Shrinkage in the perceived duration of speech and tone by acoustic replacement1

Abstract: To investigate mechanisms for perceiving the duration of an auditory event, an effect of perceptual grouping upon perceived duration was studied psychophysically. In the first experiment, the perceived duration of a spoken word was measured under three conditions of acoustic continuity (i.e., (a) intact, (b) noise‐replaced, and (c) gap‐replaced) as a function of the duration of the target stimulus. Under the noise‐replaced condition, a portion of the target stimulus was physically replaced with a noise burst. Under the gap‐replaced condition, the replacement was made with a gap. The gap‐replacement resulted in a prominent shrinkage of the perceived duration. In the case of noise‐replacement, the amount of shrinkage was moderate but highly significant, although the word employed was perceived to be phonetically intact. Independent of this effect of replacement, the amount of shrinkage was also affected by the physical duration of the target stimulus. The second experiment tested an effect of noise replacement on the perceived duration of a tone burst. In this case, the noise replacement also shrunk the perceived duration of the non‐speech stimulus. This noise‐induced shrinkage could be regarded as being general for the auditory duration. The phenomenon is discussed in relation to a revised model for perceived duration.     

Experience and Theory

N. R. Hanson's discussion of experience is criticized. Experience, though necessary for knowing, is insufficient as a basis for understanding in either science or religion. Experience alone can be misleading. We may begin with experience, but we cannot claim to understand until experience has been mediated by theory. The article is excerpted from Metaphoric Process: The Creation of Scientific and Religious Understanding (Gerhart and Russell 1984), Chapter 2.     

Beyond illusion: Psychoanalysis and the question of religious truth1

In this paper the author critically examines the nature of the positive, reconciliatory attitude towards religion that has become increasingly prevalent within psychoanalytic thinking and writing over the past 20 years. She shows how this positive attitude rests on a change in the nature of the prototype of religion and its reassignment to the realm of illusion, thus making irrelevant an issue most central both to psychoanalysis and to traditional Judeo‐Christian belief ‐ the passionate search for truth. The author demonstrates how the concern with truth, and specifically with the truth of religious claims, lies at the basis of the opposition between psychoanalysis and religion but, paradoxically, also provides the common ground for dialogue between the two. She argues that, as Freud developed his ideas regarding the origin of conviction in religious claims in his Moses and monotheism (1939), the nature of this common ground was expanded and the dialogue became potentially more meaningful. The author concludes that meaningful dialogue emerges through recognition of fundamental differences rather than through harmonisation within a realm of illusion. In this light, the present study may also be seen as an attempt to recognise fundamental differences that have been evolving within psychoanalysis itself.     

高低自我监控者在不同互动情境中的被洞悉错觉

用Snyder的自我监控量表,从大学生中筛选出典型高低自我监控者。要求他们不动声色地喝下1杯醋和4杯水,而后,让观众根据他们的表现去辨别饮料的味道,并让被试预测可能猜中的人数。在实验1中,被试和观众以录像为媒介间接的互相推测;在实验2中,被试和观众现场直接的互相推测。两个实验都包括高低自我监控者各21名。实验结果表明,自我监控水平对被洞悉错觉有明显的影响,在直接和间接两种互动情境中,低自我监控者的被洞悉错觉都比高自我监控者强烈。互动情境对高自我监控者有明显的影响,在间接的互动中,高自我监控者出现了明显的被洞悉错觉;而在直接的互动情境中,低自我监控者的被洞悉错觉依然非常明显,高自我监控者则趋于消失     

利用反诱导消除McCollough效应

ＭｃＣｏｌｌｏｕｇｈ效应在完全黑暗和自然视觉条件下的消退过程很缓慢,而利用同频补色条栅来进行反诱导,能在十几分钟内消除显色效应。消除所用时间与反诱导条栅的亮度、颜色和栅条间距（空间频率）有关。进一步说明导致ＭｃＣｏｌｌｏｕｇｈ效应恢复平衡的主要因素跟网膜刺激方式有关。     

