Symptom reduction and termination: client change and therapist identified reasons for saying goodbye

Empirical efforts have focused on predicting whether or not clients prematurely terminate therapy, with nonattendance of last session equated to premature termination. However, this fails to explore the relationship between clients’ distress reduction and reasons for termination. With this study, we aimed to understand how clients’ distress change relates to premature termination and examine clients’ distress change in conjunction with therapists’ perceptions of termination reasons. We collected data from 797 clients who prematurely terminated or attended termination but completed therapy a minimum of three individual sessions provided by 38 therapists. Clients completed an assessment of psychological symptoms before each session. At the end of treatment, therapists identified the reasons they believed termination occurred for all clients in the sample. Results demonstrate that total sessions attended and missed predict premature termination, whereas distress change does not. Additionally, clients who were believed to accomplish goals do show greater change. However, therapists’ indicated that over half of clients did not reach goals at termination and they did not perceive nonattendance at last session to equate to drop out in all cases. Implications are discussed with respect to understanding why clients’ terminate, therapeutic goal conceptualization, and review of goals during termination in time-limited psychotherapy.     

Epistemic Justice and a Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing

The dual aim of this article is to reveal and explain a certain phenomenon of epistemic injustice as manifested in testimonial practice, and to arrive at a characterisation of the anti–prejudicial intellectual virtue that is such as to counteract it. This sort of injustice occurs when prejudice on the part of the hearer leads to the speaker receiving less credibility than he or she deserves. It is suggested that where this phenomenon is systematic it constitutes an important form of oppression.     

Objective and epistemic gradability: Is the new angle on the Knobe effect empirically grounded?

According to the New Angle, any explanation of the Knobe effect must be gradable and asymmetric. It has been argued that only Hindriks’ approach meets both criteria. First, we argue that Holton’s hypothesis also meets the criteria. Second, we show that the authors are not justified in taking the criteria to be empirically justified. We have failed to replicate the asymmetry result in two experiments. Moreover, gradability can be objective or epistemic. We show that the New Angle presupposes objective gradability. In our experiments, the patterns of responses to questions about epistemic and objective gradability are the same, irrespective of whether the feature is objectively gradable (e.g., blameworthiness) or not (e.g., intentionality). Our results thus question the extent to which the New Angle is empirically grounded. Moreover, they raise doubt whether the answers to questions about epistemic and objective gradability can be taken at face value at all.

Abbreviations: NRH - normative reasons hypothesis; NVH - norm violation hypothesis; DQ - degree question; DAQ - degree of agreement question     

How permissive consent works

Consent that is voluntary, informed and given by a competent person sometimes transforms a wrong into a right act. How does consent that meets these requirements change the moral property of an act, namely that of being a wronging of a person? This is the question this paper will deal with. Some authors argue that valid consent changes the moral property of an act by changing the reasons which speak against the act. This account of the normative force of consent will be critically examined and rejected. An alternative model will then be put forward and defended according to which consent changes the moral property of an act if and only if the wrong-making property of the act is that it is not consented to. The upshot will be that consent does not eliminate the wrong-making property if the unconsented act is wrong for other reasons than not being consented to.     

Remarks on the psycho-logic of action

The present paper is a discussion of Jan Smedslund's main action axiom (4.3.1) in Psycho-logic. I have interpreted the axiom in two different ways: a) as a presupposition about the determinants of action, and b) as a definition of highest expected utility. My conclusion is that taken as a supposition about the determinants of action, 4.3.1 is basically right, though not in the form it has in Psychologic. 4.3.1 taken as a definition, on the other hand, is basically wrong.     

Eudaimonism and the Ground of Normative Reasons

This essay develops an argument against eudaimonism in support of John Hare's earlier critique of eudaimonism. In contrast to Hare, who mounts a Kantian-Scotist objection to what he calls a single-source view of motivation in eudaimonism, my critique of eudaimonism focuses on the ground of normative reasons in eudaimonism while also taking a page from Scotus's ethics. I argue that the main issue with eudaimonism is with the ultimate end and manner of our willing, which fails to correspond to the right ordering of love based on the nature of goodness in the object.     

What use has approved

The meaning of a word is given by a customary rule for its use. I defend that claim and explain its implications by a comparison with customary rules in law. I address two problems about customary rules: first, how can the mere facts of social practice yield a norm? Secondly, how can we explain disagreement about the requirements of a custom, if those requirements are determined by the shared practice of the participants in a community? These problems can be resolved in a way that illuminates customary rules, and helps to explain the relation between the meaning of a word and the customary rule for its use. The meaning of a word is the usefulness that it has because of the customary rule for its use.