References to social norms by preschool children and their linguistic expression

The study is based on the domain approach to the social norms and it investigated whether preschool children's references to social norms are related to their language expression. Children aged 3;8–7;5 years (N = 73; 35 boys and 38 girls) participated and were video-recorded playing in triads for 20 minutes. The norms mentioned were coded as moral or conventional rules according to Piotrowski's (1997 Piotrowski, C. 1997. Rules of everyday family life: The development of social rules in mother–child and sibling relationships. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 21: 571–598. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) coding system. Older children and more talkative children mention more conventional rules (p < .05 and p < .001, respectively); boys tend to refer to moral rules more often than girls, yet the use of moral rules was not influenced by age or talkativeness of the child. This supports the idea that children treat social norms of different domains differently: the use of moral rules does not seem to be influenced by the characteristics of the child, while the references to conventional rules depend on the age and talkativeness of the child.     

Sociomoral reasoning in children and adolescents from two collectivistic cultures

This study compared the sociomoral reasoning of 7-, 9-, 12-, and 15-year-old children and adolescents of two collectivistic cultures in the 1990s: Spain (horizontal collectivism; N = 208) and Russia (vertical collectivism; N = 247). Participants reasoned about choices and moral justifications of a protagonist in a sociomoral dilemma where participants can focus on different moral and non-moral concerns (e.g., going with their best friend, going with a new classmate or trying to do something with both). Results support previous research in western societies: participants tend to choose the option “visiting the best friend”, and self-interest tends to decrease with age whereas altruism tends to increase. Moreover, Spanish participants tended to consider all parties involved in the dilemma (i.e., old friend and new classmate), whereas Russian participants did not. These results are discussed in light of their differences as horizontal and vertical collectivistic societies. Overall, the results open an avenue for new studies when comparing the effects of culture on children's and adolescents' development.     

Adolescents' preferences for organ allocation: The role of empathy and altruism in allocation judgments

Distributive justice reasoning in adolescence, regarding the allocation of scarce medical resources, has not been thoroughly studied yet. The present study aimed to explore adolescents' preferences for organ allocation, the ethical principles that form bioethical judgments in adolescence, as well as the role of empathy and altruism in the formation of those judgments. One hundred fifty one adolescents (90 females) aged between 12 and 19 years old participated in the study. Participants were asked to suggest the criteria that should be considered in the construction of transplant waiting lists, to evaluate adults' preferable criteria and to justify their judgments. Results indicate that utilitarianism and egalitarianism were both used to form allocation judgments. Ingroup favouritism was also observed. Age differences in adolescents' preferences were witnessed, but no age effect were found regarding the principles that form participants' judgments. Aspects of empathy and altruism seemed to associate with certain allocation criteria.     

I am not now,nor have I ever been,a turnip.

This paper considers how to put together two popular ideas in the philosophy of time: detenserism (the view that tense can be analysed in token-reflexive terms) and perdurantism (the view that objects persist through time by having temporal parts. On the most obvious way of doing this, certain problems arise. I argue that to deal with these problems we need a tool that is unfamiliar to most detensers and perdurantists—the distinction between sortal and non-sortal predicates.     

What Accounts for Prosocial Behavior? Roles of Moral Identity,Moral Judgment,and Self-Efficacy Beliefs

Prior research suggests that moral identity influences individuals’ willingness to engage in prosocial behavior. Little attention, however, has been given to the roles of and relations between moral identity and other factors, such as moral judgment, in accounting for types of prosocial behavior in adolescence. The current study examined the extent to which moral identity, moral judgment, and social self-efficacy contribute to prosocial behaviors in adolescence. Approximately 338 adolescents (M_age?=?13.4 years) completed measures of moral identity, moral judgment, social self-efficacy, and prosocial behavior. Teachers rated adolescents’ prosocial behaviors, which largely corroborated the adolescents’ self-reports. Moral identity was found to predict most types of prosocial behavior. Moral judgment and moral identity were related and jointly predicted altruistic prosocial behaviors, but did not predict helping in front of others. Further, moral identity mediated the relationships between moral judgment and some forms of prosocial behavior (e.g., emotional, volunteering). Self-efficacy beliefs were found to predict some types of prosocial behavior (e.g., public), perhaps providing adolescents with confidence to engage in prosocial action. Overall, moral identity was especially effective in directly accounting for prosocial behavior, and may act as a mediator to bridge the moral judgment–moral action gap among adolescents.     