Illusory line motion and transformational apparent motion during continuous flash suppression1

A static bar is perceived to dynamically extend from a peripheral cue (illusory line motion (ILM)) or from a part of another figure presented in the previous frame (transformational apparent motion (TAM)). We examined whether visibility for the cue stimuli affected these transformational motions. Continuous flash suppression, one kind of dynamic interocular masking, was used to reduce the visibility for the cue stimuli. Both ILM and TAM significantly occurred when the d' for cue stimuli was zero (Experiment 1) and when the cue stimuli were presented at subthreshold levels (Experiment 2). We discuss that higher‐order motion processing underlying TAM and ILM can be weakly but significantly activated by invisible visual information.     

The moving rubber hand illusion revisited: Comparing movements and visuotactile stimulation to induce illusory ownership

The rubber hand illusion is a perceptual illusion in which a model hand is experienced as part of one’s own body. In the present study we directly compared the classical illusion, based on visuotactile stimulation, with a rubber hand illusion based on active and passive movements. We examined the question of which combinations of sensory and motor cues are the most potent in inducing the illusion by subjective ratings and an objective measure (proprioceptive drift). In particular, we were interested in whether the combination of afferent and efferent signals in active movements results in the same illusion as in the purely passive modes. Our results show that the illusion is equally strong in all three cases. This demonstrates that different combinations of sensory input can lead to a very similar phenomenological experience and indicates that the illusion can be induced by any combination of multisensory information.     

The use of realistic and mechanical hands in the rubber hand illusion,and the relationship to hemispheric differences

Embodiment, as measured through the rubber-hand illusion (RHI), depends on the similarity between object to be embodied and part of the body it replaces. We compared a fake hand similar to a real hand, and one matched in size but made of wires (mechanical). Left and right versions were tested to investigate whether the effect of appearance was stronger in the left hand. We found that the mechanical hand induced embodiment, though to a reduced degree relative to the realistic hand (N = 120). Left and right versions of the mechanical hand did not differ in strength of the illusion. However, with the left realistic hand there was a stronger relationship between drift (an objective measure of the illusion) and agreement on the questionnaire (subjective experience). With the mechanical hand, objective and subjective measures were unrelated. We discuss the results in relation to factors that influence the RHI and hemispheric differences.     

Memory and the Moses illusion: Failures to detect contradictions with stored knowledge yield negative memorial consequences

Although contradictions with stored knowledge are common in daily life, people often fail to notice them. For example, in the Moses illusion, participants fail to notice errors in questions such as “How many animals of each kind did Moses take on the Ark?” despite later showing knowledge that the Biblical reference is to Noah, not Moses. We examined whether error prevalence affected participants' ability to detect distortions in questions, and whether this in turn had memorial consequences. Many of the errors were overlooked, but participants were better able to catch them when they were more common. More generally, the failure to detect errors had negative memorial consequences, increasing the likelihood that the errors were used to answer later general knowledge questions. Methodological implications of this finding are discussed, as it suggests that typical analyses likely underestimate the size of the Moses illusion. Overall, answering distorted questions can yield errors in the knowledge base; most importantly, prior knowledge does not protect against these negative memorial consequences.     

The dark side of cognitive illusions: When an illusory belief interferes with the acquisition of evidence‐based knowledge

Cognitive illusions are often associated with mental health and well‐being. However, they are not without risk. This research shows they can interfere with the acquisition of evidence‐based knowledge. During the first phase of the experiment, one group of participants was induced to develop a strong illusion that a placebo medicine was effective to treat a fictitious disease, whereas another group was induced to develop a weak illusion. Then, in Phase 2, both groups observed fictitious patients who always took the bogus treatment simultaneously with a second treatment which was effective. Our results showed that the group who developed the strong illusion about the effectiveness of the bogus treatment during Phase 1 had more difficulties in learning during Phase 2 that the added treatment was effective.