延时间隔和线索类型对遗忘学习判断的影响*

主要探讨不同延时间隔和线索类型对遗忘元认知判断的影响。采用传统的学习判断任务,让被试学习40对无意义配对词,并告知随后进行测试,当呈现第一个词时,被试能够回忆与之配对的后一个词。让被试预测当延迟不同时间（5分钟、1天和1周）进行测试时,他们能够记住（学习判断）或者遗忘（遗忘判断）后一词的可能性。最后,要求被试回忆所有词对。结果发现延时间隔对学习判断和遗忘判断有相似的影响;学习判断的等级和相对准确性均高于遗忘判断,说明人们对记住和遗忘的线索很敏感;相比于学习判断,人们监测自己遗忘能力的信心不足。研究结果表明人们能够利用延时间隔和线索类型来预测未来的测验成绩,对遗忘的监测能力低于对记住的监测。     

Fit between decision mode and processing style predicts subjective value of chosen alternatives

Intuition is associated with a global processing style, whereas deliberation is associated with a local processing style. Drawing on previous research on the effects of decisional fit on the subjective value attached to chosen alternatives, we examined the possibility that a fit between processing style and decision mode results in greater subjective value than a lack of fit. In three experiments employing various combinations of naturally occurring and experimentally manipulated processing styles and decision modes, we found that when congruence was high (i.e., global processing style and intuitive judgment, or local processing style and deliberative judgment), participants judged their chosen item to be more expensive than when congruence was low. These findings indicate that increased fit resulted in higher estimated value. We discuss implications for judgment and decision‐making.     

Are highly numerate individuals invulnerable to attribute framing bias? Comparing numerically and graphically represented attribute framing

Judgments and decisions are frequently biased by attribute framing, presenting either positive or negative attributes of an object. This paper focused on two factors previously shown to moderate the attribute‐framing bias: mode of presentation and participants' numeric ability. Whereas many studies demonstrated that graphical display reduced the bias, recent findings suggest that graphical manipulation can nevertheless elicit significant framing bias. Numeracy has been shown to moderate attribute‐framing bias when the quantitative information was represented by numbers. The present study examined to what extent numeracy would still moderate the framing bias when it is graphically elicited. The results showed a significant framing bias for graphically as well as for numerically represented framing scenarios. Critically, whereas numeracy moderated the framing bias in numerically represented scenarios, it did not have a similar moderating effect when the quantitative information in the scenario was graphically represented. Theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed.     

左右侧颞顶联合区对道德意图信息加工能力的共同作用——基于经颅直流电刺激技术

行为人的意图动机是我们对日常行为的对错做出判断的重要依据。以往研究表明,左右侧颞顶联合区(TPJ)都可能与信念意图的整合加工能力相关,尤其是近年来越来越多的神经刺激研究为TPJ区域与心理状态归因能力之间的因果关系提供了证据。然而,这些研究在实验任务的选取,实验设计的优化,实验结论的稳健性上仍然有改进的空间。基于此,本研究开展了两个在设计上互相补充的实验。实验中被试的TPJ区域会接受一段时间的经颅直流电刺激,并完成一系列的道德判断任务,任务是由意图和结果,以及负性和中性2×2双变量构成的4种条件的故事:无伤人、伤人未遂、意外伤人和伤人成功,被试要对故事主角的行为做出谴责程度的道德判断。结合道德判断的谴责程度和决策时间数据发现,当人们在处理信念意图信息时,左右侧TPJ区域可能是协同互动、共同发挥作用的。在激活右侧TPJ并限制左侧TPJ的情况下,人们对负性结果的谴责程度变高,人们变得更加依赖于行为结果做出道德判断;而在限制右侧TPJ并激活左侧TPJ的情况下,人们对负性意图的谴责程度变高,人们变得更加依赖于行为者的动机做出道德判断。     

Causal Models Drive Preference between Drugs that Treat a Focal versus Multiple Symptoms

