More than words: Judgments of politicians and the role of different communication channels

We collected short video clips of speakers and created five types of stimuli: (1) the original videos, (2) the audio tracks only, (3) single pictures only, (4) speech content, and (5) stick-figure animations displaying body motion. Participants rated these stimuli on a brief Big Five personality inventory. We then used ratings of the incomplete information conditions to predict ratings of the original video condition. Impressions in the audio track condition were strong predictors throughout all trait ratings. However, other cues were also non-negligible contributors to an overall impression. People even make sense of parsimonious cues, e.g., an animated stick-figure. Thus, presenters on a public stage are not only judged by what they say but also by how they move.     

Moral sentiment predicts desire for Scottish independence

Scottish independence has been a topic of considerable political debate for some time, with the 2014 referendum concerning whether Scotland should remain a part of the United Kingdom testament to this fact. Numerous economic and political factors have been noted as determinants of the referendum vote. However, the role of psychological factors as a predictor of the desire for independence has not been well explored despite much work demonstrating the importance of specific traits and values on a range of socio-political attitudes. In the current study, using a sample of Scottish adults (n = 271), we sought to examine how two core constructs capturing moral sentiment – binding (reflecting concern for group cohesion and norms) and individualizing (reflecting concern over individual rights) – predicted the desire for independence during the build-up to the referendum. Results indicated that lower binding and higher individualizing predicted a desire for independence, with evidence for mediation via Scottish identification. These findings are consistent with the notion that the Scottish independence movement can be viewed as a broadly left-wing phenomenon. More generally, these results provide novel evidence in a charged political debate that moral sentiments concerning how individual and group life should be structured play a significant role in explaining individual differences in political sentiment.     

Integrating values and cognitive style in a model of right-wing radicalism

Research has shown that multi-factorial models of ideology not only account for political orientation but also highlight its core aspects (Feldman & Johnston, 2014). Recently, Montuori (2005) argued that reasoning according to a “logic of disjunction that creates binary opposition” exacerbates what is termed the “totalitarian mindset” (p. 26). In this study we examined this hypothesis by testing a model in which a disjunctive binary logic mediates values and proxies for right-wing radicalism. Methods: 425 participants completed a survey on political orientation that included measures of social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism. Personal values, egalitarianism, and beliefs in a free society were also assessed as they are motives typically associated with ideology. Lastly, we assessed disjunctive logic based on a scale derived from a comprehensive study of ambiguity intolerance markers. Results: A structural equation model in which beliefs in free society, egalitarianism, security, universalism and traditionalism predicted right-wing radicalism was tested with or without interposing a disjunctive logic factor. Our findings show that disjunctive logic played a major role in predicting behaviors associated with right-wing radicalism.     

Why some surprises are more surprising than others: Surprise as a metacognitive sense of explanatory difficulty

Early theories of surprise, including Darwin’s, argued that it was predominantly a basic emotion. Recently, theories have taken a more cognitive view of surprise, casting it as a process of “making sense of surprising events”. The current paper advances the view that the essence of this sense-making process is explanation; specifically, that people’s perception of surprise is a metacognitive estimate of the cognitive work involved in explaining an abnormal event. So, some surprises are more surprising because they are harder to explain. This proposal is tested in eight experiments that explore how (i) the contents of memory can influence surprise, (ii) different classes of scenarios can retrieve more/less relevant knowledge from memory to explain surprising outcomes, (iii) how partial explanations constrain the explanation process, reducing surprise, and (iv) how, overall, any factor that acts to increase the cognitive work in explaining a surprising event, results in higher levels of surprise (e.g., task demands to find three rather than one explanations). Across the present studies, using different materials, paradigms and measures, it is consistently and repeatedly found that the difficulty of explaining a surprising outcome is the best predictor for people’s perceptions of the surprisingness of events. Alternative accounts of these results are considered, as are future directions for this research.