总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1  

Julie Tannenbaum 《Philosophical Studies》2007,132(1):43-57

In “Moral Luck” Bernard Williams describes a lorry driver who, through no fault of his own, runs over a child, and feels “agent-regret.” I believe that the driver’s feeling is moral since the thought associated with this feeling is a negative moral evaluation of his action. I demonstrate that his action is not morally inadequate with respect his moral obligations. However, I show that his negative evaluation is nevertheless justified since he acted in way that does not live up to his moral values. I then use this distinctive negative moral evaluation to distinguish agent-regret from guilt and mere regret.

Julie TannenbaumEmail:

  相似文献   

    

Ilan Yaniv  Dean P. Foster 《决策行为杂志》1997,10(1):21-32

Whereas probabilistic calibration has been a central normative concept of accuracy in previous research on interval estimates, we suggest here that normative approaches for the evaluation of judgmental estimates should consider the communicative interaction between the individuals who produce the judgments and those who receive or use them for making decisions. We analyze precision and error in judgment and consider the role of the accuracy–informativeness trade-off (Yaniv and Foster, 1995) in the communication of estimates. The results shed light on puzzling findings reported earlier in the literature concerning the calibration of subjective confidence intervals. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   

    

Megumi M. Ohashi  Susumu Yamaguchi 《Asian Journal of Social Psychology》2004,7(2):169-185

Japanese are said to value being ordinary and emphasize similarity with others. We theorized that Japanese tend to perceive themselves as being ordinary, so much so that their self-predictions about future life events are biased (super-ordinary bias). Specifically, it was expected that Japanese overestimate the likelihood of experiencing common events (such as getting married or catching the flu) and underestimate the likelihood of experiencing rare events (such as winning a lottery or being murdered). We examined the effects of commonness and desirability of future life events on the relative-likelihood estimates. Our expectation was supported by three studies, involving a questionnaire, a laboratory experiment, and a mail survey. Findings are consistent with the assumed tendency to view oneself as being super-ordinary. The super-ordinary bias was also found to be independent of unrealistic optimism or pessimism.  相似文献   

    

Karen R. Chinander  Maurice E. Schweitzer   《Organizational behavior and human decision processes》2003,91(2):243-253

In this paper we identify an input bias, the systematic misuse of input information in judgments of outcome quality. In many settings irrelevant input measures, such as the amount of time an employee spends in the office, influence outcome assessments, such as performance reviews. Across four studies we find that input values subtly, but significantly distort judgments of outcome quality. Irrelevant input information predictably influences outcome assessments even when people recognize that input measures should not matter and believe that input information did not matter. We examine the mechanics of the input bias, and suggest that because input measures are often easy to manipulate or misrepresent, the input bias is likely to have broad implications for managerial judgment and decision making.  相似文献   

    

Aaron Stalnaker 《The Journal of religious ethics》2008,36(3):425-444

  相似文献   

    

HIDEHITO HONDA  KIMIHIKO YAMAGISHI 《The Japanese psychological research》2009,51(4):266-273

Verbal probability phrases (e.g. \"possible\" or \"doubtful\") have a feature called \"directionality\" ( Teigen & Brun, 1995 ), which focuses listeners on event occurrence or nonoccurrence. We conducted an experiment about certainty estimations based on verbal probabilities in order to examine the effect of directionality on perceived certainty. In measuring perceived certainty, we used scale-based method involving responses with a scale (e.g. 101 points' scale, 0 = unlikely to 100 = likely) and numerical method involving responses such as \"50%.\" We found that, although the effect of directionality on perceived certainty was observed in using the scale-based method, the effect disappeared when the numerical method was used. We discuss these results from two types of information processing (intuitive, associative processing and deliberate, rule-based processing).  相似文献   

    

Clare Harries  Ilan Yaniv  Nigel Harvey 《决策行为杂志》2004,17(5):333-348

We present two studies that evaluate how people combine advice and how they respond to outlying opinions. In a preliminary study, we found that individuals use discounting strategies when they encounter an extreme opinion in a small sample of opinions taken only once (a one‐shot advice‐taking situation). The main study examines the influence of outlying opinions (which may or may not be accurate) within a learning paradigm with feedback. This study shows that it is easy to reinforce a discounting strategy (with feedback) whereas it is more difficult to counteract this default strategy. In the discussion we consider cognitive, statistical, and strategic justifications for discounting opinions, from both theoretical and practical points of view. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   

    

Martijn C. Willemsen  Gideon Keren 《决策行为杂志》2004,17(4):313-329

Separate and joint evaluations differ in the manner in which attribute information is processed. We propose that negative attributes weigh more in separate compared to joint ratings. To assess the relative weights of positive and negative attributes, stimuli were employed containing mixed attribute valence, with good and poor attributes. In three experiments it was demonstrated empirically that, using such mixed valence options, the negative attributes indeed weighed more than the positive ones in separate compared to joint ratings. Direct evidence for the increased weight of negative attributes in separate ratings was provided by showing preference shifts between joint and separate ratings for options with mixed attribute valence. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   

    

J. Neil Bearden  Thomas S. Wallsten 《决策行为杂志》2004,17(5):349-363

There is considerable evidence that frequency (and probability) judgments are often subadditive. That is, the frequency judgment assigned to an event is often less than the sum of the frequency judgments assigned to the mutually exclusive component events that together form it. Explanations for subadditive judgments have typically relied on relatively high‐level cognitive constructs such as the availability and representativeness heuristics. A lower‐level explanation of subadditivity is presented in this paper through a model of memory and judgment processes, MINERVA‐DM. Under MINERVA‐DM, subadditivity is influenced by the similarity of the representations of the judged component events in memory to one another and by the placement of decision criteria. Results from two experiments support the model predictions. The first examines the effects of component event similarity on subadditivity. The second replicates the first and also provides support for the model's prediction of the effects of payoffs on similarity criteria. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   

Children's and adolescents’ reasons for socially excluding others     

Holly E. Recchia  Beverly A. Brehl  Cecilia Wainryb 《Cognitive development》2012

  相似文献