This research examines the effects of causal beliefs on drug preference. In three studies, 374 undergraduate participants imagined that they suffered from a focal symptom and then indicated their preference between a drug claiming to treat only the focal symptom (single treatment) and a drug claiming to treat the focal symptom and a nonfocal symptom (dual treatment) they thought resulted from a common‐cause or from a different cause. Participants who thought that the symptoms resulted from different causes significantly preferred the single treatment drug more and the dual treatment drug less than participants who thought the symptoms resulted from a common‐cause. Process analysis yielded a significant mediation effect. Specifically, an individual's causal model determines preference by affecting the estimates of the potential gain and loss associated with using each drug. Participants who held a common‐cause model concerning the source of the symptoms thought they would be more likely to need the nonfocal treatment provided by the dual treatment drug and less likely to suffer from side effects when taking this drug, than those with a different‐cause model. The results demonstrate the influence of causal structure on judgment and choice. © 2017 The Authors Journal of Behavioral Decision Making Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

Unraveling the Aging Skein: Disentangling Sensory and Cognitive Predictors of Age‐related Differences in Decision Making

Age‐related differences in sensory functioning, processing speed, and working memory have been identified as three significant predictors of the age‐related performance decline observed in complex cognitive tasks. Yet, the assessment of their relative predictive capacity and interrelations is still an open issue in decision making and cognitive aging research. Indeed, no previous investigation has examined the relationships of all these three predictors with decision making. In an individual‐differences study, we therefore disentangled the relative contribution of sensory functioning, processing speed, and working memory to the prediction of the age‐related decline in cognitively demanding judgment and decision‐making tasks. Structural equation modeling showed that the age‐related decline in working memory plays an important predictive role, even when controlling for sensory functioning, processing speed, and education. Implications for research on decision making and cognitive aging are discussed. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Commonalities and Differences Among Frames: A Unification Model

We provide a review and a theoretically unifying model of framing effects. Beginning with a review of findings that prospect theory, fuzzy‐trace theory, and traditional dual process models do and do not explain, we develop a model of framing based partly on Bless and Schwarz's (2010) inclusion/exclusion model of assimilation and contrast. Our model is the first of its kind to be applied to all three valence framing manipulations and presents common mechanisms explaining findings in the framing literature that were previously difficult to conceptualize within a single theory (e.g., matching effects and cognitive effort). The model also accounts for why all three framing manipulations are influenced by differences between holistic/contextual versus analytic processing as well as the presence, absence, and direction of effects produced by different versions of framing manipulations. It also predicts contrast effects (Implications and Future Directions section) and applies to manipulations involving a frame and judgmental target. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social Conceptions of Moral Agency in Hegel and Sellars

This essay contributes to our understanding of the relation between the philosophies of Hegel and Sellars. While most treatments of this relation have focused on metaphysics or epistemology, I focus on ethics, and in particular on the formulation of moral agency. I argue that Hegel and Sellars arrive at a similar metaphilosophical rejection of individual moral agency in favor of conceptions of moral agency as the outcome of social mediation. To demonstrate this, I trace how Hegel and Sellars offer parallel resolutions of the ‘Kantian paradox’: the apparent problem that, in Kantian ethics, moral agents must both freely self-legislate the moral law unto themselves and stand in a dutiful relation to the moral law as a necessary function of practical reason. Drawing Hegel and Sellars together in this way casts new light on Sellars’s understudied ethical theory and further evidences the contemporary relevance of Hegel’s moral philosophy.     

Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment

Traditional theories of moral development emphasize the role of controlled cognition in mature moral judgment, while a more recent trend emphasizes intuitive and emotional processes. Here we test a dual-process theory synthesizing these perspectives. More specifically, our theory associates utilitarian moral judgment (approving of harmful actions that maximize good consequences) with controlled cognitive processes and associates non-utilitarian moral judgment with automatic emotional responses. Consistent with this theory, we find that a cognitive load manipulation selectively interferes with utilitarian judgment. This interference effect provides direct evidence for the influence of controlled cognitive processes in moral judgment, and utilitarian moral judgment more specifically.