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231.
In modern liberal societies people are generally reluctant to morally condemn acts that they find personally distasteful so long as those acts are not harmful or unfair to others. However, in providing character education for their children, parents often have to censure harmless but offensive acts. Thus, we hypothesize that the parental role broadens the scope of morality beyond narrow considerations of harm and fairness. To test this idea we asked parents and nonparents to morally evaluate harmless/offensive acts and a control harmful act. We manipulated whether the parental role was primed before they evaluated these acts. Parents and nonparents did not differ in their moral objections to the control act regardless of parental role priming. However, when the parental role was primed parents were more morally opposed to harmless but offensive acts than were nonparents. We discuss the implications of these results for understanding the dynamics of moral judgment and the recruitment of parents into moral reform movements. 相似文献
232.
Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative
way of formulating moral relativism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true.
Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude
by considering a few problems such a position might face. 相似文献
233.
Stephen Maitzen 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2009,65(2):93-103
Skeptical theism claims that the probability of a perfect God’s existence isn’t at all reduced by our failure to see how such
a God could allow the horrific suffering that occurs in our world. Given our finite grasp of the realm of value, skeptical
theists argue, it shouldn’t surprise us that we fail to see the reasons that justify God in allowing such suffering, and thus
our failure to see those reasons is no evidence against God’s existence or perfection. Critics object that skeptical theism
implies a degree of moral skepticism that even skeptical theists will find objectionable and that it undermines moral obligations
that even skeptical theists will want to preserve. I discuss a version of the first objection and defend a version of the
second. 相似文献
234.
Gerhard Minnameier 《Journal of Adult Development》2009,16(3):131-143
The study provides an in-depth analysis of two young adult subjects from a longitudinal study who underwent successive and
significant developmental changes. Their developmental patterns, however, are only revealed by a new conception of moral stages,
which is both more comprehensive and more detailed than Kohlberg’s original approach. In particular, the suggested alternative
taxonomy neatly accommodates what appears as developmental anomalies in the Kohlbergian frame of reference. What is more,
apart from merely matching with the observed data, the new theory also explains why the subjects developed the way they did,
since it reveals the inherent cognitive conflicts at each stage and how these are resolved at the following one. Although
the theory stands against the Kohlberg theory as it is, it may be understood as an extension and further development of the
latter, in the sense that Kohlbergian stages are differentiated, supplemented, and theoretically substantiated within the
new framework.
相似文献
Gerhard MinnameierEmail: |
235.
Within cognitive science, mental processing is often construed as computation over mental representations—i.e., as the manipulation
and transformation of mental representations in accordance with rules of the kind expressible in the form of a computer program.
This foundational approach has encountered a long-standing, persistently recalcitrant, problem often called the frame problem;
it is sometimes called the relevance problem. In this paper we describe the frame problem and certain of its apparent morals
concerning human cognition, and we argue that these morals have significant import regarding both the nature of moral normativity
and the human capacity for mastering moral normativity. The morals of the frame problem bode well, we argue, for the claim
that moral normativity is not fully systematizable by exceptionless general principles, and for the correlative claim that
such systematizability is not required in order for humans to master moral normativity.
相似文献
Mark TimmonsEmail: |
236.
We review several instances where cognitive research has identified distinct psychological mechanisms for moral judgment that
yield conflicting answers to moral dilemmas. In each of these cases, the conflict between psychological mechanisms is paralleled
by prominent philosophical debates between different moral theories. A parsimonious account of this data is that key claims
supporting different moral theories ultimately derive from the psychological mechanisms that give rise to moral judgments.
If this view is correct, it has some important implications for the practice of philosophy. We suggest several ways that moral
philosophy and practical reasoning can proceed in the face of discordant theories grounded in diverse psychological mechanisms.
相似文献
Fiery CushmanEmail: |
237.
Richard Joyce 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(1):53-75
Different versions of moral projectivism are delineated: minimal, metaphysical, nihilistic, and noncognitivist. Minimal projectivism (the focus of this paper) is the conjunction of two subtheses: (1) that we experience morality as an objective aspect of the world and (2) that this experience has its origin in an affective attitude (e.g., an emotion) rather than in perceptual faculties. Both are empirical claims and must be tested as such. This paper does not offer ideas on any specific test procedures, but rather undertakes the important preliminary task of clarifying the content of these subtheses (e.g., what is meant by “objective”? what is meant by “experience”?). Finally, attention is given to the relation between (a) acknowledging that the projectivist account might be true of a token moral judgment and (b) maintaining moral projectivism to be true as a general thesis. 相似文献
238.
Jon Tresan 《The Journal of Ethics》2009,13(1):51-72
‘Internalism’ is used in metaethics for a cluster of claims which bear a family resemblance. They tend to link, in some distinctive
way—typically modal, mereological, or causal—different parts of the normative realm, or the normative and the psychological.
The thesis of this paper is that much metaethical mischief has resulted from philosophers’ neglect of the distinction between
two different features of such claims. The first is the modality of the entire claim. The second is the relation between the
items specified in the claim. In part one I explain this distinction and the problems neglecting it may cause. In part two
I show that it has been neglected, and has caused those problems, at least with respect to one version of internalism. That
is judgment internalism, which claims that moral beliefs are necessarily related to pro- or con-attitudes; e.g., that if you
believe you ought to x you must have some motivation to x. The considerations standardly adduced in favor of judgment internalism
support only a version which lacks the metaethical implications typically attributed to it, at least so far as anyone has
shown. Proponents and opponents of judgment internalism fail to realize this because of their neglect of the modality/relation
distinction. I illustrate by considering discussions of judgment internalism by Russ Shafer-Landau, Simon Blackburn, James
Dreier, David Brink, and others.
相似文献
Jon TresanEmail: |
239.
Ishtiyaque Haji 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(2):169-179
Practical reasons, roughly, are reasons to have our desires and goals, and to do what might secure these goals. I argue for
the view that lack of freedom to do otherwise undermines the truth of judgments of practical reason. Thus, assuming that determinism
expunges alternative possibilities, determinism undercuts the truth of such judgments. I propose, in addition, that if practical
reason is associated with various values in a specified way, then determinism precludes such values owing to determinism's
imperiling practical reason.
相似文献
Ishtiyaque HajiEmail: |
240.