The Fictionalist’s Attitude Problem

According to John Mackie, moral talk is representational (the realists go that bit right) but its metaphysical presuppositions are wildly implausible (the non-cognitivists got that bit right). This is the basis of Mackie’s now famous error theory: that moral judgments are cognitively meaningful but systematically false. Of course, Mackie went on to recommend various substantive moral judgments, and, in the light of his error theory, that has seemed odd to a lot of folk. Richard Joyce has argued that Mackie’s approach can be vindicated by a fictionalist account of moral discourse. And Mark Kalderon has argued that moral fictionalism is attractive quite independently of Mackie’s error-theory. Kalderon argues that the Frege–Geach problem shows that we need moral propositions, but that a fictionalist can and should embrace propositional content together with a non-cognitivist account of acceptance of a moral proposition. Indeed, it is clear that any fictionalist is going to have to postulate more than one kind of acceptance attitude. We argue that this double-approach to acceptance generates a new problem – a descendent of Frege–Geach – which we call the acceptance–transfer problem. Although we develop the problem in the context of Kalderon’s version of non-cognitivist fictionalism, we show that it is not the non-cognitivist aspect of Kalderon’s account that generates the problem. A closely related problem surfaces for the more typical variants of fictionalism according to which accepting a moral proposition is believing some closely related non-moral proposition. Fictionalists of both stripes thus have an attitude problem.

The Metaphysical Morality of Francis Hutcheson: A Consideration of Hutcheson’s Critique of Moral Fitness Theory

Hutcheson’s theory of morality shares far more common ground with Clarke’s morality than is generally acknowledged. In fact, Hutcheson’s own view of his innovations in moral theory suggest that he understood moral sense theory more as an elaboration and partial correction to Clarkean fitness theory than as an outright rejection of it. My aim in this paper will be to illuminate what I take to be Hutcheson’s grounds for adopting this attitude toward Clarkean fitness theory. In so doing, I hope to bring to light an otherwise unexpected continuity between moral sense theory and the moral rationalism to which it is usually opposed, and, in so doing, draw attention to the anti-sceptical realism that lies at the heart of both accounts.

论伦理秩序

实存的伦理关系是客观条件与主观条件的历史性统一,伦理关系本质上是现实合理性秩序中的关系,是有主体精神渗透其中并通过道德、法律、习俗等规则体系维系的关系,它的首要问题是秩序的合理性和正当性。研究伦理秩序应把道德和伦理两个概念加以区分;伦理秩序的顺畅和谐在于道德的有效调节,也在于法律的有效控制。伦理秩序在社会变革中经过必然与自由的辩证运动,使矛盾化解,推动社会和谐发展。和谐社会应当是以公正支撑的合理的伦理秩序的社会。     

Empathy,morality and psychopathic traits in women

Empathic and moral processing correlates of psychopathic personality have seldom been studied in women. In this study, we experimentally tested associations between psychopathic personality traits and empathic and moral processing in a female sample, and further directly compared them to results from a male sample. We found that high levels of affective-interpersonal traits were associated with diminished affective response to sad and fearful emotions in others; lower propensity to feel moral emotions; higher endorsement of utilitarian solutions to moral dilemmas involving direct harm; and less self-reported difficulty when performing moral decision making. Overall, our findings strengthen the view that the two dimensions of psychopathy make distinct contributions to emotional and moral processing; and demonstrate that, in women, psychopathic personality traits are associated with a similar pattern of empathic and moral processing biases as the one that has been previously reported in men.     

Personal and impersonal stimuli differentially engage brain networks during moral reasoning

Moral decision making has recently attracted considerable attention as a core feature of all human endeavors. Previous functional magnetic resonance imaging studies about moral judgment have identified brain areas associated with cognitive or emotional engagement. Here, we applied graph theory-based network analysis of event-related potentials during moral decision making to reveal the personal/impersonal distinction in the organization of functional connectivity. Our results indicated that the personal task had more larger long-range connections involved in frontal regions and the right hemisphere, and higher network efficiency of some frontal electrodes such as F2 than the impersonal. These might be related to brain resource reorganization contributing to efficient conflict resolution. These findings provide new insights into neural mechanisms of moral dilemmas.     

