A game-to-game investigation of the relation between need-supportive and need-thwarting coaching and moral behavior in soccer

ObjectiveAlthough perceived need-supportive and need-thwarting coaching have received considerable attention, the question whether coach behavior fluctuates from game to game, with resulting associations with players’ moral behavior has not been examined.Design and methodA Belgian sample of soccer players (N = 197; M = 26.57) was followed during five competition games, with players completing measures both prior to and following each game assessing, pre-game and on-game perceived coaching as well as athletes’ moral behavior.ResultsResults of multilevel analyses indicated that there exists substantial variation in perceived need-thwarting and need-supportive coaching behavior from game to game. The game-to-game variation in perceived pre-game need-thwarting coaching behavior related positively to variation in the adoption of an objectifying stance, which, in turn, related to variation in antisocial behavior oriented towards the opponent, the referee, and even their own teammates. Variation in perceived on-game need-supportive and need-thwarting coaching behavior yielded an additional relation to team-related moral outcomes. Finally, supplementary analysis indicated that these effects also held for an objective marker of moral functioning (i.e., number of yellow cards) and that players’ level of competition-contingent pay related to their antisocial behavior via an objectifying stance.ConclusionThe discussion highlights the fluctuating and dynamic nature of motivating coaching behavior, and its association with players’ moral functioning.     

女性面孔吸引力的加工及其对男性诚实道德行为的影响:一项ERP研究

研究考察了不同女性面孔吸引力情境对男性被试诚实道德决策行为的影响,同时采用ERP技术对社会情境中面孔吸引力的信息加工方式特点进行探究。结果发现,高面孔吸引力记录员情境中被试倾向更加真实地报告自己的预测结果而表现出更多诚实的道德决策;ERP结果则发现高吸引力记录员面孔较之于低吸引力记录员面孔在反应提示界面在大脑中后部诱发更大的早期N200成分。结果提示,在与面孔审美评价无关的社会情境中个体面孔的吸引力信息能够被快速识别与自动化加工,同时也会直接促进他人自身的道德行为水平。     

Who Knows? Knowledge Activation,Belief in Certainty of Knowledge,Maximization Tendencies and Need for Cognition in Answerability Judgments

In this study, investigating answerability judgments, 123 participants judged whether each of 46 general knowledge questions could currently be answered by themselves, by someone else, or by no one. There were 26 consensus questions (high expected consensus about their answerability) and 20 non-consensus questions. Before each question, half of the participants rated the extent of their knowledge related to the question. Results showed that answering consensus questions compared with non-consensus led to a lower proportion of “No one knows” answers. Moreover, in the knowledge rating condition compared with the control condition, participants choose “No one knows” proportionally less. Participants’ ratings of belief in certainty of knowledge were associated with more “Someone else knows” for the non-consensus questions. Moreover, tendency to maximization led to a higher proportion of “Someone else knows” options for the non-consensus questions. Finally, high need for cognition was associated with fewer choices of “Someone else knows.”     

“To‐be‐forgotten” statements become less true: Memory processes involved in selection and forgetting lead to truthfulness changes of ambiguous sentences

What happens when people try to forget something? What are the consequences of instructing people to intentionally forget a sentence? Recent studies employing the item‐method directed forgetting paradigm have shown that to‐be‐forgotten (TBF) items are, in a subsequent task, emotionally devaluated relative to to‐be‐remembered (TBR) items, an aftereffect of memory selection (Vivas, Marful, Panagiotidou & Bajo, 2016). As such, distractor devaluation by attentional selection generalizes to memory selection. In this study, we use the item‐method directed forgetting paradigm to test the effects of memory selection and inhibition on truth judgments of ambiguous sentences. We expected the relative standing of an item in the task (i.e., whether it was instructed to be remembered or forgotten) to affect the truthfulness value of that item, making TBF items less valid/truthful than TBR items. As predicted, ambiguous sentences associated with a “Forget” cue were subsequently judged as less true than sentences associated with a “Remember” cue, suggesting that instructions to intentionally forget a statement can produce changes in the validity/truthfulness of that statement. To our knowledge, this is the first study to show an influence of memory processes involved in selection and forgetting on the perceived truthfulness of sentences.     

Moral rationalism and psychopathy: Affective responses to reason

Evidence suggests that psychopaths’ notoriously immoral behavior is due to affective rather than rational deficits. This evidence could be taken to show that, contrary to moral rationalism, moral norms are not norms of reason. Rationalists could reply either that psychopaths’ behavior is in fact primarily due to rational deficits or that affects are involved in responding to rational norms. Drawing on the work of Antonio Damasio and colleagues, I argue the latter is the better defense of moral rationalism.     

