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441.
重建世界的人文精神--牟宗三儒家式的人文主义 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
牟宗三对世界人文精神的重建,乃是出于他对人类精神趋下的时代悲情和他对人文主义精神的信念,顺康德的精神路向,本儒家的心性之学,绍续和改造西方近代人文主义,完成于“三统并建”的学说之中,旨在把宗教、哲学、科学和艺术统一起来,表现为“儒家式的人文主义”。它既特别重视人性、个性与人格,又强调道德主体是其根源和基础。牟要以儒家的理想和价值来安置人性、个性与人格,固然是要使个人免于泛滥为自然主义、浪漫主义与工具主义的牺牲品,然而其更深层的基本的关怀和用心,乃在于从他所主张的“道德的形上学”的高度为人提供一个安身立命之本.使人成为一个具体的全面的发展的人。 相似文献
442.
Ira Newman 《Philosophia》2008,36(1):43-54
Philosophers have often applied a distinctively epistemic framework to the question of how moral knowledge can be derived
from fictional literature, by considering how true propositions, or their argumentative support, can be the cognitive fruits
of reading works of fiction. I offer an alternative approach. I focus not on whether readers fail to assent to the truth of
a proposition or fail to provide it rational support. Instead, I focus on how readers fail to accord a truth (which they already
accept) adequate importance in their web of beliefs about living a good human life. This is a form of ignorance, but in the
form of neglect, or failure to pay proper regard – which is one sense of the term ‘forgetfulness’. I argue that works of fictional
literature may, at times, stimulate audience members to overcome their own particular forms of forgetfulness in this respect.
And I use Tolstoy’s The Death of Ivan Ilyich as a case in point.
相似文献
Ira NewmanEmail: |
443.
Coughlin SS 《Science and engineering ethics》2008,14(1):103-110
There has been increasing interest in developing practical, non-theoretical tools for analyzing ethical problems in public
health, biomedicine, and other scientific disciplines so that professionals can make and justify ethical decisions in their
own research or practice. Tools for ethical decisionmaking, together with case studies on ethics, are often used in graduate
education programs and in continuing professional education. Students can benefit from opportunities to further develop their
analytical skills, to recognize ethical issues, and to develop their moral sensitivity. One practical approach for illustrating
and facilitating ethical analysis uses cases with contrary facts and circumstances, an approach which complements rather than
replaces theoretical approaches to moral reasoning. Cases with contrary facts and circumstances are presented in two or more
alternative ways so that the facts, circumstances, or framing of one version runs counter to that of the other version (s).
Cases with contrary facts, together with practical steps for identifying and analyzing ethical issues, are likely to be useful
tools for illustrating and facilitating ethics analysis and stimulating the moral imagination.
The findings and conclusions in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention. 相似文献
444.
Fischer’s Way: The Next Level 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Saul Smilansky 《The Journal of Ethics》2008,12(2):147-155
I present an analogy between analytic philosophy and a particular sort of computer game, and analyze some aspects of John
Martin Fischer's My Way in the light of this analogy. I set out the different levels of the free will question, and explore how well Fischer does
on them. On the compatibility level, he succeeds, in my view, in confronting the "metaphysical challenge" and the "manipulation
challenge", but does less well with the "moral arbitrariness challenge". The compatibilist perspective captures only part
of the moral and personal truth on the compatibility issue, and is shown to be inherently shallow. On the next levels we see
that Fischer confronts particular dangers: the very virtues that make his minimalist position so resilient on the second (compatibility)
level, render it too impoverished when it comes to the third, which asks about the very importance of taking moral responsibility
seriously. Connecting to other positions (such as P.F. Strawson's version of naturalism) may be an imperative, but would also
be risky. Likewise, on the fourth level, where we confront the difficulty of deciding how to deal with the previous conclusions,
it is doubtful how well Fischer can do, given his previous philosophical commitments.
相似文献
Saul SmilanskyEmail: |
445.