The Reliability of Armchair Intuitions

Armchair philosophers have questioned the significance of recent work in experimental philosophy by pointing out that experiments have been conducted on laypeople and undergraduate students. To challenge a practice that relies on expert intuitions, so the armchair objection goes, one needs to demonstrate that expert intuitions rather than those of ordinary people are sensitive to contingent facts such as cultural, linguistic, socio‐economic, or educational background. This article does exactly that. Based on two empirical studies on populations of 573 and 203 trained philosophers, respectively, it demonstrates that expert intuitions vary dramatically according to at least one contingent factor, namely, the linguistic background of the expert: philosophers make different intuitive judgments if their native language is English rather than Dutch, German, or Swedish. These findings cast doubt on the common armchair assumption that philosophical theories based on armchair intuitions are valid beyond the linguistic background against which they were developed.     

High cost helping scenario: The role of empathy,prosocial reasoning and moral disengagement on helping behavior

This study aimed to investigate the process that leads people to offer or omit help in response to an explicit request for assistance, taking into account both emotional and cognitive factors. Specifically, a hypothetical scenario methodology was used in a sample of 174 Italian youths (50% males) to examine whether and how factors such as empathy, prosocial moral reasoning and moral disengagement influence the propensity to help when providing assistance is not in the individual’s personal interest. While a few previous studies have included moral disengagement as an antecedent of prosocial decision making, we highlight the significance of this factor in the avoidance of moral responsibility towards others in need. The results highlight two ways in which differences in emotional tendencies and moral-cognitive processes may operate in prosocial decision making in high personal cost situations. First, high empathy levels could promote an altruistic response which in turn fosters mature prosocial moral reasoning. Second, personal distress may enhance moral disengagement mechanisms that may facilitate self-centred behaviors.     

Moral Instincts and the Problem with Reductionism: A Critical Look at the Work of Marc Hauser

In his most recent book Moral Minds, Marc Hauser argues that many foundational moral instincts have clear biological explanations. To make this argument, Hauser focuses on the similarities between the acquisition of morality and the acquisition of language. Similar to language, one learns a particular moral framework from one's environment, but the biological components necessary for moral development are universal. While I agree with Hauser's overall conclusion regarding moral instincts, I reject the notion that a purely biological analysis of morality can provide an adequate framework for justification. The problem, as I see it, is Hauser acknowledges the bottom-up influences taking place between biology and moral formation, but he refuses to account for the top-down influences that occur between metaphysical assumptions, moral beliefs, and biological conclusions. Thus, the current critique will focus on the connection between Hauser's failure to account for top-down influence and the subsequent shortcoming related to moral justification.     

A closer look at moral dilemmas: Latent dimensions of morality and the difference between trolley and footbridge dilemmas

Although a distinction between moral-personal and moral-impersonal dilemmas (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001 Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M. and Cohen, J. D. 2001. An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgement. Science, 293: 2105–2108. doi:10.1126/science.1062872.[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) has been widely accepted as an explanation for a difference between the trolley and footbridge dilemmas (Thomson, 1985 Thomson, J. J. 1985. “The trolley problem”. In Ethics: Problems and principles, Edited by: Fischer, J. M. and Ravizza, M. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.  [Google Scholar]), its psychometric properties remain a mystery. In this study 219 participants completed 62 moral dilemma tasks used in Greene et al. (2001 Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M. and Cohen, J. D. 2001. An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgement. Science, 293: 2105–2108. doi:10.1126/science.1062872.[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), and the correlation structure among the dilemmas was analysed through factor analysis and structural equation modelling. Findings suggest that, first, moral-personal dilemmas are composed of one factor, indicating that the assumption in Greene et al. (2001 Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M. and Cohen, J. D. 2001. An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgement. Science, 293: 2105–2108. doi:10.1126/science.1062872.[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) was supported. Second, moral-impersonal dilemmas are explained by two factors that reflect procedural and consequential aspects of decision making. Third, the trolley and footbridge dilemmas fall under the same factor category; therefore the difference between the two dilemmas cannot be attributed to emotional involvement. Additionally, the results of the structural equation modelling suggest that they differ in the engagement of rational processing.