Scrutinizing the Emotional Nature of Intuitive Coherence Judgments

Dual‐system models propose that cognitive processing can occur either intuitively or deliberately. Unlike deliberate decision strategies, intuitive ones are assumed to have an emotional component attached to the decision process. We tested if intuitive decisions are indeed accompanied by an emotional response while deliberate decisions are not. Specifically, we conducted a psychophysiological study in which participants were instructed to decide either intuitively or deliberately if three simultaneously presented words were semantically coherent or incoherent (triad task). The degree of emotionality of these two decision strategies (intuitive vs. deliberate) was compared using changes in electrodermal activity (EDA) and the reaction time (RT) effect of an affective priming paradigm as primary measurements. Based on a valence‐arousal model, our results revealed that intuitive and deliberate judgments do not differ as to their emotional valence but that they do differ in emotional arousal. Most notably, sympathetic activation during intuitive judgments was significantly lower compared to sympathetic activation during deliberate judgments. Our results reflect that a relaxed state of mind—manifested in low sympathetic activity—could underlie the holistic processing that is assumed to facilitate the proliferation of semantic associations during coherence judgments. This suggests that coherence judgments made under an (instructed) intuitive decision mode have a specific psychophysiological signature and that arousal is the differentiating component between intuitive and deliberate decision strategies. © 2016 The Authors Journal of Behavioral Decision Making Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

How Do Lay People Weight Information About Instrumentality, Expressiveness, and Gender-Typed Hobbies When Judging Masculinity–Femininity in Themselves, Best Friends, and Strangers?

To study how people weight information when judging their own and others’ masculinity–femininity (M–F), I asked 170 male and 205 female participants to rate themselves and their best friends on M–F, instrumentality, expressiveness, and gender-typed hobby preferences. Also, each participant judged the M–F of eight fictitious women (or men) described as possessing low or high instrumentality, low or high expressiveness, and hobbies typical of men or women. Regression analyses showed that gender-typed hobby preferences predicted M–F ratings of self and friends more strongly than instrumentality or expressiveness did. Similarly, analyses of participants’ judgments of fictitious people showed that participants weighted gender-typed hobbies more strongly than instrumentality and expressiveness when judging targets’ M–F. All results converged to show that lay people’s judgments of M–F are based more on information about gender-typed interests than on information about instrumentality or expressiveness.     

Egocentrism in moral development: Gibbs, Piaget, Kohlberg

In Gibb’s theory of moral development Piagetian ideas concerning egocentrism play an important role. Based on these ideas Gibbs offers a detailed analysis of transitions in moral development. However, Gibbs still fails to utilize the full potential offered by Piaget’s equilibration theory, because he does not generalize the idea of overcoming egocentrism, as an important mechanism, to all stage transitions. Gibbs seeks a non-relativistic theoretical/ethical justification for his claims about moral development in a difficult to substantiate notion of an underlying reality. Moreover, such objectivist claims are difficult to reconcile with his endorsement of Piaget’s constructivism.Following Piaget’s equilibration theory development can be seen as the march to an ever widening perspective, possible through reflecting abstraction, and implying overcoming egocentric biases that recur at all levels of development. Assuming the widest level in the case of moral development is the moral point of view, an impartial procedure that should guarantee that everybody involved can freely agree as the result of considering arguments reflecting all viewpoints, fits in with a tradition in ethics from Kant, to Rawls, to Habermas which takes the moral point of view as the ultimate moral principle. These so called ‘Procedural Ethics’ theories are not relativistic, but not objectivist either, because they ultimately depend on the characteristics of the procedure.     

Moral development, executive functioning, peak experiences and brain patterns in professional and amateur classical musicians: interpreted in light of a Unified Theory of Performance

This study compared professional and amateur classical musicians matched for age, gender, and education on reaction times during the Stroop color-word test, brainwaves during an auditory ERP task and during paired reaction-time tasks, responses on the Gibbs Sociomoral Reflection questionnaire, and self-reported frequencies of peak experiences. Professional musicians were characterized by: (1) lower color-word interference effects (Stroop task), (2) faster categorization of rare expected stimuli (P3b), and a trend for faster processing of rare unexpected stimuli (P3a), (3) higher scores on the Sociomoral Reflection questionnaire, and (4) more frequent peak experiences during rest, tasks, and sleep. Both groups had high values on the Brain Integration Scale. These findings are interpreted in light of a Unified Theory of Performance, which posits that effectiveness in any area is influenced by one’s level of mind-brain development—emotional, cognitive, moral, ego and cortical development—with higher mind-brain development supporting greater effectiveness in any domain.     

Exploring the informational sources of metaperception: the case of Change Blindness Blindness

Perceivers generally show a poor ability to detect changes, a condition referred to as “Change Blindness” (CB). They are, in addition, “blind to their own blindness”. A common explanation of this “Change Blindness Blindness” (CBB) is that it derives from an inadequate, “photographical” folk-theory about perception. This explanation, however, does not account for intra-individual variations of CBB across trials. Our study aims to explore an alternative theory, according to which participants base their self-evaluations on two activity-dependent cues, namely search time and perceived success in prior trials. These cues were found to influence self-evaluation in two orthogonal ways: success-feedback influenced self-evaluation in a global, contextual way, presumably by recalibrating the norm of adequacy for the task. Search time influenced it in a local way, predicting the success of a given trial from its duration.