The development of moral motivation across the adult lifespan

What explains the behaviour of moral exemplars, individuals who dedicate themselves, in long-term service, to others' betterment? Such exemplars actualize their self-interest (agency) by promoting the interests of others (communion), whereas most people engage agency to attain more agency. In two studies we determine how these profiles develop across adulthood. Young adult exemplars and matched comparison participants described their personal goals and completed a semi-structured interview. Agentic and communal motives were coded from these materials and compared to the motivational profiles of older exemplars and comparisons. We found that (a) young adults actively separated their agency from their communion (suggesting a heightened motivational tension during this developmental period), and (b) younger exemplars used their agency to further agency and communion equally, whereas younger comparisons used their agency to further more agency. These findings explicate the nature of moral motivational development across the adult lifespan.     

Collective moral disengagement: Initial validation of a scale for adolescents

Collective moral disengagement refers to shared group beliefs that morally justify negative actions. This study reports an initial validation of the newly developed Classroom Collective Moral Disengagement Scale (CCMDS) for adolescents. This self-report instrument assesses the degree to which mechanisms of moral disengagement are shared by students in their class. Data were collected from two samples of 486 and 654 adolescents attending middle and high schools in Italy. Through exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses the unidimensional structure of the scale was established. Multigroup analyses demonstrated configural, metric and scalar invariance of the model across age and gender groups. The final version of the scale consists of 17 items and it has good internal consistency and validity. It is concluded that the scale is a promising measure for research concerning group level morality.     

Challenges for the sequential two-system model of moral judgement

Considerable evidence supports the sequential two-system (“default interventionist”) model of moral judgement, as proposed by Greene and others. We tested whether judgement speed and/or personal/impersonal moral dilemmas can predict the kind of moral judgements (utilitarian or deontological) subjects make for each dilemma, and whether personal dilemmas create difficulty in moral judgements. Our results showed that neither personal/impersonal conditions nor spontaneous/thoughtful-reflection conditions were reliable predictors of utilitarian or deontological moral judgements. Yet, we found support for an alternative view, in which, when the two types of responses are in conflict; the resolution of this conflict depends on both the subject and the dilemma. While thinking about this conflict, subjects sometimes change their minds in both directions, as suggested by the data from a mouse-tracking task.     

Compatibilism can be natural

Compatibilism is the view that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. Natural compatibilism is the view that in ordinary social cognition, people are compatibilists. Researchers have recently debated whether natural compatibilism is true. This paper presents six experiments (N = 909) that advance this debate. The results provide the best evidence to date for natural compatibilism, avoiding the main methodological problems faced by previous work supporting the view. In response to simple scenarios about familiar activities, people judged that agents had moral responsibilities to perform actions that they were unable to perform (Experiment 1), were morally responsible for unavoidable outcomes (Experiment 2), were to blame for unavoidable outcomes (Experiments 3–4), deserved blame for unavoidable outcomes (Experiment 5), and should suffer consequences for unavoidable outcomes (Experiment 6). These findings advance our understanding of moral psychology and philosophical debates that depend partly on patterns in commonsense morality.     

The role of cognitive resources in determining our moral intuitions: Are we all liberals at heart?

Recent research provides evidence that one important difference between liberals and conservatives is their basic moral intuitions. These studies suggest that while liberals and conservatives respond similarly to considerations of harm/care and fairness (what Graham and Haidt call the “individualizing” foundations), conservatives also respond strongly to considerations of in-group, authority, and purity (the “binding” foundations) while liberals do not. Our study examined two alternative hypotheses for this difference—the first being that liberals cognitively override, and the alternative being that conservatives cognitively enhance, their binding foundation intuitions. Using self-regulation depletion and cognitive load tasks to compromise people's ability to monitor and regulate their automatic moral responses, we found support for the latter hypothesis—when cognitive resources were depleted/distracted, conservatives became more like liberals (de-prioritizing the binding foundations), rather than the other way around. This provides support for the view that conservatism is a form of motivated social cognition.     

Moral judgments and the role of social harm: Differences in automatic versus controlled processing

The social intuitionist model has served as an important corrective to the earlier dominance of rational deliberation in moral psychology. Yet the relationship between intuition and deliberation in moral judgments remains largely unexplored. Three studies were conducted to explore the role of automatic and controlled processes in moral judgments. Results suggest that controlled processing is attuned to instances of social harm. Immoral acts (i.e., cases of serious academic dishonesty) that involved diffuse harm in the form of flouting societal rules did not result in increased moral censure under deliberation. In contrast, similar dishonest acts that involved direct social harm to others resulted in harsher, more punitive moral judgments under deliberation, providing evidence of augmentation of automatic responses under controlled processing. The results suggest that the intuitionist sensitivity to direct physical harm has parallels in the controlled processing system, which seems sensitive to non-physical instances of social harm, such as over-benefiting the self at the expense of deserving others.     

Effects of Manipulation on Attributions of Causation,Free Will,and Moral Responsibility

If someone brings about an outcome without intending to, is she causally and morally responsible for it? What if she acts intentionally, but as the result of manipulation by another agent? Previous research has shown that an agent's mental states can affect attributions of causal and moral responsibility to that agent , but little is known about what effect one agent's mental states can have on attributions to another agent. In Experiment 1, we replicate findings that manipulation lowers attributions of responsibility to manipulated agents. Experiments 2–7 isolate which features of manipulation drive this effect, a crucial issue for both philosophical debates about free will and attributions of responsibility in situations involving social influence more generally. Our results suggest that “bypassing” a manipulated agent's mental states generates the greatest reduction in responsibility, and we explain our results in terms of the effects that one agent's mental states can have on the counterfactual relations between another agent and an outcome.     

儿童移情与道德发展关系研究综述

移情是人际交往中情感的相互作用,是对他人情绪的觉察而导致自己情绪唤起的一种情感体验。培养儿童的移情对儿童的道德发展具有重要作用。本文从移情的概念入手,介绍和探讨儿童移情与道德发展的关系研究状况,并对儿童的移情培养提出建议。     

关于道德唤起与道德行为关系的实验研究

本文通过一个关于测验作弊的实验研究,揭示了道德唤起与道德行为之间存在的一定关系,即不同的道德唤起水平会对道德行为产生一定的影响。通过实验后的个别访谈,我们分析了道德认知、道德情感与道德唤起之间的关系。最后,我们提出了本实验研究的不足之处和可能存在的后续研究。     

The education of the categorical imperative

In this article, I examine anew the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant and its contributions to educational theory. I make four claims. First, that Kant should be read as having the Categorical Imperative develop out of subjective maxims. Second, that moral self-perfection is the aim of moral education. Third, that moral self-perfection develops by children habituating the results of their moral maxims in scenarios and cases. Fourth, that character and culture, Kant’s highest aims for humanity, are the ultimate beneficiaries of this process.