Addressing moral problems through practical reasoning

In this paper, following the work of Hare, we consider moral reasoning not as the application of moral norms and principles, but as reasoning about what ought to be done in a particular situation, with moral norms perhaps emerging from this reasoning. We model this situated reasoning drawing on our previous work on argumentation schemes, here set in the context of Action-Based Alternating Transition Systems. We distinguish what prudentially ought to be done from what morally ought to be done, consider what legislation might be appropriate and characterise the differences between morally correct, morally praiseworthy and morally excusable actions. We also describe an implementation which simulates this reasoning and discuss some issues arising from the simulation.     

基于场景记忆的参照系整合过程中的物体方位判断

以绝对方位中的物体方位判断为实验任务,并按照以往研究把判断过程进行分解为获取目标位置信息、获取前行方向信息和判断目标物体相对于参照物体的方位信息,旨在考察不同信息获取过程下的目标位置和前行方向如何影响基于场景记忆的参照系整合过程中的绝对方位判断。实验1的判断任务同时包括这三个过程;实验2和实验3中的判断任务分别独立于路径描述（即定位后判断,先获知目标位置信息,再进行方位判断）和自身定向（即定向后判断,先获取前行方向信息,再进行方位判断）。每个任务均为目标位置（R0o－前、R45o－左前/右前、R90o－左/右、R135o－左后/右后, R180o－后）×前行方向（北、东南西、斜方向）的组内设计、因变量为正确率和判断时间为主,共有60名大学生被试（男女各半）参与实验。发现：朝北优势效应只在实验1中明显;三个实验任务中均存在正方向－左右位置优势效应、以及0o和180o位置优势效应;目标位置对物体方位判断的影响程度要大于前行方向对判断的影响程度。结合以往的研究来看,场景记忆上的判断比视觉媒介上的同类判断受目标位置影响的程度要大,其他影响模式比较一致。从判断的信息获取过程上对结果进行了讨论,这有助于理解绝对方位判断的认知结构     

Moral disagreement and procedural justice: Moral mandates as constraints to voice effects

Procedural voice is a widely used and effective means to reduce or eliminate conflict. Moral disagreements, however, are particularly inflammatory, divisive, and difficult to manage. The current article reports two studies that demonstrated the unique challenge that moral disagreements pose. Specifically, the studies tested the extent to which procedural voice affected justice judgements, group climate, and decision acceptance when people perceived decisions to have moral implications. Results indicated that when people's outcome preferences represent strong moral convictions, outcomes were the primary determinant of perceived fairness and related judgements, irrespective of whether people had voice in the decision‐making process.     

Pursuing moral outrage: Anger at torture

Moral outrage—anger at violation of a moral standard—should be distinguished from anger at the harm caused by standard-violating behavior. Recent research that used experimental manipulation to disentangle these different forms of anger found evidence of personal and empathic anger, but not of moral outrage. We sought to extend this research by assessing anger at a more extreme moral violation: torture. If the person tortured is a member of one’s group (nationality), anger may not be over the moral violation but over the harm done to one of “us.” In an experiment designed to create the necessary appraisal conditions, we found clear evidence of identity-relevant personal anger (anger when a person from one’s nationality is tortured) but little evidence of moral outrage (anger even when a person from an identity-irrelevant nationality is tortured). Implications for understanding moral emotion and moral motivation are discussed.     

Possessing Moral Concepts

Moral discourse allows for speakers to disagree in many ways: about right and wrong acts, about moral theory, about the rational and conative significance of moral failings. Yet speakers’ eccentricities do not prevent them from engaging in moral conversation or from having (genuine, not equivocal) moral disagreement. Thus differences between speakers are compatible with possession of moral concepts. This paper examines various kinds of moral disagreements and argues that they provide evidence against conceptual-role and informational atomist approaches to understanding our moral concepts. Conceptual role approaches fail because they cannot account for shared concepts among speakers with different commitments to the practical and conative ramifications of moral judgments. Informational atomist views fail because speakers need not be locked on to the same moral properties to share moral concepts.

