Can you tickle yourself if you swap bodies with someone else?

The effect of the body transfer illusion on the perceived strength of self- and externally-generated “tickle” sensations was investigated. As expected, externally generated movement produced significantly higher ratings of tickliness than those associated with self-generated movements. Surprisingly, the body transfer illusion had no influence on the ratings of tickliness, suggesting that highly surprising, and therefore hard to predict, experiences of body image and first-person perspective do not abolish the attenuation of tickle sensations. In addition, evidence was found that a version of the rubber hand illusion exists within the body transfer illusion. We situate our findings within the larger debate over sensory attenuation: (1) there is an attenuation of prediction errors that depends upon the context in which sensory input is predicted (i.e., efference copy), and (2) sensory attenuation is a necessary consequence of self-generated movement irrespective of context (i.e., active inference). The results support the notion of active inference.     

Higher-order cognitive factors affect subjective but not proprioceptive aspects of self-representation in the rubber hand illusion

In the current study we look at whether subjective and proprioceptive aspects of selfrepresentation are separable components subserved by distinct systems of multisensory integration. We used the rubber hand illusion (RHI) to draw the location of the ‘self’ away from the body, towards extracorporeal space (Out Condition), thereby violating top-down information about the body location. This was compared with the traditional RHI which drew position of the ‘self’ towards the body (In Condition). We were successfully able to draw proprioceptive position of the limbs in and out from the body suggesting body perception is a purely bottom-up process, resistant to top-down effects. Conversely, we found subjective self-representation was altered by the violation of top-down body information – as the strong association of subjective and proprioceptive factors found in the In Condition became non-significant in the Out Condition. Interestingly, we also found evidence that subjective embodiment can modulate tactile perception.     

Body-ownership for actively operated non-corporeal objects

Rubber-hand and virtual-hand illusions show that people can perceive body ownership for objects under suitable conditions. Bottom-up approaches assume that perceived ownership emerges from multisensory matching (e.g., between seen object and felt hand movements), whereas top-down approaches claim that novel body parts are integrated only if they resemble some part of a permanent internal body representation. We demonstrate that healthy adults perceive body ownership for a virtual balloon changing in size, and a virtual square changing in size or color, in synchrony with movements of their real hand. This finding is inconsistent with top-down approaches and amounts to an existence proof that non-corporeal events can be perceived as body parts if their changes are systematically related to one’s actions. It also implies that previous studies with passive-stimulation techniques might have underestimated the plasticity of body representations and put too much emphasis on the resemblance between viewed object and real hand.     

Feeling the burn: When it looks like it hurts,and belongs to me,it really does hurt more

We examined changes in pain sensitivity in the rubber hand illusion (RHI). Experiment 1 investigated changes in pain tolerance immediately after a “healthy” and “wounded” RHI when immersing the hand in a cold pressor ice bath. There was 19% increased pain tolerance and increased perception detection threshold after the healthy RHI, but 11% reduction after the wounded RHI. Experiment 2 examined pain experience during the wounded RHI with capsaicin-induced hyperalgesia. Pain intensity and unpleasantness was higher on the illusion arm during the synchronous RHI, compared with asynchronous trials. There was no change in pain experience on the control arm, and both arms had similar pain sensitivity after the experiment. Our results highlight the impact of embodying a substitute limb on pain, with increased tolerance and reduced tactile sensitivity when the fake limb is healthy and apparently pain-free, but increased pain sensitivity when the self-attributed limb appears to be wounded.     

Frustration and disappointment

The paper describes research on children’s responses to failures of gratification. Although this has always been an important area of consideration in psychoanalytic thinking, arguments are put forward for the child’s actual feelings of disappointment being significant in ways that have yet to be fully realised theoretically and clinically within Kleinian object relations. Since Freud first used the term ‘frustration’, it has been applied in psychoanalysis as a means by which to describe in an undifferentiated way all those responses to failures of gratification that have an aggressive content. It will be argued that, in a context of the historical shift in thinking from drive to relational models, there is now perhaps scope to posit the existence instead of two discrete object relational positions towards such failures of aim – that frustrated responses can be differentiated in important structural and developmental ways from disappointed ones, by suggesting that the former are schizoid, whilst the latter are depressive in quality. To try and begin to test the hypothesis that there might be an object relational distinction between feelings of frustration and feelings of disappointment, selected process notes from two training cases became the subject of a combined piece of clinical and theoretical research. I will outline how this research was undertaken and present the findings that arose from the clinical part of it. With the use of a content analysis, a method for gathering interesting quantitative data about the children’s various responses to the failures of gratification was arrived at.     

