Age-related differences in the visual processes implied in perception and action: distance and location parameters

The aim of the two present experiments was to examine the ontogenetic development of the dissociation between perception and action in children using the Duncker illusion. In this illusion, a moving background alters the perceived direction of target motion. Targets were held stationary while appearing to move in an induced displacement. In Experiment 1, 30 children aged 7, 9, and 12 years and 10 adults made a perceptual judgment or pointed as accurately as possible, with their index finger, to the last position of the target. The 7-year-old children were more perceptually deceived than the others by the Duncker illusion but there were no differences for the goal-directed pointing movements. In Experiment 2, 50 children aged 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 years made a perceptual judgment or reproduced as accurately as possible, with a handle, the distance traveled by the target. Participants were perceptually deceived by the illusion, judging the target as moving although it was stationary. When reproducing the distance covered by the target, children were unaffected by the Duncker illusion. Our results suggest that the separation of the allocentric visual perception pathway from the egocentric action pathway occurs before 7 years of age.     

Is the sense of bodily ownership related to pre-reflective bodily awareness? A reply to Kuhle

There are two ways in which we are aware of our bodies: reflectively, when we attend to them, and pre-reflectively, a kind of marginal awareness that pervades regular experience. However, there is an inherent issue with studying bodily awareness of the pre-reflective kind: given that it is, by definition, non-observational, how can we observe it? Kuhle claims to have found a way around this problem—we can study it indirectly by investigating an aspect of reflective bodily awareness: the sense of bodily ownership. Unfortunately, I argue, there is little reason to believe a relationship between pre-reflective bodily awareness and the sense of bodily ownership exists. Until more work is done, pre-reflective bodily awareness remains beyond our empirical grasp.     

A Müller-Lyer-type illusion of egocentric distance with 3D convex and concave objects

An illusion of egocentric distance with concave and convex objects at a distance of 135 cm is reported. When the centre of a concave object was viewed with both eyes its surface appeared nearer than the centre of the surface of a convex object at the same distance. The distortion was about two per cent of the viewing distance with right-angle objects and about five per cent with hemicylindrical objects. The distortion was slightly reduced when size cues for distance were attached to the surfaces of the objects, absent with monocular viewing, greater with convex than with concave objects, and occurred with the generally convex surface of a model human face. Possible explanations of the findings are discussed.     

A strange hand: On self-recognition and recognition of another

This article provides a phenomenological analysis of the difference between self-recognition and recognition of another, while referring to some contemporary neuroscientific studies on the rubber hand illusion. It examines the difference between these two forms of recognition on the basis of Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s work. It argues that both phenomenologies, despite their different views on inter-subjectivity, allow for the specificity of recognition of another. In explaining self-recognition, however, Husserl’s account seems less convincing. Research concerning the rubber hand illusion has confirmed that self-recognition involves more than an immediate experience of oneself. Merleau-Ponty’s later work, describing self-recognition as the result of assimilative identification, will be used to explain the possibility of illusion between one’s “hereness” and “thereness”. The possibility of this illusion is inherent to self-recognition, while it is lacking in recognition of another.

How is Recalcitrant Emotion Possible?

A recalcitrant emotion is an emotion that we experience despite a judgment that seems to conflict with it. Having been bitten by a dog in her childhood, Jane cannot shake her fear of dogs, including Fido, the cute little puppy that she knows to be in no way dangerous. There is something puzzling about recalcitrant emotions, which appear to defy the putatively robust connection between emotions and judgments. If Jane really believes that Fido cannot harm her, what is she afraid of? This article seeks to show how recalcitrant emotion is possible. I argue that reductive theories that identify emotions with judgments, desires, or some combination thereof, cannot explain the possibility of emotional irrationality without contradiction. I then show that the appeal to sui generis attitudes also fails to solve the puzzle of recalcitrant emotions, and diagnose this failure as stemming from a misleading analogy between emotions and perceptions, and in particular, between recalcitrant emotions and perceptual illusions. The solution can be found in a different analogy: between emotions and actions; more specifically, between recalcitrant emotions and weakness of the will, akrasia. Like akratic actions, recalcitrant emotions entail responding to reasons, but to inferior reasons. Irrational but non-contradictory emotions are possible just as weakness of will is possible.