Eavesdropping on social life: The accuracy of stranger ratings of daily behavior from thin slices of natural conversations

In two studies the authors examined the accuracy of stranger ratings of daily behavior based on thin slices of natural conversations. Methodologically, the studies extend past research by using a behavioral accuracy criterion, benchmarking zero-acquaintance accuracy against target and informant accuracy, and employing a representative design that sampled contexts from targets’ daily situations. Theoretically, the studies investigate how stereotypes influence the accuracy of first impressions depending on their sample-based validity. Across both studies, after listening to five conversational snippets (2.5 min total), the ratings of strangers were as accurate as the targets’ and informants’ ratings. Further, ratings for gender-stereotypic behaviors with a kernel of truth resulted in greater initial accuracy than ratings for gender-stereotypic behaviors with no kernel of truth.     

Confidence judgments in real classroom settings: monitoring performance in different types of tests

During testing, students have a valuable opportunity to exercise and improve their self-regulatory skills. However, the extent to which they profit from those experiences may vary according to some personal, test-related, and environmental factors. This study investigated the effects of metacognitive skills and test types on students' test performances, confidence judgments, and on the accuracy of those judgments. A sample of 129 psychology undergraduate students (50 men and 79 women, mean age = 18.9 years) were categorized according to their metacognitive skills (high vs average vs low) and had their test performances and monitoring processes in two different types of tests (i.e., multiple-choice and short-answer tests) compared throughout one academic term. Their test preparation practices, along with their attributional and regulatory processes during test-taking, were also compared by using open-ended questions. The results showed that: (1) high-metacognitive students presented more effective test preparation practices, better test performances, and superior attributional, regulatory, and monitoring processes than their counterparts; (2) differences in performance and judgment accuracy were significantly larger in the short-answer tests than in the multiple-choice tests; and (3) over time, students' performances and confidence levels varied in specific patterns according to the type of test being taken. The results are discussed, focusing on the educational implications of the interactions observed and on how they may determine what students can learn from test-taking experiences. In addition, based on the results obtained, specific suggestions on how to increase the metacognitive awareness of university students through instruction and on how to improve their academic assessment are provided.     

Let there be no mistake! On assessment mode and the transference effect in social perception

We examined the possibility that assessment regulatory mode orientation affects the tendency to exhibit transference effects in social perception. Based on a social cognitive methodological paradigm devised by Andersen and colleagues [e.g., Andersen, Glassman, Chen, & Cole, 1996], we find that the transference effect is more pronounced when individuals’ (chronic) assessment orientation is low (vs. high). These results suggest that transference is more likely to occur when less attention is directed towards the target of perception.     

Sad, thus true: Negativity bias in judgments of truth

An effect observable across many different domains is that negative instances tend to be more influential than comparably positive ones. This phenomenon has been termed the negativity bias. In the current work, it was investigated whether this effect pertains to judgments of truth. That is, it was hypothesized that information valence and perceived validity should be associated such that more negative information is deemed more true. This claim was derived from the findings that negative instances tend to demand more attentional resources and that more elaborate processing can render messages more persuasive. In three experiments, manipulating information valence through framing - and assessing judgments of truth - the hypothesized negativity bias was corroborated. Potential explanations and implications for further research are discussed.     

Hard incompatibilism and its rivals

In this article I develop several responses to my co-authors of Four Views on Free Will. In reply to Manuel Vargas, I suggest a way to clarify his claim that our concepts of free will and moral responsibility should be revised, and I question whether he really proposes to revise the notion of basic desert at stake in the debate. In response to Robert Kane, I examine the role the rejection of Frankfurt-style arguments has in his position, and whether his criticism of my version of this argument is sound. In reply to John Fischer, I argue that the reasons-responsiveness central to his account of moral responsibility is not best characterized counterfactually, and I provide a suggestion for revision.