A case study of expert judgment: Economists' probabilities versus base-rate model forecasts

In this case study of economists' forecasts concerning economic downturn, we examine key issues concerning the psychology of prediction and the controversy surrounding the value of expertise in forecasting. We examine when experts' knowledge promotes forecast accuracy and whether biases found in psychological studies (including underutilization of relevant base rates and tendencies to extreme prediction) occur in these economic forecasts. Experts' forecasts were compared to forecasts derived from base-rate models that relied on the historical frequencies of economic downturns. The performance patterns of the experts and models crossed over the forecast horizon. Experts outperformed models in shorter-term forecasting, whereas models outperformed experts in longer-term forecasting. These results highlight the abilities and limits of experts and models in prediction and the sources of their inaccuracy.     

Good to the last drop? Millikan stories as “canned” pedagogy

In recent literature, the famous Millikan oil-drop experiment appears as a case of “good scientific judgment” on the one hand, and scientific misconduct on the other. This article discusses different interpretations of the fact that Nobel laureate Robert Millikan’s notebooks show that he eliminated a number of oildrops in his published 1913 paper on the charge of the electron, while reporting that he had included all the drops. Starting with the common source of all Millikan stories, historian of physics Gerald Holton’s 1978 paper, I discuss recent “canned” versions of Millikan-as-misbehaver in books on scientific fraud. Then I examine some versions of Millikan-as-good-scientist, particularly the reconstruction by historian of physics Allan Franklin, and the views of some practicing physicists. Finally, we have an instructive head-on collision between the two standard treatments of Millikan. The problem with canned stories is not only insufficient information; we also lack a realistic evaluation of the role of ethics in science. As a fundamentally knowledge-seeking enterprise, science may harbor an inherent, perhaps irresolvable, conflict between scientific and ethical concerns. The author’s special interests include standards for “good science”, science and values, and social psychology.     

Moral judgment and self-reported moral events in adulthood

As part of a 13-year study of the development of reasoning about the Good Life and moral judgment, 29 middle-class, well-educated adults, ranging in age from 18 to 80 years, were interviewed twice, 4 years apart on Standard Form Moral Judgment interviews and were asked to describe their own moral events that occurred recently. Both times, the average moral judgment score on the hypothetical dilemmas was about stage 4. The reasoning in the spontaneously reported moral events was significantly lower, although the two scores were highly correlated. Difference scores between the two were not related to scores on the hypothetical dilemmas. While there were no significant gender differences in scores on the hypothetical dilemmas, there were in scores on spontaneously reported events favoring males. The philosophic quality of the reported events could be easily categorized by traditional moral-philosophic categories; about half of the events contained traditional deontic moral content (moral right); the other half contained material defined as the moral good. The context of most events was interpersonal as opposed to societal. The most frequent issue discussed concerned honesty about financial issues, particularly income tax evasion. Ways to expand the research on adult moral experience are discussed.     

The Effect of Cognitive Load on Intent-Based Moral Judgment

When making a moral judgment, people largely care about two factors: Who did it (causal responsibility), and did they intend to (intention)? Since Piaget's seminal studies, we have known that as children mature, they gradually place greater emphasis on intention, and less on mere bad outcomes, when making moral judgments. Today, we know that this developmental shift has several signature properties. Recently, it has been shown that when adults make moral judgments under cognitive load, they exhibit a pattern similar to young children; that is, their judgments become notably more outcome based. Here, we show that all of the same signature properties that accompany the outcome-to-intent shift in childhood characterize the “intent-to-outcome” shift obtained under cognitive load in adults. These findings hold important implications for current theories of moral judgment.     

THE BIBLICAL ROOTS OF LOCKE'S THEORY OF PERSONAL IDENTITY

Locke's consciousness‐based theory of personal identity resulted not only from his agnosticism on substance, but also from his biblical theology. This theory was intended to complement and sustain Locke's moral and theological commitments to a system of otherworldly rewards and sanctions as revealed in Scripture. Moreover, he inferred mortalist ideas from the Bible, rejecting the resurrection of the same body and maintaining that the soul dies at physical death and will be resurrected by divine miracle. Accordingly, personal identity is neither in the soul, nor in the body, nor in a union of soul and body. To Locke, personal identity is in consciousness, which, extending “backwards to any past Action or Thought,” enables the self, both in this life and upon resurrection for the Last Judgment, to recognize that “it is the same self now it was then; and ‘tis by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that Action was done” (Essay II.xxvii.9).     

