Personal values and relational models

In this study, the comprehensive value research by Schwartz (e.g. 1992) was linked to Fiske's relational models theory (RMT, e.g. Fiske, 1991). A sample of 297 people answered the personal values questionnaire (PVQ), the modes of relationship questionnaire (MORQ) and the relationship profile scale (RPS) in a web‐based online survey. As hypothesized, the set of 10 values correlated in a systematic manner—according to the circular structure of personal value systems—with both trait‐like construal of and motivational investment in the relational models communal sharing (CS), authority ranking (AR) and market pricing (MP). Further research concerning a person–environment value congruency approach to predict well‐being is suggested combining the two research traditions. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dual pathways to engage in ‘Silent Marches’ against violence: moral outrage,moral cleansing and modes of identification

A survey (N = 120) examined variables that contribute to the willingness of people to engage in silent marches against violence in the Netherlands. As argued in Sacred Value Protection Model (SVPM) of Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, and Lerner ( 2000 ) and moral mandate theory of Skitka, Bauman, and Sargis ( 2005 ), moral threats that are triggered by violent incidents, may indeed drive people to protest against such incidents. Our findings indicated dual pathways to such protests, that are all associated with reactive, angry empathic concerns. These concerns involve people's outrageous, punitive reactions towards offenders on behalf of the victims. These concerns are directly or indirectly related to people's participation intentions. That is, they directly influence the participation intention variable, or indirectly, through (re‐)establishing the belief in a just‐world, or through more fearful, self‐directed moral cleansing reactions. These latter reactions aim at reinforcing community‐shared moral standards. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On Using Ethical Theories to Teach Engineering Ethics

Many engineering ethics classes and textbooks introduce theories such as utilitarianism and Kantianism (and most others draw from these theories without mentioning them explicitly). Yet using ethical theories to teach engineering ethics is not devoid of difficulty. First, their status is unclear (should one pick a single theory or use them all? does it make a difference?) Also, textbooks generally assume or fallaciously ‘prove’ that egoism (or even simply accounting for one’s interests) is wrong. Further, the drawbacks of ethical theories are underestimated and the theories are also otherwise misrepresented to make them more suitable for engineering ethics as the authors construe it, viz. the ‘moral reasoning’ process. Stating in what various theories disagree would allow the students to frame the problem more productively in terms of motive–consequence or society–individual dichotomies rather than in terms of Kant–utilitarian.     

Ethics Consultation and Autonomy

Services of ethics consultants are nowadays commonly used in such various spheres of life as engineering, public administration, business, law, health care, journalism, and scientific research. It has however been maintained that use of ethics consultants is incompatible with personal autonomy; in moral matters individuals should be allowed to make their own decisions. The problem this criticism refers to can be conceived of as a conflict between the professional autonomy of ethics experts and the autonomy of the persons they serve. This paper addresses this conflict and maintains that when the nature of both ethics consultation and individual autonomy is properly understood, the professional autonomy of ethics experts is compatible with the autonomy of the persons they assist.     

The pedagogical imperative of values education

Recent research has exposed the potential of quality teaching to exercise a positive influence on student achievement. Extending beyond surface and factual learning, quality teaching has posited conceptions of ‘intellectual depth’, ‘communicative competence’ and ‘self‐reflection’ as being central to effective learning. Implicit in these conceptions are values dimensions reflected in notions of positive relationships, the centrality of student welfare, school coherence, ambience and organisation. The influences of these on student learning, welfare and progress have been observed across public, private and religious sectors, thus confirming earlier studies of similar phenomena in religious schools. Evidence from the Australian Government's Values Education Good Practice Schools Project indicates the benefit to all schools of reflecting on, re‐evaluating and rethinking the implications of values education for curricula, classroom management and school ethos in the interests of student wellbeing and progress. This indicates a pedagogical imperative for values education which extends beyond boundaries of personal or systemic interests and ideologies.     

What is wrong with religious education? A response to Philip Barnes

This article reviews Philip Barnes’ account of problems with religious eEducation (RE), and explores the practical implications of his position. Acknowledging his compelling logic – that RE is premised on an acceptance of all religions as equally theologically true – this article argues for optimism: with controversy and ambiguity moving to centre stage, a re‐orientation of RE’s attainment targets could focus RE curricula and provide a measure of direction for future progress. Equally, a focus on developing individual values for life in a plural democracy – where personal destinies often conflict both culturally and existentially – would likewise give RE a more potent purpose and the foundations for a normative agenda. Inspired by J.S. Mill, this article concludes that such RE may have to move beyond the classroom to achieve its potential as a critical, inclusive, relevant and progressive subject with coherent social and educational aims.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">My Way</Emphasis> and Life’s Highway: Replies to Steward,Smilansky, and Perry

I seek to reply to the thoughtful and challenging papers by Helen Steward, Saul Smilansky, and John Perry. Steward argues that agency itself requires access to alternative possibilities; I attempt to motivate my denial of this view. I believe that her view here is no more plausible than the view (which she rejects) that it is unfair to hold someone morally responsible, unless he has genuine access to alternative possibilities. Smilansky contends that compatibilism is morally shallow, and that we can see this from the “ultimate perspective.” In reply, I explore the nature of “zooming” arguments, and I contend that even from a somewhat more detached perspective, important features that distinguish us from mere animals can be discerned (even in a causally deterministic universe). Finally, I seek to address Perry’s defense of classical compatibilism. My main objection to his form of compatbilism is that agents must be construed as having a certain kind of “baggage”—even on his own account.

《孙膑兵法》的流传、失传及研究价值初探

本文通过考察《孙膑兵法》的流传情况、分析其失传原因,认为《孙膑兵法》的根本价值在于对《孙子兵法》的诠释,同时,对佚而复出的古书源流研究提出新的思考。     

The (near) necessity of alternate possibilities for moral responsibility

Harry Frankfurt has famously criticized the principle of alternate possibilities—the principle that an agent is morally responsible for performing some action only if able to have done otherwise than to perform it—on the grounds that it is possible for an agent to be morally responsible for performing an action that is inevitable for the agent when the reasons for which the agent lacks alternate possibilities are not the reasons for which the agent has acted. I argue that an incompatibilist about determinism and moral responsibility can safely ignore so-called “Frakfurt-style cases” and continue to argue for incompatibilism on the grounds that determinism rules out the ability to do otherwise. My argument relies on a simple—indeed, simplistic—weakening of the principle of alternate possibilities that is explicitly designed to be immune to Frankfurt-style criticism. This alternative to the principle of alternate possibilities is so simplistic that it will no doubt strike many readers as philosophically fallow. I argue that it is not. I argue that the addition of one highly plausible premise allows for the modified principle to be employed in an argument for incompatibilism that begins with the observation that determinism rules out the ability to do otherwise. On the merits of this argument I conclude that deterministic moral responsibility is impossible and that Frankfurt’s criticism of the principle of alternate possibilities—even if successful to that end—may be safely ignored.

Prolegomena to a future phenomenology of morals

Moral phenomenology is (roughly) the study of those features of occurrent mental states with moral significance which are accessible through direct introspection, whether or not such states possess phenomenal character – a what-it-is-likeness. In this paper, as the title indicates, we introduce and make prefatory remarks about moral phenomenology and its significance for ethics. After providing a brief taxonomy of types of moral experience, we proceed to consider questions about the commonality within and distinctiveness of such experiences, with an eye on some of the main philosophical issues in ethics and how moral phenomenology might be brought to bear on them. In discussing such matters, we consider some of the doubts about moral phenomenology and its value to ethics that are brought up by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Michael Gill in their contributions to this issue.