Educating moral emotions: a praxiological analysis

This paper presents a praxiological analysis of three everyday educational practices or strategies that can be considered as being directed at the moral formation of the emotions. The first consists in requests to imagine other's emotional reactions. The second comprises requests to imitate normative emotional reactions and the third to re-appraise the features of a situation that are relevant to an emotional response. The interest of these categories is not just that they help to organize and recognize the significance of what might otherwise appear to be a disparate set of ordinary moral-educational interactions between children and educators. We suggest, further, that this analysis provides some new insight into what distinguishes the broad and recurrent conceptions of moral education from one another. Rather than being straightforwardly reducible to intractable differences over core normative or meta-ethical questions they can also be seen as correlating with different suppositions about the central role of the emotions in moral life and, correspondingly, different but to a large degree compatible interpretations of what the "education of the moral emotions" primarily means.

Imagining human enhancement: whose future,which rationality?

This article critically evaluates bettering human life. Because this involves lives that do not exist yet, the article investigates human eugenics and enhancement through the social prism of ‘the imaginary’ (defined ‘as a set of assumptions and concepts for thinking and speaking about human enhancement and its future direction’) [1]. “Exploring basic assumptions underlying the idea of human enhancement” investigates underlying assumptions and claims for human enhancement. Firstly, human eugenics and enhancement entangles a factual as well as a normative claim about what improvement/betterment maybe constitutive of. Secondly, claims about what a better life is, is often a future orientated claim about whether certain kinds of life that do not exist yet should ever exist. Moral images of thought are introduced and how they work to make normative judgments about lives that do not exist. This implicates the moral problem of difference, where an image of a ‘better’ life—classically expressed in eugenics as a ‘superior’ and/or ‘normal’ life—necessarily entails inferiority and/or deviance from a norm. “Moral imagination in contemporary fiction and the history of old eugenics”, introduces moral images in history of eugenics and demonstrates how examples fall foul of the problem. “The new (liberal) eugenics and the moral image of therapy” examines progress in contemporary debates, the move from authoritarian to non-authoritarian eugenics (human enhancement), and how, to some extent, this has solved the problem of difference, through liberal defence of personal choice. “The heart of the eugenic issue” suggests that personal choice in liberal non-authoritarian eugenics is not immune to basic drive behind all eugenic arguments; desire as lack which is expressed as the continual dissatisfaction of not having our future expectations met.

Post-conventional moral reasoning and reputation

Kohlberg’s theory of moral development conceives conventional and post-conventional moral reasoning as consecutive levels in a developmental sequence. This claim was examined in terms of the relationship between preference for these two styles of reasoning on the one hand and moral identity as perceived by others (reputation) and as self-perceived and on the other. Participants (n = 172), in groups of four mutual acquaintances, provided ratings of one another’s standing, and estimates of their own standing and reputation, on four trait dimensions (moral responsibility, consideration for others, respect for authority, and political orientation). Post-conventional moral reasoning, assessed using the Defining Issues Test, was not significantly related either to reputation or to self-rating on any dimension except political orientation. Conventional reasoning was related to politics though in the opposite direction, but additionally to both self- and other-ratings of moral responsibility and to the corresponding ratings of respect for authority. Findings do not support the view that the conventional/post-conventional distinction in moral reasoning is a developmental difference. An alternative proposed is that these are independent domains of moral thought, related to quite different aspects of social behaviour and political attitudes.     

儒家成德精神动力的心理学分析

儒家是要成德的。儒家为什么要成德 ?这就是儒家之所以为儒家的精神动力问题 ,从心理学看则是动机问题。儒家成德的精神动力源于孔子“以德配天”的天命思想。“以德配天”的思想一方面为成德找到了外在本原依据 ,另一方面也彰显了人的主体性。但面对天不应德的现实 ,孔子虽然以盲目命来化解 ,但儒家的成德内在合理性毕竟受到怀疑。先秦儒家通过“时”来化解这种质疑。后儒则逐步从外在预设向个体内在、本然性方面转换 ,逐步形成了以张载为代表的人的内在本原成德观。虽然如此 ,面对成德过程中的诸多不确定性 ,外在的盲目命思想一直保留下来。这样内在本然成德动力和外在“际命”化解的思想从内外方面使儒家成德动力得以维系和作用     

牟宗三"实践的智慧学"探求诠论

对哲学作为“实践的智慧学”的探求是牟宗三后期哲学思考的核心。这一探索,开启了牟宗三中国哲学与康德哲学双向诠释的基本视域,也拓出了道德形而上学体系建构的理论地平。“实践的智慧学”诠释具有独特的理论内涵,也隐含了牟氏道德形上学自我批判与超越的思想线索。     

当代道德教育指向:从道德顺从到道德选择的理路

我国的道德教育有着悠久的历史,其主体流质是道德顺从教育,原因有:伦理本位的思想传统;群体本位的教育倾向和道德教育的政治统治功能强化。当代道德教育的时代背景的变迁即社会结构的转型和多元化社会的形成以及当代道德教育人本倾向和生活世界的实践回归,标示着道德选择教育成为了道德教育的内在要求和指向。     

Moral Obligation and Moral Motivation in Confucian Role-Based Ethics

How is the Confucian moral agent motivated to do what he or she judges to be right or good? In western philosophy, the answer to a question such as this depends on whether one is an internalist or externalist concerning moral motivation. In this article, I will first interpret Confucian ethics as role-based ethics and then argue that we can attribute to Confucianism a position on moral motivation that is neither internalist nor externalist but somewhere in between. I will then illustrate my claim with my reading of Mencius 6A4, showing that it is superior to readings found in the literature, which typically assume that Mencius is an internalist.     

社会性道德视角下的市场社会道德基础探究--兼析经济学的价值判断

在个体层面上,“利己”与“道德”是人性中的两种德性,二者并不矛盾;在型构社会层面上．为了维系合作秩序的扩展,须构建与市场社会相适应的社会性道德基础。中国的传统社会缺失了社会性道德这一维度,休谟在特定的历史时期所提出的社会性道德论说对于建设中国当下的市场经济有特别的理论借鉴意义。普世性的道德准则是经济学的前提,经济学自身的价值判断准则也同样拒斥不道德的经济行为。“市场经济可以不讲道德”的命题是不成立的。     

道德判断中的性别差异研究

通过问卷形式呈现给被试道德两难故事,对491名大学生的道德判断进行了研究,发现：1）人类道德判断存在着结果主义和非结果主义两种不同的倾向;2）在小范围内道德判断可能存在性别差异,但在大多数情况下,男女道德判断是极其相似的;3）男女道德判断的性别差异更大程度上是研究所假设的情境引起的,而不是真正的道德判断差异。