Basic value orientations and moral foundations: Convergent or discriminant constructs?

This study examined the structural and genetic links between value orientations, based on the theory of basic values, and moral concerns, based on moral foundations theory. We hypothesized both structural and genetic convergence of Conservation (versus openness to change) with Binding foundations and of Self-transcendence (versus self-enhancement) with Individualizing foundations. We analyzed self- and informant ratings from 924 participants with extended multitrait-multirater modeling and ran twin model analyses on self-ratings from 555 twin pairs. For Conservation and Binding foundations, we found partial convergence across different rater perspectives and a substantial genetic overlap, but also distinct genetic factors. Self-transcendence and Individualizing foundations were found to be structurally divergent, but genetically linked. We discuss the conceptual and measurement-related implications of the findings.     

Challenges for the sequential two-system model of moral judgement

Considerable evidence supports the sequential two-system (“default interventionist”) model of moral judgement, as proposed by Greene and others. We tested whether judgement speed and/or personal/impersonal moral dilemmas can predict the kind of moral judgements (utilitarian or deontological) subjects make for each dilemma, and whether personal dilemmas create difficulty in moral judgements. Our results showed that neither personal/impersonal conditions nor spontaneous/thoughtful-reflection conditions were reliable predictors of utilitarian or deontological moral judgements. Yet, we found support for an alternative view, in which, when the two types of responses are in conflict; the resolution of this conflict depends on both the subject and the dilemma. While thinking about this conflict, subjects sometimes change their minds in both directions, as suggested by the data from a mouse-tracking task.     

On the Alleged Connection between Moral Evil and Human Freedom: A Response to Trakakis’ Third Critique

In this essay, I respond to Nick Trakakis’ “A Third (Meta-)Critique.” This critique is directed against my argument concerning the inadequacy of the traditional theistic argument from free will. I contend that the argument from free will does not adequately explain the distribution of moral evil in the world. I maintain that the third critique, like Trakakis’ earlier critiques, is unconvincing. I remain convinced that my original argument regarding the inadequacy of the traditional argument from free will is compelling. The argument from freedom of the will, considered in itself, is unpersuasive.

Imaginability,morality, and fictional truth: dissolving the puzzle of ‘imaginative resistance’

This paper argues that there is no genuine puzzle of ‘imaginative resistance’. In part 1 of the paper I argue that the imaginability of fictional propositions is relative to a range of different factors including the ‘thickness’ of certain concepts, and certain pre-theoretical and theoretical commitments. I suggest that those holding realist moral commitments may be more susceptible to resistance and inability than those holding non-realist commitments, and that it is such realist commitments that ultimately motivate the problem. However, I argue that the relativity of imaginability is not a particularly puzzling feature of imagination. In part 2, I claim that it is the so-called ‘alethic’ puzzle, concerning fictional truth, which generates a real puzzle about imaginative resistance. However, I argue that the alethic puzzle itself depends on certain realist assumptions about the nature of fictional truth which are implausible and should be rejected in favour of an interpretive view of fictional truth. Once this is done, I contend, it becomes evident that the supposed problem of imaginative resistance as it has hitherto been discussed in the literature is not puzzling at all.

Intuition as a Basic Source of Moral Knowledge

The idea that intuition plays a basic role in moral knowledge and moral philosophy probably began in the eighteenth century. British philosophers such as Anthony Shaftsbury, Francis Hutcheson, Thomas Reid, and later David Hume talk about a “moral sense” that they place in John Locke’s theory of knowledge in terms of Lockean reflexive perceptions, while Richard Price seeks a faculty by which we obtain our ideas of right and wrong. In the twentieth century intuitionism in moral philosophy was revived by the works of G. E. Moore, H. A. Prichard, and W. D. Ross. These philosophers reject Kantian deontological ethics and utilitarianism insisting that intuition is the only source of moral knowledge. Recently, there is a renewed interest in intuition by philosophers doing meta-philosophy by reflecting on what philosophers do, and why they disagree. In this essay we plan to take some of this recent literature on intuition and apply it to moral philosophy. We will proceed by (1) defining a conception of intuition, (2) answering some skeptical challenges, (3) delimiting its target, and (4) arguing that intuition is often a source of moral knowledge.

