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121.
Richard Joyce 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(1):53-75
Different versions of moral projectivism are delineated: minimal, metaphysical, nihilistic, and noncognitivist. Minimal projectivism (the focus of this paper) is the conjunction of two subtheses: (1) that we experience morality as an objective aspect of the world and (2) that this experience has its origin in an affective attitude (e.g., an emotion) rather than in perceptual faculties. Both are empirical claims and must be tested as such. This paper does not offer ideas on any specific test procedures, but rather undertakes the important preliminary task of clarifying the content of these subtheses (e.g., what is meant by “objective”? what is meant by “experience”?). Finally, attention is given to the relation between (a) acknowledging that the projectivist account might be true of a token moral judgment and (b) maintaining moral projectivism to be true as a general thesis. 相似文献
122.
Jon Tresan 《The Journal of Ethics》2009,13(1):51-72
‘Internalism’ is used in metaethics for a cluster of claims which bear a family resemblance. They tend to link, in some distinctive
way—typically modal, mereological, or causal—different parts of the normative realm, or the normative and the psychological.
The thesis of this paper is that much metaethical mischief has resulted from philosophers’ neglect of the distinction between
two different features of such claims. The first is the modality of the entire claim. The second is the relation between the
items specified in the claim. In part one I explain this distinction and the problems neglecting it may cause. In part two
I show that it has been neglected, and has caused those problems, at least with respect to one version of internalism. That
is judgment internalism, which claims that moral beliefs are necessarily related to pro- or con-attitudes; e.g., that if you
believe you ought to x you must have some motivation to x. The considerations standardly adduced in favor of judgment internalism
support only a version which lacks the metaethical implications typically attributed to it, at least so far as anyone has
shown. Proponents and opponents of judgment internalism fail to realize this because of their neglect of the modality/relation
distinction. I illustrate by considering discussions of judgment internalism by Russ Shafer-Landau, Simon Blackburn, James
Dreier, David Brink, and others.
相似文献
Jon TresanEmail: |
123.
Ishtiyaque Haji 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(2):169-179
Practical reasons, roughly, are reasons to have our desires and goals, and to do what might secure these goals. I argue for
the view that lack of freedom to do otherwise undermines the truth of judgments of practical reason. Thus, assuming that determinism
expunges alternative possibilities, determinism undercuts the truth of such judgments. I propose, in addition, that if practical
reason is associated with various values in a specified way, then determinism precludes such values owing to determinism's
imperiling practical reason.
相似文献
Ishtiyaque HajiEmail: |
124.
125.
Mark Moller 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2009,30(2):131-145
Many who believe that human embryos have moral status are convinced that their use in human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research
can be morally justified as long as they are discarded embryos left over from fertility treatments. This is one reason why
this view about discarded embryos has played such a prominent role in the debate over publicly funding hESC research in the
United States and other countries. Many believe that this view offers the best chance of a compromise between the different
sides in this debate. This paper focuses on what seems to be the most plausible argument for this view about discarded embryos.
It shows that this argument is unsound regardless of how one understands the claim that embryos have moral status. It also
discusses the implications of this conclusion for attempts to use this argument as a basis for public policy.
相似文献
Mark MollerEmail: |
126.
Nano-ethics as NEST-ethics: Patterns of Moral Argumentation About New and Emerging Science and Technology 总被引:6,自引:3,他引:3
There might not be a specific nano-ethics, but there definitely is an ethics of new & emerging science and technology (NEST),
with characteristic tropes and patterns of moral argumentation. Ethical discussion in and around nanoscience and technology
reflects such NEST-ethics. We offer an inventory of the arguments, and show patterns in their evolution, in arenas full of
proponents and opponents. We also show that there are some nano-specific issues: in how size matters, and when agency is delegated
to smart devices. Our overall approach is a pragmatist ethics, and we conclude that struggle (and learning) might be more
productive than models emphasizing consensus.
相似文献
Tsjalling SwierstraEmail: |
127.
