On the New Form of Human Advancement and the Shared Values of Humanity—From the Perspective of the Relations Between Particularity and Universality

The relation between particularity and universality provides an important perspective to understand a new form of human advancement and the shared values of humanity, as well as their relations. On the one hand, as a unique state of civilization, a new form of human advancement is universal to a principle extent. China is moving closer to the center of the world; it will only give its particularity only if it can create universality since human universality is the essential attribute of socialism. A new form of human advancement also addresses universal problems facing mankind, embraces existing cultures, and coexists with them in harmony. On the other hand, as a reference to universal value, the shared values of humanity are precisely based on the particularity of “realistic man.” The difference is a premise that fundamentally defines how common is possible. Humanity is in the complex relationship between various groups and individual subjects, whose common values have the nature of good means to serve the universal purpose, and whose essence is the public value in the international community. Both a new form of human advancement and the shared values of humanity highlight the principal position of China. The connotation of the shared values of humanity constitutes the fundamental component of the core values of a new form of human advancement which in turn implements the shared values of humanity. Carrying forward the shared values of humanity poses higher requirements for China to develop a new form of human advancement.     

The Shared Values of Humanity and Its Philosophical Implications: From the Perspective of Civilization

The concept of the shared values of humanity, embodying the spirit of putting people first and solving real-life problems, is of great significance for constructing a new global order and building a human community with a shared future. The shared values of humanity respect the differences in understanding and realization paths of different civilizations, and seek common grounds with an inclusive and open attitude. The core socialist values are an embodiment and an extension of the shared values of humanity. The fine traditional Chinese culture has also laid a profound cultural basis for the pursuit of the shared values of humanity, enabling us to make up a better scheme for building a human community with a shared future from the perspective of civilization.     

For the greater goods? Ownership rights and utilitarian moral judgment

People often judge it unacceptable to directly harm a person, even when this is necessary to produce an overall positive outcome, such as saving five other lives. We demonstrate that similar judgments arise when people consider damage to owned objects. In two experiments, participants considered dilemmas where saving five inanimate objects required destroying one. Participants judged this unacceptable when it required violating another’s ownership rights, but not otherwise. They also judged that sacrificing another’s object was less acceptable as a means than as a side-effect; judgments did not depend on whether property damage involved personal force. These findings inform theories of moral decision-making. They show that utilitarian judgment can be decreased without physical harm to persons, and without personal force. The findings also show that the distinction between means and side-effects influences the acceptability of damaging objects, and that ownership impacts utilitarian moral judgment.     

Transfer effects between moral dilemmas: A causal model theory

Evaluations of analogous situations are an important source for our moral intuitions. A puzzling recent set of findings in experiments exploring transfer effects between intuitions about moral dilemmas has demonstrated a striking asymmetry. Transfer often occurred with a specific ordering of moral dilemmas, but not when the sequence was reversed. In this article we present a new theory of transfer between moral intuitions that focuses on two components of moral dilemmas, namely their causal structure and their default evaluations. According to this theory, transfer effects are expected when the causal models underlying the considered dilemmas allow for a mapping of the highlighted aspect of the first scenario onto the causal structure of the second dilemma, and when the default evaluations of the two dilemmas substantially differ. The theory’s key predictions for the occurrence and the direction of transfer effects between two moral dilemmas are tested in five experiments with various variants of moral dilemmas from different domains. A sixth experiment tests the predictions of the theory for how the target action in the moral dilemmas is represented.     

Client as Expert: Incorporating Spirituality Using the Tree Ring Technique

Addressing spirituality with clients from diverse spiritual backgrounds is a facet of culturally competent and ethical practice, yet various obstacles contribute to spirituality being overlooked. This article features a counseling technique used with clients who are experiencing difficulty with issues of a spiritual nature. Based on constructivist principles, the tree ring technique provides a context and process for examining clients’ spiritual conflicts, whereby the client is the expert and the counselor adopts a not‐knowing stance.     

The Black Church,Values, and Secular Counseling: Implications for Counselor Education and Practice

There has been a recent increase in the amount of attention given in the counseling literature to addressing clients’ religion and spirituality. However, Black American churchgoers are rarely the target population in the discourse, and little is known about how the Black church shapes their views. This article provides information on values of the Black church and the church's influence on Black American churchgoers regarding secular counseling. Implications for counselor education and practice are discussed.     

Moral cognition,affect, and psychopathy

Few theorists would challenge the idea that affect and emotion directly influence decision-making and moral judgment. There is good reason to think that they also significantly assist in decision-making and judgment, and in fact are necessary for fully effective moral cognition. However, they are not sufficient. Deliberation and more reflective thought processes likewise play a crucial role, and in fact are inseparable from affective processes. I will argue that while the dual-process account of moral judgment set forth by Craigie (2011) has great merit, it fails to appreciate fully the extent to which affective and reflective processes are not only integrated, but also mutually interdependent. Evidence from psychopathy indicates that when reflective processes are not assisted adequately by what I will call ‘affective framing’, and moral cognition is of the “cooler,” less emotionally-informed variety, what results is not effective cognitive functioning, but rather psychopathology. My proposed account of affective framing aims to make sense of the way in which affect plays a strictly necessary and integral role not just in intuitive moral responses, but also in reflective moral judgments, so that moral cognition is accomplished by the joint operation of affective processes and reflective reasoning processes.     

Why there might be a moral faculty: A reply to Johnson

Is there a cognitive faculty dedicated to the moral domain? Mark Johnson has developed a number of arguments against the existence of such a faculty. I claim that these arguments are not persuasive and that there may be a moral faculty.     

The myth of the moral faculty: Response to Kirkby

David Kirkby argues that I have misrepresented Marc Hauser's conception of a moral faculty, in a way that invalidates my chief arguments against the existence and necessity of such a faculty. The core of Kirkby's challenge is that what Hauser lists as necessary conditions for the moral faculty to do its work are not themselves components of that faculty. I argue that there is no useful way to distinguish necessary conditions of moral judgments from the alleged moral faculty itself, and that even if we could do this, we would be left with an empty non-explanation of the supposed moral faculty that amounts to nothing more than the claim that we have a faculty that generates judgments of right versus wrong.     

Psychopaths and blame: The argument from content

The recent debate over the moral responsibility of psychopaths has centered on whether, or in what sense, they understand moral requirements. In this paper, I argue that even if they do understand what morality requires, the content of their actions is not of the right kind to justify full-blown blame. I advance two independent justifications of this claim. First, I argue that if the psychopath comes to know what morality requires via a route that does not involve a proper appreciation of what it means to cause another harm or distress, the content of violations of rules against harm will be of a lower grade than the content of similar actions by normal individuals. Second, I argue that in order to intend a harm to a person—that is, to intend the distinctive kind of harm that can only befall a person—it is necessary to understand what personhood is and what makes it valuable. The psychopath's deficits with regard to mental time travel ensure that s/he cannot intend this kind of harm.