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471.
Moral phenomenology: Foundational issues 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Uriah Kriegel 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(1):1-19
In this paper, I address the what, the how, and the why of moral phenomenology. I consider first the question What is moral phenomenology?, secondly the question How to pursue moral phenomenology?, and thirdly the question Why pursue moral phenomenology? My treatment of these questions is preliminary and tentative, and is meant not so much to settle them as to point in their answers’ direction. 相似文献
472.
In this paper, following the work of Hare, we consider moral reasoning not as the application of moral norms and principles, but as reasoning about what ought to be done in a particular situation, with moral norms perhaps emerging from this reasoning. We model this situated reasoning drawing on our previous work on argumentation schemes, here set in the context of Action-Based Alternating Transition Systems. We distinguish what prudentially ought to be done from what morally ought to be done, consider what legislation might be appropriate and characterise the differences between morally correct, morally praiseworthy and morally excusable actions. We also describe an implementation which simulates this reasoning and discuss some issues arising from the simulation. 相似文献
473.
Procedural voice is a widely used and effective means to reduce or eliminate conflict. Moral disagreements, however, are particularly inflammatory, divisive, and difficult to manage. The current article reports two studies that demonstrated the unique challenge that moral disagreements pose. Specifically, the studies tested the extent to which procedural voice affected justice judgements, group climate, and decision acceptance when people perceived decisions to have moral implications. Results indicated that when people's outcome preferences represent strong moral convictions, outcomes were the primary determinant of perceived fairness and related judgements, irrespective of whether people had voice in the decision‐making process. 相似文献
474.
C. Daniel Batson Mary C. Chao Jeffery M. Givens 《Journal of experimental social psychology》2009,45(1):155-160
Moral outrage—anger at violation of a moral standard—should be distinguished from anger at the harm caused by standard-violating behavior. Recent research that used experimental manipulation to disentangle these different forms of anger found evidence of personal and empathic anger, but not of moral outrage. We sought to extend this research by assessing anger at a more extreme moral violation: torture. If the person tortured is a member of one’s group (nationality), anger may not be over the moral violation but over the harm done to one of “us.” In an experiment designed to create the necessary appraisal conditions, we found clear evidence of identity-relevant personal anger (anger when a person from one’s nationality is tortured) but little evidence of moral outrage (anger even when a person from an identity-irrelevant nationality is tortured). Implications for understanding moral emotion and moral motivation are discussed. 相似文献
475.
David Merli 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):535-556
Moral discourse allows for speakers to disagree in many ways: about right and wrong acts, about moral theory, about the rational
and conative significance of moral failings. Yet speakers’ eccentricities do not prevent them from engaging in moral conversation
or from having (genuine, not equivocal) moral disagreement. Thus differences between speakers are compatible with possession
of moral concepts. This paper examines various kinds of moral disagreements and argues that they provide evidence against
conceptual-role and informational atomist approaches to understanding our moral concepts. Conceptual role approaches fail
because they cannot account for shared concepts among speakers with different commitments to the practical and conative ramifications
of moral judgments. Informational atomist views fail because speakers need not be locked on to the same moral properties to
share moral concepts.
相似文献
David MerliEmail: |
476.
Derk Pereboom 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):21-33
In this article I develop several responses to my co-authors of Four Views on Free Will. In reply to Manuel Vargas, I suggest
a way to clarify his claim that our concepts of free will and moral responsibility should be revised, and I question whether
he really proposes to revise the notion of basic desert at stake in the debate. In response to Robert Kane, I examine the
role the rejection of Frankfurt-style arguments has in his position, and whether his criticism of my version of this argument
is sound. In reply to John Fischer, I argue that the reasons-responsiveness central to his account of moral responsibility
is not best characterized counterfactually, and I provide a suggestion for revision.
相似文献
Derk PereboomEmail: |
477.
In some cases people judge it morally acceptable to sacrifice one person’s life in order to save several other lives, while in other similar cases they make the opposite judgment. Researchers have identified two general factors that may explain this phenomenon at the stimulus level: (1) the agent’s intention (i.e. whether the harmful event is intended as a means or merely foreseen as a side-effect) and (2) whether the agent harms the victim in a manner that is relatively “direct” or “personal”. Here we integrate these two classes of findings. Two experiments examine a novel personalness/directness factor that we call personal force, present when the force that directly impacts the victim is generated by the agent’s muscles (e.g., in pushing). Experiments 1a and b demonstrate the influence of personal force on moral judgment, distinguishing it from physical contact and spatial proximity. Experiments 2a and b demonstrate an interaction between personal force and intention, whereby the effect of personal force depends entirely on intention. These studies also introduce a method for controlling for people’s real-world expectations in decisions involving potentially unrealistic hypothetical dilemmas. 相似文献
478.
Waelbers K 《Science and engineering ethics》2009,15(1):51-68
This article defends three interconnected premises that together demand for a new way of dealing with moral responsibility
in developing and using technological artifacts. The first premise is that humans increasingly make use of dissociated technological
delegation. Second, because technologies do not simply fulfill our actions, but rather mediate them, the initial aims alter
and outcomes are often different from those intended. Third, since the outcomes are often unforeseen and unintended, we can
no longer simply apply the traditional (modernist) models for discussing moral responsibility. We need to reinterpret moral
responsibility. A schematic layout of a model on Social Role-Responsibility that incorporates these three premises is presented
to allow discussion of a new way of interpreting moral responsibility.
相似文献
Katinka WaelbersEmail: |
479.
Xiaomei Yang 《Dao》2009,8(2):173-188
No one denies the importance of applying knowledge to actions. But claiming identity (unity) of knowledge and action is quite
another thing. There seem to be two problems with the claim: (1) the identity claim implies that the sole cause for one to
fail to act on what one judges to be right is ignorance, but it is obviously false that the sole cause of failure in moral
actions is ignorance. (2) The identity statement implies non-separation of knowledge and action. But knowledge does not necessarily
lead to action. However, the identity of knowledge and action is what a famous Ming Confucian scholar, Wang Yang-ming, proposed and the concept became the central doctrine of his teaching. Though there are several major interpretations
of Wang’s doctrine in contemporary literature, it is not clear to me how they deal with the above mentioned difficulties.
In this article, I will discuss these interpretations of the doctrine and propose a new interpretation. My purpose is to give
an interpretation of Wang’s doctrine that has the capacity of dealing with these challenges to the doctrine and also captures
the essence of his teaching. 相似文献
480.
Although intellectuals have been a part of the cultural landscape, it is in post-conflict societies, such as those found in
Kosovo and Bosnia, that there has arisen a need for an intellectual who is more than simply a social critic, an educator,
a man of action, and a compassionate individual. Enter the hyperintellectual. As this essay will make clear, it is the hyperintellectual,
who through a reciprocating critique and defense of both the nationalist enterprise and strong interventionism of the International
Community, as well as being a man of action and compassionate and empathic insider, strives to create a climate of understanding
and to enlarge the moral space so as to reduce the divisiveness between opposing parties. In this way the hyperintellectual
becomes a catalyst for the creation of a democratic culture within the civil societies of Kosovo and Bosnia.
相似文献
Rory J. ConcesEmail: |