Gerhard Schurz 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2001,32(1):65-107
Normic Laws and the Significance of Nonmonotonic Reasoning for Philosophy of Science. Normic laws have the form ‘if A then normally B’. They have been discovered in the explanation debate, but were considered
as empirically vacuous (§1). I argue that the prototypical (or ideal) normality of normic laws implies statistical normality
(§2), whence normic laws have empirical content. In §3–4 I explain why reasoning from normic laws is nonmonotonic, and why
the understanding of the individual case is so important here. After sketching some foundations of nonmonotonic reasoning
as developed by AI-researchers (§5), Iargue that normic laws are also the best way to understand ceteris paribus laws (§6).
§7 deals with the difference between physical and non-physical disciplines and §9 with the difference between normicity and
approximation. In §8 it is shown how nonmonotonic reasoning provides a new understanding of the protection of theories against
falsification by auxiliary hypotheses. §10, finally, gives a system- and evolution-theoretical explanation of the deeper reason
for the omnipresence of normic laws in practice and science, and forthe connection between ideal and statistical normality.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
128.
ObjectivesThe purpose of this study was to examine associations between late adolescent football players’ perceptions of the motivational climate – as initiated by mothers and fathers – and attitudes towards moral decision making in sports.DesignCross-sectional.MethodsParticipants were 213 Swedish football players (144 males, 67 females) aged 16–19 years who completed measures assessing perceived parent-initiated motivational climate (i.e., success-without-effort climate [SWEC]; worry conducive climate [WCC]; and learning/enjoyment climate [LEC]) and attitudes towards moral decision-making in sport (i.e., acceptance of cheating [AOC]; acceptance of gamesmanship [AOG] and keeping winning in proportion [KWIP]).ResultsCanonical correlations demonstrated moderate positive relations between parent-initiated − both mother and father − performance climates (WCC and SWEC) and AOC and AOG. Moreover, the relationship between mother and father-initiated learning/enjoyment climate (LEC) were shown to be moderately and positively associated with the prosocial attitude dimension of KWIP. Results also showed that a mother-initiated LEC and a mother-initiated SWEC were stronger predictors of the criterion variables (AOC, AOG, and KWIP) than equivalent father-initiated climate dimensions.ConclusionsThe results highlight the importance of considering the relationship between parent-initiated climates − especially initiated by mothers − and the development of moral decision-making among youth football players. 相似文献
129.
Dolichan Kollareth Mariko Kikutani Mariko Shirai James A. Russell 《International journal of psychology》2019,54(5):612-620
According to one important set of theories, different domains of immorality are linked to different discrete emotions—panculturally. Violations against the community elicit contempt, whereas violations against an individual elicit anger. To test this theory, American, Indian and Japanese participants (N = 480) indicated contempt and anger reactions (with verbal rating and face selection) to both the types of immorality. To remedy method problems in previous research, community and autonomy violations were created for the same story‐frame, by varying the target to be either the community or an individual. Community and autonomy violations did not differ significantly in the emotion elicited: overall, both types of violations elicited more anger than contempt (and more negative emotion of any kind than positive emotion). By verbal rating, Americans and Indians reported more anger than contempt for both types of violation, whereas Japanese reported more contempt than anger for both types. By face selection, the three cultural groups selected anger more than contempt for both types of violation. The results speak against defining distinct domains of morality by their association with distinct emotions. 相似文献
130.
Sean Luke 《Heythrop Journal》2024,65(1):3-18
Abstract: In recent years, attempts to reconcile God's exhaustive providential control over the future and human freedom frequently appeal to Molinism. Through the theory of Middle Knowledge, it is claimed, God can exercise meticulous providence over free creatures while preserving the libertarian agency of those creatures. Historically, both Thomist and Reformed theologians have critiqued the theory of Middle Knowledge for effectively eliminating God's aseity, making God's knowledge in some sense dependent on some non-God reality. In this paper, I aim to push the discussion forward by integrating Thomist, Molinist, and Reformed perspectives in the view I call Molinist Thomist Calvinism. By resourcing each of these views, I try to offer a coherent way to affirm God's meticulous providence, including God's unconditional election of some and not others, and morally significant human freedom. 相似文献