Natural Compatibilism,Indeterminism, and Intrusive Metaphysics

The claim that common sense regards free will and moral responsibility as compatible with determinism has played a central role in both analytic and experimental philosophy. In this paper, we show that evidence in favor of this “natural compatibilism” is undermined by the role that indeterministic metaphysical views play in how people construe deterministic scenarios. To demonstrate this, we re-examine two classic studies that have been used to support natural compatibilism. We find that although people give apparently compatibilist responses, this is largely explained by the fact that people import an indeterministic metaphysics into deterministic scenarios when making judgments about freedom and responsibility. We conclude that judgments based on these scenarios are not reliable evidence for natural compatibilism.     

在亲／反社会情境下儿童对说谎的理解及其道德评价的研究

本研究比较了幼儿及小学儿童在亲社会与反社会情境下对说谎/说真话的理解及幼儿对其所作的道德评价上的年龄差异.结果表明自4岁开始儿童能够明确地理解说谎/说真话,并作出相应的道德判断.但3岁幼儿无论是对说谎/说真话概念的判断,还是道德评价,不能对行为与言语作明确的区别.习俗性特征对说谎概念判断的影响始于9岁.     

Moral Development and Higher States of Consciousness

This paper discusses possible relationships between the cognitive–moral development theory of Lawrence Kohlberg and Charles Alexander's life-span model. Central to Alexander's model is the role which levels of mind and higher states of consciousness play throughout the general periods of development. Parallel to Kohlberg's cosmic perspective Stage 7—which goes beyond the representational logic and reasoning identified by Piaget's highest stage—are the postrepresentational stages of development, described by Vedic psychology and Alexander's model as "higher states of consciousness"—transcendental consciousness, cosmic consciousness, God consciousness, and unity consciousness. Research indicates that EEG brainwave coherence is associated with the development of higher states of consciousness and Kohlberg's Stage 7. Studies on the Transcendental Meditation (TM) and TM-Sidhi programs as effective technologies for promoting moral development are further discussed.     

THE PRIMORDIAL ROOTS OF BEING

Abstract. Suffering, alongside the feeling of sanctity of life, pervades human experience, generating primal anxiety, which humans learn to shore up with social solidarity and with the practice of communication in religious rituals. The roots of social belonging spring from the primordial sentiments toward ethnicity, race, language, religion, customs and traditions, and region. Self–identity, mediated by mental formations derived from social relations, is composed of thinking and values. Daily experience reveals that cultural differences produce blind spots in thinking and barriers in values—-governing areas of activity, social relations, the world, and identity of being—-that impedes cross—-cultural understanding.     

Critical Consciousness: An Alternative Pathway for Positive Personal and Social Development

This paper presents a conceptual model of the integrative psychological construct of critical consciousness (CC), defined as a moral awareness which propels individuals to disembed from their cultural, social, and political environment, and engage in a responsible critical moral dialogue with it, making active efforts to construct their own place in social reality and to develop internal consistency in their ways of being. The ontogeny of CC is analyzed in terms of the synergistic interaction between its two main components, structural developmental and moral motivation. The paper describes the cross-cultural interview research which allowed the elaboration of the CC developmental pathway. It posits the dimension of moral motivation as distinguishing the CC pathway, and illustrates the continuum between predominantly moral and expediency motivation through brief case vignettes. The paper differentiates three developmental macrolevels of CC, and illustrates through case vignettes two alternatives of social consciousness at the level of conventional morality—CC and non-CC. Some possible sources of moral motivation in personal history and biography are discussed.     

Explaining the Feelings of Justice

Philosophical theories about justice feelings and axiological feelings generally suffer from the fact that they look for simple criteria of justice, legitimacy, fairness. For this reason, they appear as of little help to account for the findings from sociological empirical studies. Weber's notion of "axiological rationality" can be interpreted as suggesting a "cognitivist" theory of axiological feelings. According to this theory, the causes responsible for the fact that a social actor endorses an axiological statement would not be basically different from the causes responsible for his endorsement of a representational statement. He would endorse the statement "X is fair" as he endorses "X is true", because these statements appear to him as grounded on strong reasons, though he may not perceive these reasons explicitly. This cognitivist theory was used by analysts of collective moral sentiments, as Adam Smith, before Max Weber. A careful examination of two empirical studies shows that the cognitivist theory can make the observational findings more easily understandable. The "cognitivist theory" eliminates the weaknesses of the major general philosophical and sociological theories of axiological feelings. It shows notably that these feelings can be context-dependent without this contextuality making them irrational. This theory includes two major principles: that instrumental rationality does not overlap with rationality shortly; that there are no simple criteria of "fairness", "legitimacy", etc.     

论道德意识的认知特征

道德作为一种实践意识 ,其认知特征主要有三 :一是人道为本 ,自觉觉他 ;二是“是”“应”同辙 ,智仁并举 ;三是情理交融 ,知行合一。     

Salience,Imagination, and Moral Luck

One key desideratum of a theory of blame is that it be able to explain why we typically have differing blaming responses in cases involving significant degrees of luck. T.M. Scanlon has proposed a relational account of blame, and he has argued that his account succeeds in this regard and that this success makes his view preferable to reactive attitude accounts of blame. In this paper, I aim to show that Scanlon's view is open to a different kind of luck-based objection. I then offer a way of understanding moral luck cases which allows for a plausible explanation of our differential blaming responses by appealing to the salience of certain relevant features of the action in question.     

Counterfactual and semi-factual thoughts in moral judgements about failed attempts to harm

People judge that an individual who attempts to harm someone but fails should be blamed and punished more when they imagine how things could have turned out worse, compared to when they imagine how things could have turned out the same, or when they think only about what happened. This moral counterfactual amplification effect occurs when people believe the protagonist had no reason for the attempt to harm, and not when the protagonist had a reason, as Experiment 1 shows. It occurs for intentional failed attempts to harm and also for accidental near-misses, as Experiment 2 shows, but not for failed attempts in which the harm occurs anyway by another cause, for both general judgments about the event and specific judgments about the individual's actions, as Experiments 3 and 4 show. The implications for understanding the role of counterfactual thoughts in moral judgement are discussed.     

Stephen Hawking,Morality, ETI,and How We’ve Evolved Past a Murderous Past

I disagree with Hawking, arguing that there are some good reasons to believe that ETI would not be out to harm us.