Experimental philosophy of actual and counterfactual free will intuitions

Five experiments suggested that everyday free will and moral responsibility judgments about some hypothetical thought examples differed from free will and moral responsibility judgments about the actual world. Experiment 1 (N = 106) showed that free will intuitions about the actual world measured by the FAD-Plus poorly predicted free will intuitions about a hypothetical person performing a determined action (r = .13). Experiments 2–5 replicated this result and found the relations between actual free will judgments and free will judgments about hypothetical determined or fated actions (rs = .22–.35) were much smaller than the differences between them (η_p² = .2–.55). These results put some pressure on theoretical accounts of everyday intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility.     

信念与结果对道德、法律责任判断的影响

在"执行者"和"旁观者"两个情境中,通过操纵当事人的信念和事件结果,考察了被试的道德与法律责任判断。结果显示:进行道德责任判断时,被试对当事人的信念信息更敏感;进行法律责任判断时,则对事件结果的信息更敏感。"执行者"情境中的道德和法律责任评分均高于"旁观者"情境中的责任评分。这说明道德、法律责任判断的内部机制有所不同,并且当事人的不同角色导致第三方对其的责任判断出现差异。     

On the Psychoanalytic Treatment of the Depressive Personality

In order to discuss the depressive personality we have first to distinguish between this clinical entity and other types of depressive psychopathology that might also be chronic. The character traits and psychodynamics of the depressive personality confirm that there is a special group of patients, who belong to a depressive disorder continuum. The particular technical problems that depressive personality present are: (1) the inability to enjoy anything and the consequences of this on the therapist's experience and interventions, and (2) the negative therapeutic reaction which threatens the analytic process and the therapist's competence. If we combine transference/extratransference interpretations with an "empathetic understanding" approach to systematic confrontation and interpretation, we can therefore justify the need for a slightly modified psychoanalytic technique in the treatment of the depressive personality.     

Punishing hypocrisy: The roles of hypocrisy and moral emotions in deciding culpability and punishment of criminal and civil moral transgressors

Three experiments explored how hypocrisy affects attributions of criminal guilt and the desire to punish hypocritical criminals. Study 1 established that via perceived hypocrisy, a hypocritical criminal was seen as more culpable and was punished more than a non-hypocritical criminal who committed an identical crime. Study 2 expanded on this, showing that negative moral emotions (anger and disgust) mediated the relationships between perceived hypocrisy, criminal guilt, and punishment. Study 3 replicated the emotion finding from Study 2 using new scenarios where group agents were clearly aware of the hypocrisy of their actions, yet acted anyway. Again, perceived hypocrisy worked through moral emotions to affect criminal guilt and punishment. The current studies provide empirical support for theories relating hypocrisy and moral transgressions to moral emotions, also informing the literature on the role of moral emotions in moral reasoning and legal decision making.     

The fractal property of internal structure of facial affect recognition: A complex system approach

Based on a circumplex model of facial affect, four inner affective circumplexes, assumed to have 100%, 75%, 50%, and 25% emotional intensities, were investigated in terms of fractal, which is a concept of complex systems. Results revealed that the perimeters of the circumplex excluding the 25% condition possessed fractal property characterised by features specific to fractals. Results also showed that fractal dimension in the 50% condition (1.58 dimension) was significantly higher than that in the 100% (1.45 dimension) and 75% (1.45 dimension) conditions, indicating that the cognitive structure of facial affect in the 50% condition was more complex than that in the 100% and 75% conditions.     

Hot as hell! The self-conscious nature of action regrets

Gilovich, Medvec, and Kahneman (1998) have shown that real-life regrets for actions and inactions correspond to different emotional states. When people regret something they have done they experience painful “hot” emotions such as disgust or guilt, whereas when the regret is about a failure to act they rather experience wistful emotions. In four questionnaire studies, we have tested the hypothesis that regrettable actions elicit a particular subcategory of these hot emotions: the self-conscious emotions (i.e., guilt, shame, embarrassment, remorse, and anger toward oneself). These studies used different methodologies and all converged to show that self-conscious emotions were the only hot emotions to be systematically greater for action regrets than for inaction regrets. A similar pattern was observed for judgments of responsibility and morality. We emphasize the theoretical and methodological implications of these results in the discussion.     

Disparities in the moral intuitions of criminal offenders: The role of psychopathy

The present study examined whether and in what ways psychopathy is associated with abnormal moral intuitions among criminal offenders. Using Haidt et al.’s Moral Foundations Questionnaire, 222 adult male offenders assessed for clinical psychopathy reported their degree of support for five moral domains: Harm Prevention, Fairness, Respect for Authority, Ingroup Loyalty, and Purity/Sanctity. As predicted, psychopathy total score explained a substantial proportion of the variance in reduced support for Harm Prevention and Fairness, but not the other domains. These results confirm that psychopathy entails a discrete set of moral abnormalities and suggest that these abnormalities could potentially help to explain the characteristic antisocial behavior of individuals with psychopathy.     

Situational power moderates the influence of Self-Transcendence vs. Self-Enhancement values on behavior in ultimatum bargaining

We examined the interactive effects of personal values and situational power on proposer and responder behavior in an ultimatum bargaining game. The current literature suggests that situational power could moderate the influence of personal values on behavior. For proposers (N = 107), high scores on the Self-Transcendence vs. Self-Enhancement value dimension predicted higher proposals, but only among participants told that they were in a powerful position. For responders (N = 95), high scores on the Self-Transcendence vs. Self-Enhancement value dimension predicted accepting smaller proposals, but again only among participants told that they were in a powerful position. Our results support the idea that high situational power elicits behavior more consistent with one’s standing on the Self-Transcendence vs. Self-Enhancement value dimension.     

Time and moral judgment

Do moral judgments hinge on the time available to render them? According to a recent dual-process model of moral judgment, moral dilemmas that engage emotional processes are likely to result in fast deontological gut reactions. In contrast, consequentialist responses that tot up lives saved and lost in response to such dilemmas would require cognitive control to override the initial response. Cognitive control, however, takes time. In two experiments, we manipulated the time available to arrive at moral judgments in two ways: by allotting a fixed short or large amount of time, and by nudging people to answer swiftly or to deliberate thoroughly. We found that faster responses indeed lead to more deontological responses among those moral dilemmas in which the killing of one to save many necessitates manhandling an innocent person and in which this action is depicted as a means to an end. Thus, our results are the first demonstration that inhibiting cognitive control through manipulations of time alters moral judgments.     

Gross gods and icky atheism: Disgust responses to rejected religious beliefs

Disgust is an emotional response that helps to maintain and protect physical and spiritual purity by signaling contamination and motivating the restoration of personal cleanliness. In the present research we predicted that disgust may be elicited by contact with outgroup religious beliefs, as these beliefs pose a threat to spiritual purity. Two experiments tested this prediction using a repeated taste-test paradigm in which participants tasted and rated a drink before and after copying a passage from an outgroup religion. In Experiment 1, Christian participants showed increased disgust after writing a passage from the Qur'an or Richard Dawkins' The God Delusion, but not a control text. Experiment 2 replicated this effect, and also showed that contact with an ingroup religious belief (Christians copying from the Bible) did not elicit disgust. Moreover, Experiment 2 showed that disgust to rejected beliefs was eliminated when participants were allowed to wash their hands after copying the passage, symbolically restoring spiritual cleanliness. Together, these results provide evidence that contact with rejected religious beliefs elicits disgust by symbolically violating spiritual purity. Implications for intergroup relations between religious groups is discussed, and the role of disgust in the protection of beliefs that hold moral value.