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121.
Moral dilemmas and moral rules 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Recent work shows an important asymmetry in lay intuitions about moral dilemmas. Most people think it is permissible to divert a train so that it will kill one innocent person instead of five, but most people think that it is not permissible to push a stranger in front of a train to save five innocents. We argue that recent emotion-based explanations of this asymmetry have neglected the contribution that rules make to reasoning about moral dilemmas. In two experiments, we find that participants show a parallel asymmetry about versions of the dilemmas that have minimized emotional force. In a third experiment, we find that people distinguish between whether an action violates a moral rule and whether it is, all things considered, wrong. We propose that judgments of whether an action is wrong, all things considered, implicate a complex set of psychological processes, including representations of rules, emotional responses, and assessments of costs and benefits. 相似文献
122.
The idea that intuition plays a basic role in moral knowledge and moral philosophy probably began in the eighteenth century.
British philosophers such as Anthony Shaftsbury, Francis Hutcheson, Thomas Reid, and later David Hume talk about a “moral
sense” that they place in John Locke’s theory of knowledge in terms of Lockean reflexive perceptions, while Richard Price
seeks a faculty by which we obtain our ideas of right and wrong. In the twentieth century intuitionism in moral philosophy
was revived by the works of G. E. Moore, H. A. Prichard, and W. D. Ross. These philosophers reject Kantian deontological ethics
and utilitarianism insisting that intuition is the only source of moral knowledge. Recently, there is a renewed interest in
intuition by philosophers doing meta-philosophy by reflecting on what philosophers do, and why they disagree. In this essay
we plan to take some of this recent literature on intuition and apply it to moral philosophy. We will proceed by (1) defining
a conception of intuition, (2) answering some skeptical challenges, (3) delimiting its target, and (4) arguing that intuition
is often a source of moral knowledge.
相似文献
Thomas W. SmytheEmail: |
123.
Garry Young 《Philosophia》2007,35(2):171-180
This paper aims to challenge the view that the sign present in many Frankfurt-style scenarios is insufficiently robust to
constitute evidence for the possibility of an alternate decision, and therefore inadequate as a means of determining moral
responsibility. I have amended Frankfurt’s original scenario, so as to allow Jones, as well as Black, the opportunity to monitor
his (Jones’s) own inclination towards a particular decision (the sign). Different outcome possibilities are presented, to
the effect that Jones’s awareness of his own inclinations leads to the conclusion that the sign must be either (a) a prior
determinate of the decision about to be made, (b) prior and indeterminate (therefore allowing for a contra-inclination decision
to be made), or (c) constitutive of a decision that Jones has made but is not yet aware of. In effect, this means that, prior
to the intervention of Black, Jones must have decided to do otherwise or could have so decided. Either way, although Frankfurt’s
conclusion, that Jones could not have done other than he did, is upheld, the idea that he could not have decided otherwise must be rejected, and with it the view that the sign is nothing more than a flicker of freedom insufficient for
assigning morally responsibility.
相似文献
Garry YoungEmail: |
124.
Alexander A. Guerrero 《Philosophical Studies》2007,136(1):59-97
This paper takes on several distinct but related tasks. First, I present and discuss what I will call the “Ignorance Thesis,”
which states that whenever an agent acts from ignorance, whether factual or moral, she is culpable for the act only if she
is culpable for the ignorance from which she acts. Second, I offer a counterexample to the Ignorance Thesis, an example that
applies most directly to the part I call the “Moral Ignorance Thesis.” Third, I argue for a principle—Don’t Know, Don’t Kill—that
supports the view that the purported counterexample actually is a counterexample. Finally, I suggest that my arguments in
this direction can supply a novel sort of argument against many instances of killing and eating certain sorts of animals.
相似文献
Alexander A. GuerreroEmail: |
125.