Faith E. Fletcher Paul Ndebele Maureen C. Kelley 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2008,29(5):307-330
The debate over how to best guide HIV-infected mothers in resource-poor settings on infant feeding is more than two decades
old. Globally, breastfeeding is responsible for approximately 300,000 HIV infections per year, while at the same time, UNICEF
estimates that not breastfeeding (formula feeding with contaminated water) is responsible for 1.5 million child deaths per
year. The largest burden of these infections and deaths occur in Sub-Saharan Africa. Using this region as an example of the
burden faced more generally in other resource-poor settings, we contrast the evolution of the clinical standard of care for
infant feeding with HIV-infected mothers in high-income countries to the current international clinical guidelines for HIV-infected
mothers and infant feeding in resource-poor settings. While the international guidelines of exclusive breastfeeding for a
6-month period seem to offer the least-worst strategy for reducing mother-to-child transmission of HIV during infancy while
conferring some immunity through breastfeeding post-6 months, we argue that the impact of the policy on mothers and healthcare
workers on the ground is not well understood. The harm reduction approach on the level of health policy translates into a
complicated, painful moral dilemma for HIV-positive mothers and those offering them guidance on infant feeding. We argue that
the underlying socio-economic disparities that continue to fuel the need for a harm reduction policy on infant feeding and
the harm to women and children justify: (1) that higher priority be given to solving the infant feeding dilemma with improved
data on safe feeding alternatives, and (2) support of innovative, community-driven solutions that address the particular economic
and cultural challenges that continue to result in HIV-transmission to children within these communities.
相似文献
Maureen C. KelleyEmail: |
446.
Godfrey B. Tangwa 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2008,29(5):297-306
The central importance of reproduction in all human cultures has given rise to many methods and techniques of assisting reproduction
or overcoming infertility. Such methods and techniques have achieved spectacular successes in the Western world, where processes
like in vitro fertilization (IVF) constitute a remarkable breakthrough. In this paper, the author attempts to reflect critically
on assisted reproduction technologies (ART) from the background and perspective of African culture, a culture within which
human reproduction is given the highest priority but which also exhibits a highly ambivalent attitude to modern technology-assisted
methods of reproduction. The author considers the ethical crux of reproductive technologies to be linked to the issue of the
moral status of the human embryo and argues that a morally significant line of demarcation cannot be drawn between embryos and other categories of humans. 相似文献
447.
The Great Apes and the Severely Disabled: Moral Status and Thick Evaluative Concepts 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Logi Gunnarsson 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(3):305-326
The literature of bioethics suffers from two serious problems. (1) Most authors are unable to take seriously both the rights
of the great apes and of severely disabled human infants. Rationalism—moral status rests on rational capacities—wrongly assigns
a higher moral status to the great apes than to all severely disabled human infants with less rational capacities than the
great apes. Anthropocentrism—moral status depends on membership in the human species—falsely grants all humans a higher moral
status than the great apes. Animalism—moral status is dependent on the ability to suffer—mistakenly equates the moral status
of humans and most animals. (2) The concept person is widely used for justificatory purposes, but it seems that it cannot play such a role. It seems that it is either redundant
or unable to play any justificatory role. I argue that we can solve the second problem by understanding person as a thick evaluative concept. This then enables us to justify assigning a higher moral status to the great apes than to
simple animals: the great apes are persons. To solve the first problem, I argue that certain severely disabled infants have
a higher moral status than the great apes because they are dependent upon human relationships for their well-being. Only very
limited abilities are required for such relationships, and the question who is capable of them must be based on thick evaluative
concepts. Thus, it turns out that to make progress in bioethics we must assign thick evaluative concepts a central role.
相似文献
Logi GunnarssonEmail: |
448.
Moral phenomenology: Foundational issues 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Uriah Kriegel 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(1):1-19
In this paper, I address the what, the how, and the why of moral phenomenology. I consider first the question What is moral phenomenology?, secondly the question How to pursue moral phenomenology?, and thirdly the question Why pursue moral phenomenology? My treatment of these questions is preliminary and tentative, and is meant not so much to settle them as to point in their answers’ direction. 相似文献
449.
In this paper, following the work of Hare, we consider moral reasoning not as the application of moral norms and principles, but as reasoning about what ought to be done in a particular situation, with moral norms perhaps emerging from this reasoning. We model this situated reasoning drawing on our previous work on argumentation schemes, here set in the context of Action-Based Alternating Transition Systems. We distinguish what prudentially ought to be done from what morally ought to be done, consider what legislation might be appropriate and characterise the differences between morally correct, morally praiseworthy and morally excusable actions. We also describe an implementation which simulates this reasoning and discuss some issues arising from the simulation. 相似文献
450.
Procedural voice is a widely used and effective means to reduce or eliminate conflict. Moral disagreements, however, are particularly inflammatory, divisive, and difficult to manage. The current article reports two studies that demonstrated the unique challenge that moral disagreements pose. Specifically, the studies tested the extent to which procedural voice affected justice judgements, group climate, and decision acceptance when people perceived decisions to have moral implications. Results indicated that when people's outcome preferences represent strong moral convictions, outcomes were the primary determinant of perceived fairness and related judgements, irrespective of whether people had voice in the decision‐making process. 相似文献