Moral Conviction and Political Engagement

The 2004 presidential election led to considerable discussion about whether moral values motivated people to vote, and if so, whether it led to a conservative electoral advantage. The results of two studies—one conducted in the context of the 2000 presidential election, the other in the context of the 2004 presidential election—indicated that stronger moral convictions associated with candidates themselves and attitudes on issues of the day uniquely predicted self-reported voting behavior and intentions to vote even when controlling for a host of alternative explanations (e.g., attitude strength, strength of party identification). In addition, we found strong support for the hypothesis that moral convictions equally motivated political engagement for those on the political right and left and little support for the notion that a combination of morality and politics is something more characteristic of the political right than it is of the political left.     

道德之一元论与多元论：缘起、内涵与论争

一元论与多元论之争是道德心理学领域近些年最为活跃的理论交锋之一。道德一元论认为所有外在的道德现象与内在的道德结构都可以用一种因素来解释。道德多元论则认为道德不能只用单一因素来解释,而是存在多个不同质的道德维度,且具有文化敏感性。对应道德理论和道德基础理论是这场争议的典型代表。双方就伤害的解释力、道德失声现象、模块化道德与洁净维度独立性等方面展开论争。未来研究应从三个具体方面进一步探索道德之一元论与多元论难题,进而保持道德心理学领域的理论活力。     

从道德本位到权利本位的转换——梁启超《新民说》审视

梁启超《新民说》是对以《大学》为代表的中国传统“新民”思想的改造和发展。他以民权、独立、自由的资产阶级“公德”代替以伦理道德为核心的封建主义的“私德” ,用中西文化中的优秀道德传统构建新国民 ,实现了从以伦理道德为本位的旧道德向以权利为本位的新道德的转换 ,“旧国民”向“新国民”的转换。     

Assuming a Position: Women and Men as Moral Critics in Their Own War Zone

In their search for an authentic moral self, women and men may at some time in their lives assume a position of resistance. Men are most likely to assume this position in the sphere of war. It is not clear, however, where or when women would be expected to assume such a position or what the nature of that position might be, and how far it could be likened to that of the resisting man. This paper explores the idea that choosing to be a single mother can be a position by and from which women can voice their moral criticism. Such position is comparable to the (known and well-studied) position taken by men who show their moral criticism by refusing to participate in a specific battle during a morally controversial war. The paper begins with an examination of the philosophical and psychological concepts of separate and connected moral positions available to resisting men and women in the spheres of war and family. The conclusions are based on data from two samples of resisters in the spheres of war and the family: 36 soldiers (30 years old on average) who decided to take a stand as selective conscientious objectors (SCOs) during a morally controversial war and 50 (biologically) mature single women (over age 30) who chose to become pregnant and to remain unwed mothers. The conceptual and methodological questions regarding this comparison are discussed.     

Limits of morality: A sociological approach to higher moral stages

Grounded in the wider framework of Kohlberg's (1984) stage theory of moral development and Habermas' (1981; Habermas &; Luhmann, 1971) theory of discourse, this article addresses the question: Is a moral stage 6 society possible? Toward answering this question, a sociological approach to moral stage 6 is employed that complements the usual psychological approach to moral development. The article posits that a moral stage 6 society is impossible. Therefore, lower-stage institutions cannot be abolished; they have to be controlled and supervised. This calls for a new and structurally different type of discourse, the metadiscourse. The article postulates that such metadiscourse has the property of moral stage 7 according to the general stage model (Commons &; Richards, 1984a, 1984b). Finally, several strategies for controlling lower-stage institutions are considered, with bureaucracy serving as example of a lower-stage institution.