The Evidence-Based Practice of Applied Behavior Analysis

Evidence-based practice (EBP) is a model of professional decision-making in which practitioners integrate the best available evidence with client values/context and clinical expertise in order to provide services for their clients. This framework provides behavior analysts with a structure for pervasive use of the best available evidence in the complex settings in which they work. This structure recognizes the need for clear and explicit understanding of the strength of evidence supporting intervention options, the important contextual factors including client values that contribute to decision making, and the key role of clinical expertise in the conceptualization, intervention, and evaluation of cases. Opening the discussion of EBP in this journal, Smith (The Behavior Analyst, 36, 7–33, 2013) raised several key issues related to EBP and applied behavior analysis (ABA). The purpose of this paper is to respond to Smith’s arguments and extend the discussion of the relevant issues. Although we support many of Smith’s (The Behavior Analyst, 36, 7–33, 2013) points, we contend that Smith’s definition of EBP is significantly narrower than definitions that are used in professions with long histories of EBP and that this narrowness conflicts with the principles that drive applied behavior analytic practice. We offer a definition and framework for EBP that aligns with the foundations of ABA and is consistent with well-established definitions of EBP in medicine, psychology, and other professions. In addition to supporting the systematic use of research evidence in behavior analytic decision making, this definition can promote clear communication about treatment decisions across disciplines and with important outside institutions such as insurance companies and granting agencies.     

Are People Naïve Probability Theorists? A Further Examination of the Probability Theory + Variation Model

Two experiments tested predictions derived from the Probability Theory + Variation (PTV) model. PTV model assumes that judgments follow probability theory, but systematic errors arise from noise in the judgments. Experiment 1 compared the PTV model to a configural weighted averaging model in joint probability judgment and found more support for the PTV model in diagnostic cases. Specifically, noise was negatively correlated with semantic coherence and conjunction and disjunction fallacies increased when order effects produced more noise in conjunctions and disjunctions. Consistent with both models, judgments adhered stochastically to the addition law. Contrary to the integration rules of the PTV model, we failed to find increased noise in disjunctions compared to conjunctions. Experiment 2 tested predictions of the PTV model for conditional probability judgment. Consistent with the PTV model, noise was negatively correlated with semantic coherence in conditional probabilities and judgments adhered stochastically to Bayes' theorem. Conversion errors were generally more prevalent than conditional reversals, a finding that is not fully consistent with the PTV model. In general, the quantitative fit of the PTV model was relatively better for overlapping and subset problems compared to identical, independent and mutually exclusive problems, especially for semantic coherence. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Understanding cumulative risk

This paper summarizes the theory of simple cumulative risks—for example, the risk of food poisoning from the consumption of a series of portions of tainted food. Problems concerning such risks are extraordinarily difficult for naïve individuals, and the paper explains the reasons for this difficulty. It describes how naïve individuals usually attempt to estimate cumulative risks, and it outlines a computer program that models these methods. This account predicts that estimates can be improved if problems of cumulative risk are framed so that individuals can focus on the appropriate subset of cases. The paper reports two experiments that corroborated this prediction. They also showed that whether problems are stated in terms of frequencies (80 out of 100 people got food poisoning) or in terms of percentages (80% of people got food poisoning) did not reliably affect accuracy.     

Methodological concerns in moral judgement research: Severity of harm shapes moral decisions

Research on moral judgement traditionally deals with scenarios involving trade-offs between saving lives and causing harm or death. In the field of moral psychology and philosophy, these specific scenarios are regularly used jointly, regardless of the severity of harm. We predicted that the confounding between distinct phrasings involving different degrees of harm will have an impact on the frequency of utilitarian judgements regardless of the mere moral value of the action (as usually investigated in the moral judgement field). In line with this prediction, a first experiment showed that utilitarian responses were less frequent for conflicting moral scenarios that involved death, as compared to scenarios that involved non-lethal harm. A second experiment showed that participants' utilitarian responses decreased as the severity of harm increased. Experimental studies on moral reasoning should take greater care to avoid potential confounds associated with this content factor.     

