Correlations of trait and state emotions with utilitarian moral judgements

In four experiments, we asked subjects for judgements about scenarios that pit utilitarian outcomes against deontological moral rules, for example, saving more lives vs. a rule against active killing. We measured trait emotions of anger, disgust, sympathy and empathy (the last two in both specific and general forms, the latter referring to large groups of people), asked about the same emotions after each scenario (state emotions). We found that utilitarian responding to the scenarios, and higher scores on a utilitarianism scale, were correlated negatively with disgust, positively (but weakly and inconsistently) with anger, positively with specific sympathy and state sympathy, and less so with general sympathy or empathy. In a fifth experiment, we asked about anger and sympathy for specific outcomes, and we found that these are consistently predictive of utilitarian responding.     

Two Models of Moral Judgment

This paper compares two theories and their two corresponding computational models of human moral judgment. In order to better address psychological realism and generality of theories of moral judgment, more detailed and more psychologically nuanced models are needed. In particular, a motivationally based theory of moral judgment (and its corresponding computational model) is developed in this paper that provides a more accurate account of human moral judgment than an existing emotion‐reason conflict theory. Simulations based on the theory capture and explain a range of relevant human data. They account not only for the original data that were used to support the emotion – reason conflict theory, but also for a wider range of data and phenomena.     

Problem Definition in Marital and Family Therapy: A Qualitative Study

This paper describes findings from a grounded theory study on the process of constructing problem definitions by marital and family therapists. Coding of the observations and interviews resulted in two meta-problem definition processes. In the first meta-process clinicians kept their definitions internal to themselves during the therapy session. In contrast, the second meta-definition process involved clinicians bringing forth their internal problem definitions and incorporating them into the therapeutic conversation. Implications for existing conceptualizations and marital and family therapy practice and supervision are discussed, as well as suggestions for further consideration.     

Dual-process morality and the personal/impersonal distinction: A reply to McGuire, Langdon, Coltheart, and Mackenzie

A substantial body of research supports a dual-process theory of moral judgment, according to which characteristically deontological judgments are driven by automatic emotional responses, while characteristically utilitarian judgments are driven by controlled cognitive processes. This theory was initially supported by neuroimaging and reaction time (RT) data. McGuire et al. have reanalyzed these initial RT data and claim that, in light of their findings, the dual-process theory of moral judgment and the personal/impersonal distinction now lack support. While McGuire and colleagues have convincingly overturned Greene et al.’s interpretation of their original RT data, their claim that the dual-process theory now lacks support overstates the implications of their findings. McGuire and colleagues ignore the results of several more recent behavioral studies, including the study that bears most directly on their critique. They dismiss without adequate justification the results of a more recent neuroimaging study, three more recent patient studies, and an emotion-induction study. Their broader critique is based largely on their conflation of the dual-process theory with the personal/impersonal distinction, which are independent.     

Perceived certainty based on verbal probability phrases: Effect of directionality and its dependence on method

Verbal probability phrases (e.g. "possible" or "doubtful") have a feature called "directionality" ( Teigen & Brun, 1995 ), which focuses listeners on event occurrence or nonoccurrence. We conducted an experiment about certainty estimations based on verbal probabilities in order to examine the effect of directionality on perceived certainty. In measuring perceived certainty, we used scale-based method involving responses with a scale (e.g. 101 points' scale, 0 = unlikely to 100 = likely) and numerical method involving responses such as "50%." We found that, although the effect of directionality on perceived certainty was observed in using the scale-based method, the effect disappeared when the numerical method was used. We discuss these results from two types of information processing (intuitive, associative processing and deliberate, rule-based processing).     

After the Council: Transformationsin the Shape of Moral Theologyand 'the Church to Come'

This paper seeks to explore the impact that the Council had upon moral theology, and vice versa, along with some of the main debates and methodological questions that have preoccupied Catholic ethicists since. Seeking to chart both that, as well as how, moral theology was transformed, four key points arise. First, the emergence, even prior to the council of a more participatory approach to moral theology. Second, the retrieval of an understanding of the provisionality of much moral teaching. Third, an appreciation of the circular relationship between ethics and ecclesiology. Fourth, the 'work to be done' in relation to continuing disagreements over method and the 'yearning for continuity' that emerged in reaction to the transformations in moral theology and indeed the Council in general. We close with consideration of constructive proposals for the future concerning whether and how Catholics might live with difference and indeed with less certitude, reminding ourselves that morality is not a precise and exact science, as if any such thing exists.     

A Conundrum Concerning Creation

In this paper, I expose a conundrum regarding divine creation as Leibniz conceives of such creation. What energizes the conundrum is that the concept of omnibenevolence—“consequential omnibenevolence”—that the Leibnizian argument for the view that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds presupposes, appears to sanction the conclusion that God has no practical reasons to create the actual world.

Extraversion is accurately perceived after a 50-ms exposure to a face

Twenty-four perceivers saw portraits of unacquainted persons for either 150 ms, 100 ms, or 50 ms, and rated their personality on adjective scales. Moreover, stimulus persons described themselves on these scales and the NEO Five-Factor Inventory. Consensus among perceivers and self-other agreement were not systematically related to exposure time, but self-other agreement differed strongly between traits, being highest for extraversion. Even ratings of extraversion by single perceivers were related to the stimulus persons’ self-reports. Particularly strong were correlations between perceived extraversion and self-reports on items measuring the extraversion facets excitement seeking and positive emotions. Self-other agreement for extraversion was mostly mediated by cheerfulness of facial expressions that was related to self-reports of extraversion but not of the other personality traits.