Visuospatial perspective shifting and relational self-association in dispositional shame and guilt

Although dispositional shame and guilt have been distinguished by perceptions of the self and behavioral responses, the underlying information processing patterns remain unclear. We hypothesized that an ability to contemplate alternatives to perceptions of the current environment, i.e., flexibility in perspective shifting, may be essential to both dispositions. Dispositional shame may additionally relate to negative relational knowledge that involves a self-representation of being rejected. One hundred and six community participants rated the two dispositions, and had their flexibility in perspective shifting and internalized self-association with rejection assessed. Regression analysis indicated that a lower cost of perspective shifting was observed with dispositional guilt and shame. Yet, unlike a direct association with perspective shifting for dispositional guilt, it was an interaction between perspective shifting and negative relational knowledge that accounted for dispositional shame. The association of dispositional shame with perspective shifting was contingent upon the tendency to pair the self with rejection.     

The influence of decision time on sensitivity for consequences,moral norms,and preferences for inaction: Time,moral judgments,and the CNI model

It is often discussed that moral judgments are either consistent with the principle of utilitarianism or with the principle of deontology. Utilitarianism is a moral principle stating that the right act is the one that produces the best overall outcome. Deontology represents an ethical position indicating that the morality of an action depends on the intrinsic nature of the action regardless of the consequences. Criticism on the structure of moral dilemmas includes the problem that these dilemmas confound norms and consequences. Recently, a multinomial model (the CNI model) was developed to disentangle and measure sensitivity to consequences (C), sensitivity to moral norms (N), and general preference for inaction versus action (I), respectively. In Experiment 1, we examined the influence of time pressure on moral judgments using the CNI model. We found that time pressure influenced moral dilemma judgments by decreasing participants' sensitivity for consequences. There were no significant effects of time pressure on participants' sensitivity to norms and general preference for inaction. Furthermore, in Experiment 2, we examined the link of reaction times to moral judgments more closely by fitting a hierarchical Bayesian version of the CNI model. Longer reaction times lead to an increase in parameter N, and there was no influence of reaction times on parameter C or I.     

知觉组织对时序知觉的双重影响:同时判断任务的证据

本研究探讨知觉组织对时序知觉的双重影响。实验采用三条线段构成的C形为实验材料,操纵图形朝向和SOA水平(实验1和实验2)、图形颜色(实验3)以及反应限制(实验4),要求被试完成同时判断任务。结果发现,在不同的SOA条件下,图形对向条件的同时判断频率均显著高于图形反向条件(实验1),即使在知觉组织线索弱化时这种现象仍然存在(实验2和实验3),而且知觉组织对时序知觉的影响不是由于被试的反应偏向导致的(实验4)。结果说明知觉组织对时序知觉存在双重影响:当两个刺激同时出现时,知觉组织能够提高时序知觉表现; 而当两个刺激非同时出现时,知觉组织显著降低时序知觉表现。     

Judge not? The pedagogical puzzle of right interpretation and wrong interpretation

When studying the reception history of the Bible, should students be asked to suspend judgment on a particular interpretation for the sake of the pedagogical goals of the course? Or is their judgment essential to the process of learning and understanding? This essay explores the pedagogical puzzle of right interpretation and wrong interpretation through the context of my classroom, where neither the troubling events of a nation in turmoil nor our own social, religious, and cultural locations as readers could be bracketed from the learning environment, despite my best efforts. In particular, this essay integrates the approach outlined by Gary Weissman, who argues for an embrace of student misreading in his book The Writer in the Well. His suggestion that misreading and rewriting are fundamental to the process of understanding is provocative, and its application to biblical studies presents special challenges, but this paper argues for its relevance to the pedagogical puzzle at hand.     

Gain or non‐loss: The message matching effect of regulatory focus on moral judgements of other‐orientation lies

Previous studies found that individuals with promotion focus are more likely to be persuaded by messages framed in terms of gain‐related words; individuals with prevention focus are more likely to be persuaded by messages framed in terms of loss‐related words. This is known as the message matching effect of regulatory focus. The present study extended this effect into the field of moral judgement of other‐orientation lies. Two experiments were conducted, revealing that (a) individuals with promotion focus judged gain‐framed other‐orientation lies to be more moral, while individuals with prevention focus judged non‐loss‐framed other‐orientation lies to be more moral; and (b) the subjective processing fluency had a partial mediating role in the message matching effect. Theoretical implications and future research directions were discussed.