An Indecent Proposal: The Dual Functions of Indirect Speech

People often use indirect speech, for example, when trying to bribe a police officer by asking whether there might be “a way to take care of things without all the paperwork.” Recent game theoretic accounts suggest that a speaker uses indirect speech to reduce public accountability for socially risky behaviors. The present studies examine a secondary function of indirect speech use: increasing the perceived moral permissibility of an action. Participants report that indirect speech is associated with reduced accountability for unethical behavior, as well as increased moral permissibility and increased likelihood of unethical behavior. Importantly, moral permissibility was a stronger mediator of the effect of indirect speech on likelihood of action, for judgments of one's own versus others' unethical action. In sum, the motorist who bribes the police officer with winks and nudges may not only avoid public punishment but also maintain the sense that his actions are morally permissible.     

“That Really Hurt,Charlie!” Investigating the Role of Sympathy and Moral Respect in Children's Aggressive Behavior

The authors examined the role of sympathy and moral respect in children's overt aggression, and the subtypes of proactive and reactive aggression, in an ethnically diverse sample of 5-, 7-, and 10-year-olds (N = 110). Aggressive behaviors were measured through teacher reports and peer nominations. Sympathy was assessed through teacher reports. Children reported on their moral respect within an interview procedure where they were asked for their feelings of respect toward hypothetical peers who displayed morally relevant behaviors. Results revealed that sympathy and moral respect were both negatively related to overt aggression and to the proactive aggression subtype, but unrelated to the reactive aggression subtype. The authors discuss the implications of the findings in relation to developmental research on the affective antecedents of children's aggressive behavior.     

What is beautiful brings out what is good in you: The effect of facial attractiveness on individuals' honesty

This study tested whether the presence of an attractive face would influence individuals' honesty. In 2 experiments, 225 participants were asked to predict the outcome of computerised coin‐flips and to self‐report the accuracy of their predictions. Self‐reports were made in the presence of a facial photo of a female who had been rated before the experiment as high attractive, middle attractive or low attractive by other volunteers. Participants were rewarded based on their self‐reported (not actual) accuracy. The results showed that subjects tended to give more dishonest self‐reports when presented with middle or low attractive facial images than when presented with high attractive images, with self‐reported accuracy being significantly higher than the random level. The results of this study show that presented with an attractive face, subjects tend to engage in behaviours that conform to moral codes.     

The effect of leader moral development on ethical climate and employee attitudes

This study examines the effect of leader moral development on the organization’s ethical climate and employee attitudes. Results indicate that the relationship between leader moral development and ethical climate is moderated by two factors: the extent to which the leader utilizes his or her cognitive moral development (i.e., capacity for ethical reasoning), and the age of the organization. Specifically, the influence of the leader’s moral development was stronger for high utilizing leaders, those whose moral actions were consistent with their moral reasoning. Additionally, the influence of the leader’s moral development was stronger in younger organizations. Finally, as predicted, congruence between the leader’s moral development and the employee’s moral development was positively associated with job satisfaction and organizational commitment and negatively associated with turnover intentions.     

Can Robert Adams Survive Moral Twin Earth?

Richard Boyd and Robert Adams have both developed semantic accounts of moral terms based on Hilary Putnam's causal regulation theory for natural kind terms, according to which the terms in question refer to the properties which predominantly causally regulated the terms. However, Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have mounted an objection to Boyd's semantics—their Moral Twin Earth argument. If this argument is successful against Boyd then it might be thought that it should also be successful against Adams, given the similarity between their semantic accounts. I will argue in this essay that Adams's semantics is sufficiently different from Boyd's to enable him to survive Moral Twin Earth, but that he is vulnerable to a modified version of Moral Twin Earth that I describe.     

A game-to-game investigation of the relation between need-supportive and need-thwarting coaching and moral behavior in soccer

ObjectiveAlthough perceived need-supportive and need-thwarting coaching have received considerable attention, the question whether coach behavior fluctuates from game to game, with resulting associations with players’ moral behavior has not been examined.Design and methodA Belgian sample of soccer players (N = 197; M = 26.57) was followed during five competition games, with players completing measures both prior to and following each game assessing, pre-game and on-game perceived coaching as well as athletes’ moral behavior.ResultsResults of multilevel analyses indicated that there exists substantial variation in perceived need-thwarting and need-supportive coaching behavior from game to game. The game-to-game variation in perceived pre-game need-thwarting coaching behavior related positively to variation in the adoption of an objectifying stance, which, in turn, related to variation in antisocial behavior oriented towards the opponent, the referee, and even their own teammates. Variation in perceived on-game need-supportive and need-thwarting coaching behavior yielded an additional relation to team-related moral outcomes. Finally, supplementary analysis indicated that these effects also held for an objective marker of moral functioning (i.e., number of yellow cards) and that players’ level of competition-contingent pay related to their antisocial behavior via an objectifying stance.ConclusionThe discussion highlights the fluctuating and dynamic nature of motivating coaching behavior, and its association with players’ moral functioning.     

女性面孔吸引力的加工及其对男性诚实道德行为的影响:一项ERP研究

研究考察了不同女性面孔吸引力情境对男性被试诚实道德决策行为的影响,同时采用ERP技术对社会情境中面孔吸引力的信息加工方式特点进行探究。结果发现,高面孔吸引力记录员情境中被试倾向更加真实地报告自己的预测结果而表现出更多诚实的道德决策;ERP结果则发现高吸引力记录员面孔较之于低吸引力记录员面孔在反应提示界面在大脑中后部诱发更大的早期N200成分。结果提示,在与面孔审美评价无关的社会情境中个体面孔的吸引力信息能够被快速识别与自动化加工,同时也会直接促进他人自身的道德行为水平。     

Moral rationalism and psychopathy: Affective responses to reason

Evidence suggests that psychopaths’ notoriously immoral behavior is due to affective rather than rational deficits. This evidence could be taken to show that, contrary to moral rationalism, moral norms are not norms of reason. Rationalists could reply either that psychopaths’ behavior is in fact primarily due to rational deficits or that affects are involved in responding to rational norms. Drawing on the work of Antonio Damasio and colleagues, I argue the latter is the better defense of moral rationalism.     

The evidential status of philosophical intuition

Philosophers have traditionally held that claims about necessities and possibilities are to be evaluated by consulting our philosophical intuitions; that is, those peculiarly compelling deliverances about possibilities that arise from a serious and reflective attempt to conceive of counterexamples to these claims. But many contemporary philosophers, particularly naturalists, argue that intuitions of this sort are unreliable, citing examples of once-intuitive, but now abandoned, philosophical theses, as well as recent psychological studies that seem to establish the general fallibility of intuition.In the first two sections of this paper, I evaluate these arguments, and also the counter-arguments of contemporary defenders of tradition. In the next two sections, I sketch an alternative account of the role of philosophical intuitions that incorporates elements of traditionalism and naturalism - and defend it against other such views. In the final section, however, I discuss intuitions about conscious experience, and acknowledge that my view may not extend comfortably to this case. This may seem unfortunate, since so much contemporary discussion of the epistemology of modality seems motivated by worries about the mind-body problem, and informed by the position one wishes to endorse. But, as I argue, if conscious experience is indeed an exception to the view I suggest in this paper, it is an exception that proves - and can illuminate - the rule.