Don Garrett 《Philosophical Studies》2007,132(1):1-16
Is Hume a naturalist? Does he regard all or nearly all beliefs and actions as rationally unjustified? In order to settle these questions, it is necessary to examine their key terms (‘naturalism’ and ‘rational justification’) and to understand the character—especially the normative character—of Hume’s philosophical project. This paper argues (i) that Hume is a naturalist—and, in particular, both a moral and an epistemic naturalist—in quite robust ways; and (ii) that Hume can properly regard many actions and beliefs as “rationally justified” in several different senses of that term. 相似文献
126.
Two studies examine the extent to which moral identity and moral disengagement jointly drive reactions to war. Study 1 finds support for a hypothesized positive relationship between moral disengagement and the perceived morality of a highly punitive response to the perpetuators of the September 11th attacks. It also finds that this effect was eliminated for participants who place high self-importance on their moral identities. Study 2 finds that moral disengagement effectively reduced the extent to which participants experienced negative emotions in reaction to abuses of Iraqi detainees by American soldiers; however, the effectiveness of moral disengagement was negated when participants’ moral identities were primed. 相似文献
127.
Kurt Gray 《Cognition》2014
Two prominent theories offer different perspectives on the role of harm in moral cognition. Dyadic morality suggests that harm-related concerns are pervasive, whereas moral pluralism suggests that these concerns apply only to canonically harmful violations (e.g., murder), and not impure violations (e.g., suicide). Rottman et al. (2014) contrast these two theories by examining moral judgments of suicide. They conclude that suicide wrongness is independent of harm, therefore arguing against dyadic morality and for moral pluralism. However, these conclusions may be overstated; across all these studies, a meta-analysis reveals that harm is a significant predictor of suicide judgments. Moreover, the association between harm and suicide wrongness may be suppressed in individual studies by insufficient power, restrictive exclusion criteria, a single bivariate outlier, and reliance upon the conventional significance threshold of p < .05. In revised analyses harm is robustly associated with suicide wrongness, consistent with dyadic morality. 相似文献
128.
We offer a theory of moral expertise based on an updated version of the Thomistic concept of habitus. We maintain that mature moral control arises from internalized standards of belief married to corresponding actions; the result is moral expertise. Beliefs and actions (conceptualized as habitus) coalesce in a moral identity, which is then sustained by the beliefs and actions that comprise the habitus; what we do affects who we are and what we believe, just as what we believe guides what we do. In support of these claims, we examine recent research on moral judgment, moral identity, and moral emotions. 相似文献
129.
The Investment Model (Rusbult, 1980) defines general commitment as a long‐term orientation towards relationship maintenance and feelings of psychological attachment, influenced by satisfaction, quality of alternatives and intrinsic/extrinsic investments. We suggest the importance of additionally assessing moral commitment, defined by an intrapersonal predisposition to remain in the relationship (Johnson, 1991). We argue moral commitment's association to perceived intrinsic investments acting as internal barriers influencing general commitment and promoting relationship maintenance. A correlational study resorting to structural equation modelling showed that moral commitment predicted intrinsic investments, which in turn predicted general commitment (Model 1). No direct paths emerged from moral commitment to satisfaction or quality of alternatives (Model 2), nor it emerged as a fourth direct predictor of general commitment (Model 3). Results are discussed under relationships maintenance and dissolution frameworks. 相似文献
130.
Despite decades of interest in moral character, comparatively little is known about moral behavior in everyday life. This paper reports a novel method for assessing everyday moral behaviors using the Electronically Activated Recorder (EAR)—a digital audio-recorder that intermittently samples snippets of ambient sounds from people’s environments—and examines the stability of these moral behaviors. In three samples (combined N = 186), participants wore an EAR over one or two weekends. Audio files were coded for everyday moral behaviors (e.g., showing sympathy, gratitude) and morally-neutral comparison language behaviors (e.g., use of prepositions, articles). Results indicate that stable individual differences in moral behavior can be systematically observed in daily life, and that their stability is comparable to the stability of neutral language behaviors. 相似文献