Religious factors in moral decision-making: Towards an integrated,socio-cultural,developmental, model

Abstract

For far too long, developmental approaches in the psychology of religion have paid insufficient attention to the richness and variety of social and cultural factors in human development and their relationship to religious belief, practice, belonging, identity, and world views, and often, related framing of spiritual questions, concerns, and disciplines. If scholars in the psychology of human development and psychology of religion have offered critical appraisals of the shortcomings of the neo-Piagetian, cognitive-developmental models that have dominated the scientific literature, and offered promising contributions and needed correctives to the omissions of cognitive-developmental approaches, the field is still in need of an integrated, socio-cultural developmental approach to human development and religious functioning. In this article we propose one way of moving toward a more integrated approach in these fields, with special attention to the advantages of such an effort in the study of religious elements in moral decision-making and moral development.     

The relation of elementary-school children's externalizing behaviour to emotion attributions,evaluation of consequences,and moral reasoning

This study examined the relation of elementary-school children's externalizing behaviour to emotion attributions, evaluation of consequences, and moral reasoning. Externalizing behaviour was rated by the parents using the Child Behaviour Checklist (CBCL/4 – 18). Moral development was assessed by three stories describing different types of rule violation and a moral conflict in friendship including obligations and self-interest. The children were asked about the emotions they would attribute to the hypothetical victimizer (or protagonist) and the self-as-victimizer (or protagonist), the evaluation of the interpersonal consequences of the rule violation (or action decision) as well as their justifications. Boys who made selfish action decisions and attributed positive emotions to the protagonist of the moral dilemma displayed more externalizing behaviour than girls. Furthermore, boys with consistent moral (negative) emotion attributions to the self-as-victimizer across the rule violations showed less externalizing behaviour than boys with inconsistent moral emotion attributions. Younger children who anticipated negative interpersonal consequences of transgressions displayed higher rates of externalizing behaviour than younger children who anticipated less negative consequences. Moral reasons in the context of emotion attributions to the self-as-victimizer were negatively associated with externalizing behaviour.     

Alexithymia increases moral acceptability of accidental harms

Previous research shows that when people judge moral acceptability of others' harmful behaviour, they not only take into account information about the consequences of the act but also an actor's belief while carrying out the act. A two-process model has been proposed to account for this pattern of moral judgements and posits: (1) a causal process that detects the presence of a harmful outcome and is motivated by empathic aversion stemming from victim suffering; (2) a mental state-based process that attributes beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. to the agent in question and is motivated by imagining personally carrying out harmful actions. One prediction of this model would be that personality traits associated with empathy deficits would find accidental harms more acceptable not because they focus on innocent intentions but because they have reduced concern for the victim's well-being. In this study, we show that one such personality trait, viz. alexithymia, indeed exhibits the predicted pattern and this increased acceptability of accidental harm in alexithymia is mediated by reduced dispositional empathic concern. Results attest to the validity of two-process model of intent-based moral judgements and emphasise key role affective empathy plays in harm-based moral judgements.     

Does it always feel good to get what you want? Young children differentiate between material and wicked desires

One line of research on children's attributions of guilt suggests that 3‐year‐olds attribute negative emotion to self‐serving victimizers, slightly older children attribute happiness, and with increasing age, attributions become negative again (i.e., a three‐step model; Yuill et al., 1996, Br. J. Dev. Psychol., 14, 457). Another line of research provides reason to expect that 3‐year‐olds may be predisposed to view self‐serving moral transgression as leading to positive emotion; this is a linear developmental model in which emotion attributions to transgressors become increasingly negative over the course of childhood (e.g., Nunner‐Winkler & Sodian, 1988, Child Dev., 59, 1323). However, key differences in methodology make it difficult to compare across these findings. The present study was designed to address this problem. We asked how 3‐ to 9‐year‐old children (n = 111) reason about transgression scenarios that involve satisfying wicked desires (wanting to cause harm and doing so successfully) versus material desires (wanting an object and getting it successfully via harmful behaviour). Three‐year‐old children reasoned differently about desire and emotion across these two types of transgressions, attributing negative emotion in the case of wicked desires and positive emotion in the case of material desires. This pattern of emotion attribution by young children provides new information about how young children process information about desires and emotions in the moral domain, and it bridges a gap in the existing literature on this topic.