Sense of body ownership in patients affected by functional motor symptoms (conversion disorder)

Background and aimPatients with functional neurological symptoms are commonly seen in neurological practice. Nevertheless their aetiopathology remains unclear. We have recently shown that patients affected by functional motor symptoms (FMS) present lower interoceptive awareness and higher alexithymia levels than healthy controls. Nevertheless sense of body ownership has never been studied in FMS patients.The aim of the present study was to systematically investigate the sense of body ownership, with the rubber hand illusion (RHI) paradigm, in patients with FMS and healthy controls.Materials and methodsWe included in the study 16 patients with FMS and 18 healthy controls (HC). Patients and HC were asked to complete the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20) and the self-consciousness scale (self-objectification questionnaire). All participants underwent the RHI paradigm: illusionary experience was measured by self-report and by proprioceptive alteration.ResultsA Mann–Whitney U test performed revealed that FMS (median = 2.11) participants embodied the rubber hand to the same extent than HC participants (median = 2.0, Z = −0.86, p > 0.05, r = −0.15). The same test revealed no significant difference in the Proprioceptive Drift experience between FMS (median = 0.0) and HC participants (median = −0.5, Z = −0.96, p > 0.05, r = −0.16).ConclusionsOur study revealed that sense of body ownership is not impaired in patients affected by FMS. This, together with the results from our previous experiment (studying the interoceptive awareness), supports the hypothesis that interoceptive awareness and sense of body ownership may be dissociated in patients with FMS.     

自我表征的可塑性:基于橡胶手错觉的研究

自我识别是人类自我觉知的行为标记。传统方法认为稳定的自我表征是自我识别的基础。随着对橡胶手错觉及一系列自我表征和自我识别错觉的揭示,这一能让人将外部客体感知为自身一部分的错觉研究使得我们能够以多感官整合的方式来研究自我表征和自我识别。拥有感和自主感被认为是我们进行自我识别的两类基本体验,本文对一系列橡胶手错觉范式研究的系统回顾表明,拥有感和自主感会发生改变,这说明人的自我表征是可变的和可塑的。     

Illusion of safety? Safety-related perceptions of pedestrians and car drivers around 3D crosswalks

Facilitating safe pedestrian road crossings is a major prerequisite for safe urban environments. In multiple cities around the world, 3D crosswalks have been painted, which provoke an optical illusion, of e.g., a crosswalk floating above the road, in car drivers who approach the crosswalk. However, to date, no detailed study of road users’ safety related perceptions on 3D crosswalks has been conducted. Hence, we investigated car drivers’ and pedestrians’ perceptions of a 3D crosswalk, and how they rate its safety in comparison to traditional (non-3D illusion) crosswalks. In an on-site questionnaire survey, we interviewed 201 pedestrians and 102 car drivers in the direct vicinity of a newly painted 3D crosswalk located in Yangon, Myanmar. Our results show that only 53.9 % of the car drivers report to have consciously perceived the 3D effect of the crosswalk. Nonetheless, both, pedestrians and car drivers rate the 3D crosswalk as safer for road crossing than a traditional crosswalk. A high share of pedestrians (43.3 %) report taking a detour to use the 3D crosswalk for road crossing. Approximately one third (31.3 %) of pedestrians and 48.0 % of car drivers interviewed have talked to their friends about the 3D crosswalk, indicating a high potential for using 3D crosswalks as a marketing tool for road safety actors to generate attention for pedestrian safety. Unrelated to our main research question, we found that pedestrians prefer to cross in groups, as it increases the perceived likelihood of cars yielding to them. Overall, the data points to significant increases in the perceived safety of drivers as well pedestrians around the 3D crosswalk. Future studies need to investigate how these perceptions translate to actual safety related behavior.     

The Goldilocks Problem of the specificity of visual phenomenal content

Existentialist accounts maintain that visual phenomenal content takes the logical form of an existentially quantified sentence. These accounts do not make phenomenal content specific enough. Singularist accounts posit a singular content in which the seen object is a constituent. These accounts make phenomenal content too specific. My account gets the specificity of visual phenomenal content just right. My account begins with John Searle's suggestion that visual experience represents an object as seen, moves this relation outside the scope of the existential quantifier and then replaces it with the relation of objects being ‘present as accessible’, as described by Alva Noë.     

Book Review

Abstract

Case vignettes are offered to illustrate five principles of self psychological treatment the author believes are generally accepted by self psychologists. A sixth principle is included, contributed by self psychologists informed by intersubjectivity. They are:

1. The centrality of the empathic vantage point for analytic observation. This requires a shift in the listening stance from observing from the outside to observing from the inside. The analyst attempts to listen from within the context of the analysand's subjective reality in order to understand his experience.