A Brief Delay Decreases Perceived Similarity and Improves Discrimination

A same-different discrimination between the colors of 2 halves of a circle was poorer when the halves were viewed simultaneously than when the delay between viewing them was 33 ms. The simultaneous discrimination also produced a poor performance on different stimuli relative to same stimuli in comparison to the successive discrimination. Poor-on-different performance should indicate high perceived similarity. The simultaneous colors were also judged as more similar. The delay did not alter the physical similarity of the colors. Thus, the delay may have decreased assimilation (perceived similarity) and thereby improved discrimination, in support of the hypothesis that perceived similarity frequently affects discrimination.     

Recovered Memories of Abuse Among Therapy Patients: A National Survey

This research explored the ethical decision-making process of civilians in response to real-world military dilemmas. Results revealed the complexity of these dilemmas, with about equal proportions of civilians choosing each of two response options. The moral intensity dimension of social consensus significantly predicted moral judgment in both dilemmas, whereas that of magnitude of consequences did so in only one dilemma, partially supporting our hypothesis. Both dimensions were significant predictors of moral intent in both dilemmas as was moral judgment, also supporting our hypotheses. We conclude with suggestions for future research questions in this compelling area.     

Moral motivation in defending classmates victimized by bullying

The study addresses factors that relate to defending of classmates victimized by bullying in early adolescence. Specifically, it examines whether moral motivation—measured as a combination of emotion attributions and their justifications in response to a hypothetical transgression—predicts defending in context of gender, social preference, perceived popularity and teacher support. We gathered single-time-point data on a sample of 512 sixth-graders (aged 11–13 years). A three-step hierarchical regression analysis showed that defending was positively predicted by: (1) moral motivation, when gender, social preference, perceived popularity and teacher support were accounted for; (2) interaction between moral motivation and social preference, when all other independent variables were accounted for. Simple slopes indicated that increased social preference strengthened the link between moral motivation and defending. The full model explained 40.5% of the variance in defending. The findings underscore the relevance of morality and its interplay with social preference in understanding defending.     

Deliberation Versus Intuition: Decomposing the Role of Expertise in Judgment and Decision Making

What produces better judgments: deliberating or relying on intuition? Past research is inconclusive. We focus on the role of expertise to increase understanding of the effects of judgment mode. We propose a framework in which expertise depends on a person's experience with and knowledge about a domain. Individuals who are relatively experienced but have modest knowledge about the subject matter (“intermediates”) are expected to suffer from deliberation and to benefit from a more intuitive approach, because they lack the formal knowledge to understand the reasons underlying their preferences. Individuals who are high (“experts”) or low (“novices”) on both experience and knowledge are expected to do well or poorly, respectively, regardless of decision mode. We tested these predictions in the domain of art. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that intermediates performed better when relying on intuition than after deliberation. Judgments of experts and novices were unaffected. In line with previous research relating processing style to judgment mode, Experiment 3 showed that the effect of processing style (global versus local) on judgment quality is similarly moderated by expertise. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the Psychoanalytic Treatment of the Depressive Personality

In order to discuss the depressive personality we have first to distinguish between this clinical entity and other types of depressive psychopathology that might also be chronic. The character traits and psychodynamics of the depressive personality confirm that there is a special group of patients, who belong to a depressive disorder continuum. The particular technical problems that depressive personality present are: (1) the inability to enjoy anything and the consequences of this on the therapist's experience and interventions, and (2) the negative therapeutic reaction which threatens the analytic process and the therapist's competence. If we combine transference/extratransference interpretations with an "empathetic understanding" approach to systematic confrontation and interpretation, we can therefore justify the need for a slightly modified psychoanalytic technique in the treatment of the depressive personality.     

Emotion as patheception

Emotions cannot be fully understood in purely cognitive terms. Nor can they be fully understood as mere feelings with no content. But it has not been easy to give an account of the relation of affect and cognition in a way that preserves the perceived unity of emotional experience. Consequently, emotion theories tend to lean either toward cognitivism, or, alternatively, the view that emotions are basically non-cognitive affairs. The aim of this paper is to argue for an account of emotion as a unity of affect and cognition. Emotions, it will be suggested, do not combine, blend, add, or causally relate cognition to affect, or affect to cognition, but are rather original unities which should be viewed as coordinate with, rather than subordinate to, either cognition, perception, feeling, or any other basic mental category.