The present and absent object—on thinking and the capacity to symbolize

In this paper, Bion's different theories on the development of thinking will be introduced: on the one hand, his theory of thoughts as resulting from tolerance for the absence of the object, and on the other hand, dream thoughts and thoughts as resulting from the presence of the object, originally through the mother's containing function. The effects of failures in this development will be discussed; among other things, a hypertrophy of the apparatus of projective identification at the expense of thinking capacities. Briefly, a comparison will be made between a facilitating relation between container and contained and the oscillation between the paranoid-schizoid and depressive position, which Bion describes as a prerequisite for open symbolizing processes. Bion's theories and concepts will be supplemented by Winnicott's theories on the “creative illusion” and the breast/the mother as a “subjective object” as a precondition for the symbolizing capacity that later develops in the “potential space”. Very briefly, a comparison is made between Winnicott's term “the subjective object” and Segal's term “symbolic equation”. Clinical vignettes are interpolated.     

幸福的体验效用与非理性决策行为的偏差机制

基于体验效用的幸福包括预期幸福、即时幸福和回忆幸福,这三者有极其重要的本质差异,导致决策偏差和非理性。本研究运用行为科学和认知神经科学相结合的研究方法,首次从行为层次—信息加工层次—脑神经层次三个层面,立体地开展幸福感的体验效用与非理性决策行为研究。研究计划分为三个部分:(1)预期幸福、即时幸福和回忆幸福的本质特点和行为规律;(2)三种体验效用产生偏差的认知心理机制;(3)体验效用与非理性决策偏差的脑神经机制。通过系列研究,拟解决三个关键问题:(1)在人类判断与决策过程中,预期、即时和回忆三种效用是如何影响人们的判断与决策?(2)三种体验效用出现偏差的信息加工特点和脑神经机制究竟是什么?(3)三种效用的偏差规律及对政府公共政策的启示。对这些问题的深入探讨,不仅对决策理论研究的发展是一个贡献;对政府管理制定有效的公共政策,避免"牺牲体验追求指标",解决"幸福悖论",同样有很强的实践指导意义。     

Hornsby and Baker on the physicalist orthodoxy

I examine some recent claims put forward by L. A. Paul, Barry Dainton and Simon Prosser, to the effect that perceptual experiences of movement and change involve an (apparent) experience of ‘passage’, in the sense at issue in debates about the metaphysics of time. Paul, Dainton and Prosser all argue that this supposed feature of perceptual experience – call it a phenomenology of passage – is illusory, thereby defending the view that there is no such a thing as passage, conceived of as a feature of mind-independent reality. I suggest that in fact there is no such phenomenology of passage in the first place. There is, however, a specific structural aspect of the phenomenology of perceptual experiences of movement and change that can explain how one might mistakenly come to the belief that such experiences do involve a phenomenology of passage.     

Multisensory integration in the Müller-Lyer illusion: From vision to haptics

The Müller-Lyer figure is a powerful illusion in both vision and touch, although it is still unclear whether the visual and haptic illusory effects are due to modality-specific or shared processes. In order to investigate the hypothesis of a common underlying mechanism, the performance of 24 undergraduates in a manual bisection task of the Judd variant of the Müller-Lyer figure was assessed under visual, haptic, and visuo-haptic presentations (Experiment 1). In the bimodal condition participants saw the arrowheads on the front and touched the shaft on the back of a stimulus-supporting board. Illusory effects were comparable in touch and vision and were present, albeit reduced, in the bimodal visuo-haptic condition. In Experiment 2 we used the bimodal task of Experiment 1, manipulating the spatial position of the horizontal shaft on the backside of the board. The visual arrowheads affected haptic bisection, bringing about the illusory effects, only when the shaft was aligned with them. In conclusion, illusory effects transfer cross-modally from vision to haptics only in the presence of spatial coincidence, which appears to be a crucial factor for cross-modal integration. Implications for multisensory processes are discussed.