2. Alterations in the sense of self must be recognized and understood.

3. When ruptures occur between patient and analyst (selfobject bond), such ruptures are analyzed.

4. From a technical point of view, the careful exploration of both the state of the selfobject bond, and the meanings to the patient of the analytic activity needs to be carefully examined and understood by both patient and analyst.

5. Defensive activities are thought to be undertaken in the service of psychological survival.

6. A deeply entrenched defensive structure may appear as a resistance to progress in treatment. Such pathological structures of accommodation function to dismantle progress in self delineation.     

‘The Egg of Columbus’?How Fourier's social theory exerted a significant (and problematic) influence on the formation of Marx's anthropology and social critique

In scholarship on the history of philosophy, it is widely assumed that Charles Fourier was a utopian socialist who could not have exerted a significant influence on the development of Karl Marx's thought. Indeed, both Marx and Engels seem to have advanced this view. In contrast, I argue that in 1844 when Marx was developing his anthropology and social critique, he relied upon Fourier's thought to supply a key assumption. After establishing this connection, I explain why Marx's tacit reliance on Fourier creates a problematic undercurrent in his thought.     

An Ultra‐Realist Theory of Perception

In this paper I argue for a theory of perception distinct both from classical sense‐datum theories and from intentionalist theories, that is theories according to which one perceives external objects by dint of a relation with a propositional content. The alternative I propose completely rejects any representational element in perception. When one sees that an object has a property, the situation or state of affairs of its having that property is one's perception, so that the object and property are literally part of one's mind. The most obvious objection to this view is that it embodies a rampant form of idealism. It is argued to the contrary, via consideration of the metaphysics of situations, that the theory is entirely consistent with a robustly realist view of the world.     

The composite face illusion: A whole window into our understanding of holistic face perception

Two identical top halves of a face are perceived as being different when their bottom halves belong to different faces, showing that the parts of a face cannot be perceived independently from the whole face. When this visual illusion is inserted in a matching task, observers make more mistakes and/or are slower at matching identical top face halves aligned with different bottom halves than when the bottom halves are spatially offset: The composite face effect. This composite face paradigm has been used in more than 60 studies that have provided information about the specificity and nature of perceptual integration between facial parts (“holistic face perception”), the impairment of this process in acquired prosopagnosia, its developmental course, temporal dynamics, and neural basis. Following a review of the main contributions made with the paradigm, I explain its rationale and strengths, and discuss its methodological parameters, making a number of proposals for its optimal use and refinement in order to improve our understanding of holistic face perception. Finally, I explain how this standard composite face paradigm is fundamentally different than the application to facial parts of a congruency/interference paradigm that has a long tradition in experimental psychology since Stroop (1935), and which was originally developed to measure attentional and response interference between different representations rather than perceptual integration. Moreover, a version of this congruency/interference paradigm used extensively over the past years with composite faces lacks a baseline measure and has decisional, attentional, and stimulus confounds, making the findings of these studies impossible to interpret in terms of holistic perception. I conclude by encouraging researchers in this field to concentrate fully on the standard composite face paradigm, gaze contingency, and other behavioural measures that can help us take one of the most important challenges of visual perception research: Understanding the neural mechanisms of holistic face perception.     

Holistic face perception: Mind the gap!

The most widely used measurement of holistic face perception, the composite face effect (CFE), is challenged by two apparently contradictory goals: having a defined face part (i.e., the top half), and yet perceiving the face as an integrated unit (i.e., holistically). Here, we investigated the impact of a small gap between top and bottom face halves in the standard composite face paradigm, requiring matching of sequentially presented top face halves. In Experiment 1, the CFE was larger for no-gap than gap stimuli overall, but not for participants who were presented with gap stimuli first, suggesting that the area of the top face half was unknown without a gap. This was confirmed in Experiment 2, in which these two stimulus sets were mixed up: the gap stimuli thus provided information about the area of a top face half and the magnitude of the CFE did not differ between stimulus sets. These observations indicate that the CFE might be artificially inflated in the absence of a stimulus cue that objectively defines a border between the face halves. Finally, in Experiment 3, observers were asked to determine which of two simultaneously presented faces was the composite face. Perceptual judgements for no-gap stimuli approached ceiling; however, with a gap, participants were almost unable to distinguish the composite face from a veridical face. This effect was not only due to low-level segmentation cues at the border of no-gap face halves, because stimulus inversion decreased performance in both conditions. This result indicates that the two halves of different faces may be integrated more naturally with a small gap that eliminates an enhanced contrast border. Collectively, these observations suggest that a small gap between face halves provides an objective definition of the face half to match and is beneficial for valid measurement of the behavioural CFE.