“It's hip to be square”: Grounding moral traits in geometric shapes

To examine the hypothesis that there is a metaphoric link between geometric shapes (square vs. circle) and moral traits (integrity vs. deviousness), we conducted three experiments in China. In Study 1, integrity-related words were classified faster when embedded in a square than in a circle. Conversely, deviousness-related words were classified faster in a circle than in a square. Study 2 found that a person who preferred squares was perceived as more righteous and that a person who preferred circles was perceived as more devious. Study 3 revealed that the participants were more likely to pair a square with integrity-related words and a circle with deviousness-related words in a memory task. Given the negation of square-integrity and circle-deviousness emotional congruence, the findings of this research show that shape-related information is a meaningful part of the mental representations of moral traits.     

小学生算术应用题上真实性思考及相关因素的研究

采用由7道真实性算术应用题构成的测试材料研究了207名六年级小学生。首先要求被试解答这些题目,然后对给出的不同解答作出评定。结果表明:(1)我国六年级小学生在无提示条件下真实性思考的人数比例是36.6%,显著地高于真实性解答的人数比例27.3%。(2)在解题真实性思考上,优生显著地高于中等生,中等生显著地高于差生;在对不确定真实性解答的评分上,优生显著地高于中等生与差生,在对常规性解答的评分上,优生显著地低于中等生与差生。(3)提示条件显著地提高了学生的真实性思考水平,并且与学生的学业水平存在着显著的交互作用;提示条件不影响学生对不确定真实性解答与常规性解答的评分。     

青少年道德判断能力的研究

德国道德心理学家林德提出“道德行为与发展的双面理论”,并设计了著名的“道德判断测验”,在20多年的研究中取得了很多重要成果。我们以中文版的“道德判断测验”为测量工具,以724名12-27岁青少年学生为被试进行实证研究,研究结果表明:学生的C分数随年级提高而有所提高,但不同年级之间有一定波动,说明学校教育有助于提高学生的道德判断能力,但存在不稳定因素。男女生C分数不存在显著差异,学校内部各年级之间也不存在显著差异,不同性质的学生之间不存在显著差异;     

Moral chronicity and social information processing: Tests of a social cognitive approach to the moral personality

Following Higgins, King, and Mavin (1982) chronicity paradigm, we examined the effects of chronically accessed moral constructs for prototypic moral character using two different research paradigms, spontaneous trait inferencing and lexical decision. Study 1 presented target sentences in a deliberate or spontaneous processing condition. Recall was cued with either a dispositional or semantic cue. Moral chronics made more spontaneous trait inferences with dispositional cues than semantic cues. In Study 2, participants read stories about characters who did or did not help. Moral chronics were faster responding to probes reflecting negative evaluations of story characters who did not help when requested (e.g., “disloyal”). Findings support claims that the moral personality is usefully conceptualized in terms of the chronic accessibility of moral knowledge structures.     

论信用的道德限度

社会诚信的研究和建设是当前伦理学研究和道德建设的重点,且很多学者都把信用制度的建设作为主要途径和突破口,但这是否抓出了问题的要害,却是需要慎思的。我们通过对这两个概念的反思和比较,发现诚信比信用有更高的立意和更丰富的内涵,而信用有其内在的道德限度,表现为:信用主体是抽象的人,诚信主体是现实的人;信用要实现的是外在利益,诚信则立足于人的内在价值;信用体现的是工具理性,诚信体现一种实践智慧。通过两者的比较,我们就能合理地确定信用制度起作用的性质、范围和程度,认识到它的必要性和局限性,从而摆正它在社会诚信建设中的地位。     

Moral Principles or Consumer Preferences? Alternative Framings of the Trolley Problem

We created paired moral dilemmas with minimal contrasts in wording, a research strategy that has been advocated as a way to empirically establish principles operative in a domain-specific moral psychology. However, the candidate "principles" we tested were not derived from work in moral philosophy, but rather from work in the areas of consumer choice and risk perception. Participants were paradoxically less likely to choose an action that sacrifices one life to save others when they were asked to provide more reasons for doing so (Experiment 1), and their willingness to sacrifice lives depended not only on how many lives would be saved, but on the number of lives at risk (Experiment 2). The latter effect was also found in a within-subjects design (Experiment 3). These findings suggest caution in the use of artificial dilemmas as a key testbed for revealing principled bases for moral judgment.     

Hypocrites or maligned cooperative participants? Experimenter induced normative conflict in zero-sum situations

The failure to recognize the influence of two distinct forms of moral norms can lead to the misattribution of moral behavior to egoistic motives. This is illustrated in the research of Batson and his colleagues (e.g., Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997). They reported the appearance of moral failure and hypocrisy motivation in several experiments employing essentially the same “zero-sum” experimental situation. They cited as evidence the discrepancy between participants’ apparently self-serving private acts and their subsequent public ratings of the morality of what they had done as well as their recognition of the “most” moral way to behave. The research reported here supported an alternative explanation that located the experimenter’s implicit and explicit instructions as the source of the discrepancy between the participants’ private acts and their public ratings. The findings confirmed the hypothesis that Batson and his colleagues had not merely made moral norms “salient”. They had actually presented their participants with contradictory “demands”: explicitly inviting them to meet the norm of justified self-interest in private but then give public lip-service to the experimenter’s instructions as to a supererogatory way to behave. When either of the demands was removed, the “hypocrisy” no longer occurred.     

A clean self can render harsh moral judgment

Physical cleanliness has many medical benefits, such as protection from the dangers of contagion. We explore a potential unintended consequence of cleanliness. Given the metaphorical association between physical cleanliness and moral purity (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006), we contend that a clean self may also be linked to a virtuous self. This enhanced moral self-perception can in turn license harsher moral judgment. Three experiments found that cleanliness, whether induced via physical cleansing or through a visualization task, licensed severe judgment on morally contested issues such as abortion and pornography. Further, we found that an inflated moral self mediated the relationship between cleanliness and moral judgment. These results provide unique insight to the social significance of cleanliness and may have important implications for discrimination and prejudice.     

Choosing normative properties: a reply to Eklund’s Choosing Normative Concepts

ABSTRACT

The literature surrounding Horgan and Timmons’s Moral Twin Earth scenarios has focused on whether such scenarios present a metasemantic problem for naturalist realists. But in Choosing Normative Concepts, Eklund uses a similar scenario to illuminate a novel, distinctly metaphysical problem for normative realists of both naturalist and non-naturalist stripes. The problem is that it is not clear what (if anything) would suffice for the sort of ardent realist view that normative realists have in mind – the view that reality itself favors certain ways of acting and valuing. Eklund then offers a metasemantic view that he thinks can provide the best solution to this problem. In this reply to Eklund, I argue that Eklund’s treatment of the problem and his solution re-entangle metaphysical and metasemantic issues that ought to be kept separate. I also argue that there is a purely metaphysical solution to the problem at hand, which Eklund’s own solution seems to implicitly rely upon. While these criticisms do not suggest that Eklund’s positive view is false, they do undermine some of the broader lessons that Eklund hopes to draw from the view.     

Moral responsibility and free will: A meta-analysis

Fundamental beliefs about free will and moral responsibility are often thought to shape our ability to have healthy relationships with others and ourselves. Emotional reactions have also been shown to have an important and pervasive impact on judgments and behaviors. Recent research suggests that emotional reactions play a prominent role in judgments about free will, influencing judgments about determinism’s relation to free will and moral responsibility. However, the extent to which affect influences these judgments is unclear. We conducted a meta-analysis to estimate the impact of affect. Our meta-analysis indicates that beliefs in free will are largely robust to emotional reactions.