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81.
Moral phenomenology is (roughly) the study of those features of occurrent mental states with moral significance which are
accessible through direct introspection, whether or not such states possess phenomenal character – a what-it-is-likeness.
In this paper, as the title indicates, we introduce and make prefatory remarks about moral phenomenology and its significance
for ethics. After providing a brief taxonomy of types of moral experience, we proceed to consider questions about the commonality within and distinctiveness of such experiences, with an eye on some of the main philosophical issues in ethics and how moral phenomenology might be brought
to bear on them. In discussing such matters, we consider some of the doubts about moral phenomenology and its value to ethics
that are brought up by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Michael Gill in their contributions to this issue.
相似文献
Mark Timmons (Corresponding author)Email: |
82.
83.
Wouter van Haaften 《New Ideas in Psychology》2007,25(3):207-220
I propose a concise picture of the core structure of paradigm change. It consists of the three basic steps which, I suggest, are common to all forms of paradigm change, individual as well as collective and in every conceptual domain. These steps are formularized so as to stimulate more precise theorizing about, and comparisons between various alleged forms of paradigm change. I explain the idea and give evidence for it using examples from the fields of cognitive psychology, moral psychology, and the history of science. 相似文献
84.
Moral development research has often focused on the development of moral reasoning without considering children's understanding of moral advisors. We investigated how children construe sources of moral advice by examining the characteristics that children deem necessary for reasoning about moral or scientific problems. In two experiments, children in grades K, 2, and 4 were presented with dilemmas of a moral nature or scientific nature and chose between two advisors. Second and fourth graders chose advisors differentially based on their expertise, while kindergartners did not discriminate between advisors. In a third experiment, older children indicated that only certain characteristics are needed to solve moral or scientific problems, and they endorsed these characteristics differentially based on the problem to be solved. Thus, by middle childhood, children construe moral knowledge as distinct from scientific knowledge and select advisors in each area accordingly. 相似文献
85.
康德从抽象的个人建立道德规律,与他所谓的人类的道德史相矛盾。解决的办法:是团体、社会性与集体思想作为个人先在的规定性与责任与道德的源泉。 相似文献
86.
法国现代哲学把伦理学作为一个核心问题。在现象学的框架之下,勒维纳斯和利科重新思考了主体的自由及其责任。该文简单地介绍这两位哲学家的基本观念。勒维纳斯比较强调个人对他人的无限伦理责任,而利科更强调美德,把它当作为伦理生活的出发点。虽然这些伦理立场不同而很难协调,可是它们都提供很必要的资源来思考现代伦理生活所面的困境和它的未来的可能。 相似文献
87.
David L. Rennie 《Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy》2007,37(1):53-58
Reflexivity has been defined as self-awareness, and radical reflexivity as awareness of self-awareness. Based on a qualitative
research study of the client's experience of psychotherapy, clients’ reflexivity and radical reflexivity are applied to the
concepts of moral evaluation and freedom of will. These concepts in turn are related to psychotherapy clients’ relationship
with self and with the therapist. It is shown how the nature of these relationships provides a rationale for decisions on
the appropriateness of the therapist's direction of the therapeutic process. In addition, specific interventions to offset
the power differential between the client and therapist are specified. It is concluded that unconscious determinants of experience
and action notwithstanding, clients’ self-aware agency plays a significant role in their engagement in therapy.
相似文献
David L. RennieEmail: |
88.
Predicting how another person will evaluate the intention underlying an action involves consideration of second-order mental states. Children (ages 5-10 years) and college students (N=105) predicted an observer's belief about an actor's intention and evaluated the actor from both their own perspectives and the perspective of the observer. Younger children were more likely than older children and adults to attribute a belief to the observer that mismatched the actor's prior intention. Attributed beliefs about intention were more likely to match negative prior intentions than to match positive prior intentions and were also more likely to match prior intentions when the observer knew the actor's prior intention than when the observer did not know the actor's prior intention. The judgments attributed to the observer were based on the beliefs about intention attributed to the observer, showing use of second-order mental states to infer another's sociomoral judgments. 相似文献
89.
The Argument from Moral Experience 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Don Loeb 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(5):469-484
It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and talking about morality,
has a certain objective-seeming character to it, and that this supports a presumption in favor of objectivist theories (according
to which morality is a realm of facts or truths) and against anti-objectivist theories like Mackie’s error theory (according
to which it is not). In this paper, I argue that our experience of morality does not support objectivist moral theories in
this way. I begin by arguing that our moral experience does not have the uniformly objective-seeming character it is typically
claimed to have. I go on to argue that even if moral experience were to presuppose or display morality as a realm of fact,
we would still need a reason for taking that to support theories according to which it is such a realm. I consider what I
take to be the four most promising ways of attempting to supply such a reason: (A) inference to the best explanation, (B)
epistemic conservatism, (C) the Principle of Credulity, and (D) the method of wide reflective equilibrium. In each case, I
argue, the strategy in question does not support a presumption in favor of objectivist moral theories.
相似文献
Don LoebEmail: |
90.
Michael Cholbi 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(4):323-334
Philosophers have harbored doubts about the possibility of moral expertise since Plato. I argue that irrespective of whether
moral experts exist, identifying who those experts are is insurmountable because of the credentials problem: Moral experts have no need to seek out others’ moral expertise, but moral non-experts lack sufficient knowledge to determine
whether the advice provided by a putative moral expert in response to complex moral situations is correct and hence whether
an individual is a bone fide expert. Traditional accounts of moral expertise require that moral experts give reliably correct
moral advice supported by adequate justification, an account which, I argue, is too lean in allowing for the possibility of
a moral expert who is motivationally indifferent to her own moral judgments and advice. Yet even if the proposition that a
moral expert is an individual who provides reliably correct moral advice supported by adequate justification and is necessarily motivated by that advice exhausts the necessary and sufficient conditions for moral expertise, this proposition
cannot function as an applicable criterion for non-experts to use in appraising would-be experts’ claims to expertise. The
credentials problem thus remains unanswered.
相似文献
Michael CholbiEmail: |