Situational moral adjustment and the happy victimizer

In this study we examine the possibility that the happy victimizer phenomenon (HVP), which is generally thought to be restricted to a specific period in middle childhood, also appears among adults. In contrast to other studies that explain the HVP as a lack of moral motivation or an insufficiently developed moral self, we propose to explain HVP in terms of a specific moral stage, i.e., a specific kind of moral reasoning. In particular we identify HV-typical moral reasoning with a sub-form of Kohlberg Stage 2. Adult usage of this moral stage is then explained in terms of situation-specificity. We also try to elaborate the idea of situational adjustment and to reveal the processes of activation and usage of previously acquired moral stage principles. Our empirical study shows that adults use HV-typical principles in specific situations.     

Personal Identity, Fission and Time Travel

One problem that has formed the focus of much recent discussion on personal identity is the Fission Problem. The aim of this paper is to offer a novel solution to this problem.

The Problem of Moral Luck: An Argument Against its Epistemic Reduction

Whom I call ‘epistemic reductionists’ in this article are critics of the notion of ‘moral luck’ that maintain that all supposed cases of moral luck are illusory; they are in fact cases of what I describe as a special form of epistemic luck, the only difference lying in what we get to know about someone, rather than in what (s)he deserves in terms of praise or blame. I argue that epistemic reductionists are mistaken. They implausibly separate judgements of character from judgements concerning acts, and they assume a conception of character that is untenable both from a common sense perspective and with a view to findings from social psychology. I use especially the example of Scobie, the protagonist of Graham Greene’s novel The Heart of the Matter, to show that moral luck is real—that there are cases of moral luck that cannot be reduced to epistemic luck. The reality of moral luck, in this example at least, lies in its impact on character and personal and moral identity.

The role of moral commitments in moral judgment

Traditional approaches to moral psychology assumed that moral judgments resulted from the application of explicit commitments, such as those embodied in consequentialist or deontological philosophies. In contrast, recent work suggests that moral judgments often result from unconscious or emotional processes, with explicit commitments generated post hoc. This paper explores the intermediate position that moral commitments mediate moral judgments, but not through their explicit and consistent application in the course of judgment. An experiment with 336 participants finds that individuals vary in the extent to which their moral commitments are consequentialist or deontological, and that this variation is systematically but imperfectly related to the moral judgments elicited by trolley car problems. Consequentialist participants find action in trolley car scenarios more permissible than do deontologists, and only consequentialists moderate their judgments when scenarios that typically elicit different intuitions are presented side by side. The findings emphasize the need for a theory of moral reasoning that can accommodate both the associations and dissociations between moral commitments and moral judgments.     

Kamm on Inviolability and Agent-Relative Restrictions

Agent-relative restrictions prohibit minimizing violations: that is, they require us not to minimize the total number of their violations by violating them ourselves. Frances Kamm has explained this prohibition in terms of the moral worth of persons, which, in turn, she explains in terms of persons’ high moral status as inviolable beings. I press the following criticism of this account: even if minimizing violations are permissible, we need not have a lower moral status provided other determinants thereof boost it. Thus, Kamm’s account is incomplete at best. And when, to address this incompleteness, it is insisted that our moral worth derives from specific moral statuses, the inviolability account comes to seem deficient because it begs the question against those who are not initially persuaded that minimizing violations are impermissible.

Ethical Naturalism and Moral Twin Earth

In order to rebut G. E. Moore’s open question argument, ethical naturalists adopt a theory of direct reference for our moral terms. T. Horgan and M. Timmons have argued that this theory cannot be applied to moral terms, on the ground that it clashes with competent speakers’ linguistic intuitions. While Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment shows that our linguistic intuitions confirm the theory of direct reference, as applied to ‘water’, Horgan and Timmons devise a parallel thought experiment about moral terms, in order to show that this theory runs against our linguistic intuitions about such terms. My claim is that the Horgan–Timmons argument does not work. I concede that their thought experiment is a good way to test the applicability of the theory of direct reference to moral terms, and argue that the upshot of their experiment is not what they claim it is: our linguistic intuitions about Moral Twin Earth are parallel to, not different from, our intuitions about Twin Earth.

Solidarity and Social Justice: Effect of Individual Differences in Justice Sensitivity on Solidarity Behaviour

We investigate the effect of individual differences in justice sensitivity (JS) on giving behaviour in a solidarity game, its potential moderators and the underlying psychological mechanisms. In a solidarity game, subjects are asked to make decisions about transferring money to other players in a case in which they win a random draw and the other players lose. The results of four studies showed the following: (1) JS explains a unique portion of variance in the solidarity behaviour, above and beyond other basic personality dimensions (e.g. HEXACO model); (2) its effect does not depend on contextual factors, such as the degree of moral entitlement not to share and the possibility to attribute the recipients' disadvantage to their own responsibility; and (3) individual differences in the emotions anticipated in response to different outcomes of a random draw and the cognitive interpretation of the allocation situation partially mediate the effect of JS on solidarity behaviour. We also provided the first evidence that JS predicts individual differences in the propensity to take away others' earnings (antisocial behaviour). The results are discussed with respect to the research on personality as a predictor of prosocial and antisocial behaviour. Copyright © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychology     

道德两难判断中亲属关系的认知研究:来自ERPs的证据

采用事件相关电位技术,考察个体在道德两难情境下对不同亲属的加工特征及其亲属偏见效应。道德两难情境中的主人公为被试的两个亲属(父亲、叔父)和一个熟人,要求被试阅读道德两难情境故事后,对是否愿意救助故事中主人公作出判断。结果发现,直系亲属(父亲)比旁系亲属(叔父)和熟人诱发了更大的P2和LPC平均波幅,而旁系亲属与熟人之间并无显著差异。研究表明了个体对直系亲属更为关注和敏感,表现出明显的亲属偏见效应。     

Alexithymia and the automatic processing of affective information: Evidence from the affective priming paradigm

In Study 1, we examined the moderating impact of alexithymia (i.e., a difficulty identifying and describing feelings to other people and an externally oriented cognitive style) on the automatic processing of affective information. The affective priming paradigm was used, and lower priming effects for high alexithymia scorers were observed when congruent (incongruent) pairs involving nonverbal primes (angry face) and verbal target were presented. The results held after controlling for participants' negative affectivity. The same effects were replicated in Studies 2 and 3, with trait anxiety and depression entered as additional covariates. In Study 3, no moderating impact of alexithymia was found for verbal-facial pairs suggesting that the results cannot be merely explained in terms of transcoding limitations for high alexithymia scorers. Overall, the present results suggest that alexithymia could be related to a difficulty in processing and automatically using high arousal emotional information to respond to concomittant behavioural demands.