Gettier made ESEE

Previous research in experimental philosophy has suggested that moral judgments can influence the ordinary application of a number of different concepts, including attributions of knowledge. But should epistemologists care? The present set of studies demonstrate that this basic effect can be extended to overturn intuitions in some of the most theoretically central thought experiments in contemporary epistemology: Gettier cases. Furthermore, experiment 3 shows that this effect is unlikely to be mediated by a simple desire to blame, suggesting that a correct psychological account of ordinary knowledge attribution may include moral judgment.     

When psychology undermines beliefs

This paper attempts to specify the conditions under which a psychological explanation can undermine or debunk a set of beliefs. The focus will be on moral and religious beliefs, where a growing debate has emerged about the epistemic implications of cognitive science. Recent proposals by Joshua Greene and Paul Bloom will be taken as paradigmatic attempts to undermine beliefs with psychology. I will argue that a belief p may be undermined whenever: (i) p is evidentially based on an intuition which (ii) can be explained by a psychological mechanism that is (iii) unreliable for the task of believing p; and (iv) any other evidence for belief p is based on rationalization. I will also consider and defend two equally valid arguments for establishing unreliability: the redundancy argument and the argument from irrelevant factors. With this more specific understanding of debunking arguments, it is possible to develop new replies to some objections to psychological debunking arguments from both ethics and philosophy of religion.     

Children's Sensitivity to Ulterior Motives When Evaluating Prosocial Behavior

Reasoning about ulterior motives was investigated among children ages 6–10 years (total N = 119). In each of two studies, participants were told about children who offered gifts to peers who needed help. Each giver chose to present a gift in either a public setting, which is consistent with having an ulterior motive to enhance one's reputation, or in a private setting, which is not consistent with having an ulterior motive. In each study, the 6‐ to 7‐year olds showed no evidence of understanding that the public givers might have ulterior motives, but the 8‐ to 10‐year olds rated the private givers more favorably. In 3. , the older children were more likely than the younger children to refer to impression management when explaining their judgments of the givers. The younger children who mentioned impression management did so to justify a preference for public givers (e.g., by explaining that public givers are nicer because more of their peers will know that they are nice). Results from 4. suggest that developmental change in children's reasoning about intentions and social outcomes contributes to their understanding of ulterior motives.     

Presentism,Redemption, and Moral Development

This paper explores what could justify some intuitive temporal asymmetries regarding redemption and the distribution of ills and goods throughout an agent's lifespan. After exposing the inadequacies of causal explanations – based on our differential ability to affect the future, but not the past – a metaphysical explanation is outlined in relation to three competing temporal‐ontological profiles of agents, and their varying accounts of a being's development. Only one of those conceptions of agents – supported by Presentism, the thesis that everything is present – offers an account justifying the intuitive temporal asymmetries. Finally, consequences are then drawn for the possibility of true redemption.     

Why people fail to bike the talk: Car dependence as a barrier to cycling

Antecedent conditions of cycling have been extensively studied, yet barriers that prevent individuals from choosing bicycle transportation are less known. The present study, conducted on a sample of individuals who were both cyclists and drivers (N = 280), investigated whether dependence on car transportation significantly reduces cycling frequency. It also assessed the predictive validity of a larger set of cycling determinants that included moral, objective environmental, demographic and car-related variables. Responses were analyzed using a structural equation modeling approach. Results show that moral considerations do little to predict cycling frequency and that car-related factors such as perceived behavioral control to reduce car use (β = 0.28) and car use habits (β = -0.27) have the strongest predictive power. Objective environmental factors such as temperature (β = -0.13) and altitude (β = -0.15) or demographic factors such as gender (β = 0.19) were also significant predictors of cycling frequency. The present study highlights a new perspective of understanding cycling behavior and pleads for the inclusion of car-related factors in its future conceptualizations and interventions to encourage it.     

Moral Principles or Consumer Preferences? Alternative Framings of the Trolley Problem

We created paired moral dilemmas with minimal contrasts in wording, a research strategy that has been advocated as a way to empirically establish principles operative in a domain-specific moral psychology. However, the candidate "principles" we tested were not derived from work in moral philosophy, but rather from work in the areas of consumer choice and risk perception. Participants were paradoxically less likely to choose an action that sacrifices one life to save others when they were asked to provide more reasons for doing so (Experiment 1), and their willingness to sacrifice lives depended not only on how many lives would be saved, but on the number of lives at risk (Experiment 2). The latter effect was also found in a within-subjects design (Experiment 3). These findings suggest caution in the use of artificial dilemmas as a key testbed for revealing principled bases for moral judgment.     

Hypocrites or maligned cooperative participants? Experimenter induced normative conflict in zero-sum situations

The failure to recognize the influence of two distinct forms of moral norms can lead to the misattribution of moral behavior to egoistic motives. This is illustrated in the research of Batson and his colleagues (e.g., Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997). They reported the appearance of moral failure and hypocrisy motivation in several experiments employing essentially the same “zero-sum” experimental situation. They cited as evidence the discrepancy between participants’ apparently self-serving private acts and their subsequent public ratings of the morality of what they had done as well as their recognition of the “most” moral way to behave. The research reported here supported an alternative explanation that located the experimenter’s implicit and explicit instructions as the source of the discrepancy between the participants’ private acts and their public ratings. The findings confirmed the hypothesis that Batson and his colleagues had not merely made moral norms “salient”. They had actually presented their participants with contradictory “demands”: explicitly inviting them to meet the norm of justified self-interest in private but then give public lip-service to the experimenter’s instructions as to a supererogatory way to behave. When either of the demands was removed, the “hypocrisy” no longer occurred.     

A clean self can render harsh moral judgment

Physical cleanliness has many medical benefits, such as protection from the dangers of contagion. We explore a potential unintended consequence of cleanliness. Given the metaphorical association between physical cleanliness and moral purity (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006), we contend that a clean self may also be linked to a virtuous self. This enhanced moral self-perception can in turn license harsher moral judgment. Three experiments found that cleanliness, whether induced via physical cleansing or through a visualization task, licensed severe judgment on morally contested issues such as abortion and pornography. Further, we found that an inflated moral self mediated the relationship between cleanliness and moral judgment. These results provide unique insight to the social significance of cleanliness and may have important implications for discrimination and prejudice.     

Negative stereotypes as motivated justifications for moral exclusion

We investigated the connection between moral exclusion of outgroups and on the one hand, right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), and social dominance orientation (SDO) on the other. We assumed that both RWA and SDO would increase the tendency to place other groups out of the scope of justice. However, we also tested whether negative stereotypes about an outgroup’s threatening and norm-violating misbehavior would serve as a justification for moral exclusion. These assumptions were tested in connection with Roma, Jewish, and Muslim people as target groups in the Hungarian context (N = 441). In line with our hypotheses, we found that both RWA and SDO had an indirect effect on moral exclusion mediated by negative stereotypes about the particular target group. Our findings suggested that negative stereotypes were more important legitimizing factors for RWA than for SDO. Our results highlight the benefits of interpreting the process of moral exclusion as an outcome of motivated social cognition.