全文获取类型
收费全文 | 481篇 |
免费 | 31篇 |
国内免费 | 2篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 3篇 |
2023年 | 3篇 |
2022年 | 8篇 |
2021年 | 15篇 |
2020年 | 23篇 |
2019年 | 20篇 |
2018年 | 17篇 |
2017年 | 18篇 |
2016年 | 21篇 |
2015年 | 25篇 |
2014年 | 29篇 |
2013年 | 65篇 |
2012年 | 14篇 |
2011年 | 28篇 |
2010年 | 7篇 |
2009年 | 55篇 |
2008年 | 64篇 |
2007年 | 47篇 |
2006年 | 16篇 |
2005年 | 6篇 |
2004年 | 4篇 |
2003年 | 8篇 |
2002年 | 4篇 |
2001年 | 2篇 |
2000年 | 3篇 |
1998年 | 2篇 |
1997年 | 2篇 |
1996年 | 1篇 |
1995年 | 2篇 |
1994年 | 1篇 |
1991年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有514条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
81.
John Martin Fischer 《The Journal of Ethics》2008,12(2):167-189
I seek to reply to the thoughtful and challenging papers by Helen Steward, Saul Smilansky, and John Perry. Steward argues
that agency itself requires access to alternative possibilities; I attempt to motivate my denial of this view. I believe that
her view here is no more plausible than the view (which she rejects) that it is unfair to hold someone morally responsible,
unless he has genuine access to alternative possibilities. Smilansky contends that compatibilism is morally shallow, and that
we can see this from the “ultimate perspective.” In reply, I explore the nature of “zooming” arguments, and I contend that
even from a somewhat more detached perspective, important features that distinguish us from mere animals can be discerned
(even in a causally deterministic universe). Finally, I seek to address Perry’s defense of classical compatibilism. My main
objection to his form of compatbilism is that agents must be construed as having a certain kind of “baggage”—even on his own
account.
相似文献
John Martin FischerEmail: |
82.
Richard M. Glatz 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(2):257-272
Harry Frankfurt has famously criticized the principle of alternate possibilities—the principle that an agent is morally responsible
for performing some action only if able to have done otherwise than to perform it—on the grounds that it is possible for an
agent to be morally responsible for performing an action that is inevitable for the agent when the reasons for which the agent
lacks alternate possibilities are not the reasons for which the agent has acted. I argue that an incompatibilist about determinism
and moral responsibility can safely ignore so-called “Frakfurt-style cases” and continue to argue for incompatibilism on the
grounds that determinism rules out the ability to do otherwise. My argument relies on a simple—indeed, simplistic—weakening
of the principle of alternate possibilities that is explicitly designed to be immune to Frankfurt-style criticism. This alternative
to the principle of alternate possibilities is so simplistic that it will no doubt strike many readers as philosophically
fallow. I argue that it is not. I argue that the addition of one highly plausible premise allows for the modified principle
to be employed in an argument for incompatibilism that begins with the observation that determinism rules out the ability
to do otherwise. On the merits of this argument I conclude that deterministic moral responsibility is impossible and that
Frankfurt’s criticism of the principle of alternate possibilities—even if successful to that end—may be safely ignored.
相似文献
Richard M. GlatzEmail: |
83.
Moral phenomenology is (roughly) the study of those features of occurrent mental states with moral significance which are
accessible through direct introspection, whether or not such states possess phenomenal character – a what-it-is-likeness.
In this paper, as the title indicates, we introduce and make prefatory remarks about moral phenomenology and its significance
for ethics. After providing a brief taxonomy of types of moral experience, we proceed to consider questions about the commonality within and distinctiveness of such experiences, with an eye on some of the main philosophical issues in ethics and how moral phenomenology might be brought
to bear on them. In discussing such matters, we consider some of the doubts about moral phenomenology and its value to ethics
that are brought up by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Michael Gill in their contributions to this issue.
相似文献
Mark Timmons (Corresponding author)Email: |
84.
85.
Wouter van Haaften 《New Ideas in Psychology》2007,25(3):207-220
I propose a concise picture of the core structure of paradigm change. It consists of the three basic steps which, I suggest, are common to all forms of paradigm change, individual as well as collective and in every conceptual domain. These steps are formularized so as to stimulate more precise theorizing about, and comparisons between various alleged forms of paradigm change. I explain the idea and give evidence for it using examples from the fields of cognitive psychology, moral psychology, and the history of science. 相似文献
86.
Moral development research has often focused on the development of moral reasoning without considering children's understanding of moral advisors. We investigated how children construe sources of moral advice by examining the characteristics that children deem necessary for reasoning about moral or scientific problems. In two experiments, children in grades K, 2, and 4 were presented with dilemmas of a moral nature or scientific nature and chose between two advisors. Second and fourth graders chose advisors differentially based on their expertise, while kindergartners did not discriminate between advisors. In a third experiment, older children indicated that only certain characteristics are needed to solve moral or scientific problems, and they endorsed these characteristics differentially based on the problem to be solved. Thus, by middle childhood, children construe moral knowledge as distinct from scientific knowledge and select advisors in each area accordingly. 相似文献
87.
康德从抽象的个人建立道德规律,与他所谓的人类的道德史相矛盾。解决的办法:是团体、社会性与集体思想作为个人先在的规定性与责任与道德的源泉。 相似文献
88.
法国现代哲学把伦理学作为一个核心问题。在现象学的框架之下,勒维纳斯和利科重新思考了主体的自由及其责任。该文简单地介绍这两位哲学家的基本观念。勒维纳斯比较强调个人对他人的无限伦理责任,而利科更强调美德,把它当作为伦理生活的出发点。虽然这些伦理立场不同而很难协调,可是它们都提供很必要的资源来思考现代伦理生活所面的困境和它的未来的可能。 相似文献
89.
David L. Rennie 《Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy》2007,37(1):53-58
Reflexivity has been defined as self-awareness, and radical reflexivity as awareness of self-awareness. Based on a qualitative
research study of the client's experience of psychotherapy, clients’ reflexivity and radical reflexivity are applied to the
concepts of moral evaluation and freedom of will. These concepts in turn are related to psychotherapy clients’ relationship
with self and with the therapist. It is shown how the nature of these relationships provides a rationale for decisions on
the appropriateness of the therapist's direction of the therapeutic process. In addition, specific interventions to offset
the power differential between the client and therapist are specified. It is concluded that unconscious determinants of experience
and action notwithstanding, clients’ self-aware agency plays a significant role in their engagement in therapy.
相似文献
David L. RennieEmail: |
90.
Predicting how another person will evaluate the intention underlying an action involves consideration of second-order mental states. Children (ages 5-10 years) and college students (N=105) predicted an observer's belief about an actor's intention and evaluated the actor from both their own perspectives and the perspective of the observer. Younger children were more likely than older children and adults to attribute a belief to the observer that mismatched the actor's prior intention. Attributed beliefs about intention were more likely to match negative prior intentions than to match positive prior intentions and were also more likely to match prior intentions when the observer knew the actor's prior intention than when the observer did not know the actor's prior intention. The judgments attributed to the observer were based on the beliefs about intention attributed to the observer, showing use of second-order mental states to infer another's sociomoral judgments. 相似文献