy are those occasions when something new and growth-fostering occurs. This article offers three illustrations and a discussion of these characteristics. It is based on a panel discussion held at the Stone Center-Harvard Medical School/Cambridge Hospital “Learning from Women Conference” in April, 2000.     

From false belief to friendship: Commentary on Fink,Begeer, Peterson,Slaughter, and de Rosnay

Fink, Begeer, Peterson, Slaughter, and de Rosnay (Brit. J. Dev. Psychol, 2015; 33, 1–17) represent a welcome contribution in providing empirical evidence of the link from false belief understanding at Time 1 to mutual friendship 2 years later, controlling for several other possible contributors. This opens a new and important line of inquiry into the practical significance of a Theory of Mind. As is typical of pioneering research, further study is needed to address some issues; here, we point out some of these issues and then briefly discuss the broader implications of Fink et al.'s findings.     

Random word generation reveals spatial encoding of syllabic word length

Existing random number generation studies demonstrate the presence of an embodied attentional bias in spontaneous number production corresponding to the horizontal Mental Number Line: Larger numbers are produced on right-hand turns and smaller numbers on left-hand turns (Loetscher et al.,2008, Curr. Biol., 18, R60). Furthermore, other concepts were also shown to rely on horizontal attentional displacement (Di Bono and Zorzi, 2013, Quart. J. Exp. Psychol., 66, 2348). In two experiments, we used a novel random word generation paradigm combined with two different ways to orient attention in horizontal space: Participants randomly generated words on left and right head turns (Experiment 1) or following left and right key presses (Experiment 2). In both studies, syllabically longer words were generated on right-hand head turns and following right key strokes. Importantly, variables related to semantic magnitude or cardinality (whether the generated words were plural-marked, referred to uncountable concepts, or were associated with largeness) were not affected by lateral manipulations. We discuss our data in terms of the ATOM (Walsh, 2015, The Oxford handbook of numerical cognition, 552) which suggests a general magnitude mechanism shared by different conceptual domains.     

Learning at the Margin: New Models of Strength

SUMMARY

This article was originally presented at the April, 2000 Learning from Women Conference sponsored by the Harvard Medical School and the Jean Baker Miller Training Institute. It explores the ways in which marginalization and the use of power-over maneuvers and privilege contribute to disconnection at a personal and societal level. Strength in vulnerability is proposed as an alternative to strength in isolation. The author suggests that courage is created in connection and the distorting effects of the myth of the separate-self must be challenged in order to appreciate the power of connection. This article examines specific ways to resist the disconnecting and disempowering effects of hyper-individualistic values both in and out of therapy.     

Holding multiple category representations: The role of age,theory of mind,and rule switching in children’s developing cross-classification abilities

Cross-classification, the ability to categorize multifaceted entities in many ways, is a remarkable cognitive milestone for children. Past work has focused primarily on documenting the timeline for when children reach cross-classification competence. However, it is not well understood what cognitive factors underpin children’s improvements. The current study aimed to examine the contributions of age, theory of mind, and rule switching to children’s cross-classification development. We tested 3- to 5-year-old children (N = 75) using a cross-classification task, the Theory of Mind Task Battery, and the Three-Dimensional Change Card Sort test. The results revealed that age and theory of mind predict children’s cross-classification over and above the effects of rule switching. The results also revealed that advanced-level theory of mind reasoning is a particularly strong predictor of cross-classification development. These findings increase understanding of cross-classification within children’s broader cognitive development.