全文获取类型
收费全文 | 482篇 |
免费 | 31篇 |
国内免费 | 2篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 4篇 |
2023年 | 3篇 |
2022年 | 8篇 |
2021年 | 15篇 |
2020年 | 23篇 |
2019年 | 20篇 |
2018年 | 17篇 |
2017年 | 18篇 |
2016年 | 21篇 |
2015年 | 25篇 |
2014年 | 29篇 |
2013年 | 65篇 |
2012年 | 14篇 |
2011年 | 28篇 |
2010年 | 7篇 |
2009年 | 55篇 |
2008年 | 64篇 |
2007年 | 47篇 |
2006年 | 16篇 |
2005年 | 6篇 |
2004年 | 4篇 |
2003年 | 8篇 |
2002年 | 4篇 |
2001年 | 2篇 |
2000年 | 3篇 |
1998年 | 2篇 |
1997年 | 2篇 |
1996年 | 1篇 |
1995年 | 2篇 |
1994年 | 1篇 |
1991年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有515条查询结果,搜索用时 31 毫秒
171.
Dolichan Kollareth Mariko Kikutani Mariko Shirai James A. Russell 《International journal of psychology》2019,54(5):612-620
According to one important set of theories, different domains of immorality are linked to different discrete emotions—panculturally. Violations against the community elicit contempt, whereas violations against an individual elicit anger. To test this theory, American, Indian and Japanese participants (N = 480) indicated contempt and anger reactions (with verbal rating and face selection) to both the types of immorality. To remedy method problems in previous research, community and autonomy violations were created for the same story‐frame, by varying the target to be either the community or an individual. Community and autonomy violations did not differ significantly in the emotion elicited: overall, both types of violations elicited more anger than contempt (and more negative emotion of any kind than positive emotion). By verbal rating, Americans and Indians reported more anger than contempt for both types of violation, whereas Japanese reported more contempt than anger for both types. By face selection, the three cultural groups selected anger more than contempt for both types of violation. The results speak against defining distinct domains of morality by their association with distinct emotions. 相似文献
172.
Moral Conviction and Political Engagement 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
The 2004 presidential election led to considerable discussion about whether moral values motivated people to vote, and if so, whether it led to a conservative electoral advantage. The results of two studies—one conducted in the context of the 2000 presidential election, the other in the context of the 2004 presidential election—indicated that stronger moral convictions associated with candidates themselves and attitudes on issues of the day uniquely predicted self-reported voting behavior and intentions to vote even when controlling for a host of alternative explanations (e.g., attitude strength, strength of party identification). In addition, we found strong support for the hypothesis that moral convictions equally motivated political engagement for those on the political right and left and little support for the notion that a combination of morality and politics is something more characteristic of the political right than it is of the political left. 相似文献
173.
Ishtiyaque Haji 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):1-19
The Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility is so christened because this argument allegedly circumvents
any appeal to the principle of alternate possibilities – a person is morally responsible for doing something only if he could
have avoided doing it – to secure incompatibilism. In this paper, I first summarize Peter van Inwagen’s version of the Direct
Argument. I then comment on David Widerker’s recent responses to the argument. Finally, I cast doubt on the argument by constructing
counterexamples to a rule of inference it invokes.
相似文献
Ishtiyaque HajiEmail: |
174.
Mark Siderits 《Sophia》2008,47(1):29-42
Paleo-compatibilism is the view that the freedom required for moral responsibility is not incompatible with determinism about
the factors relevant to moral assessment, since the claim that we are free and the claim that the psychophysical elements
are causally determined are true in distinct and incommensurable ways. This is to be accounted for by appealing to the distinction
between conventional truth and ultimate truth developed by Buddhist Reductionists. Paleo-compatibilists hold that the illusion
of incompatibilism only arises when we illegitimately mix two distinct vocabularies, one concerned with persons, the other
concerned with the parts to which persons are reducible. I explore the view, its roots in Buddhist Reductionism, and its prospects.
相似文献
Mark SideritsEmail: |
175.
Nalini Bhushan 《Sophia》2008,47(1):57-69
In this essay I first articulate what I take to be an influential and for the most part persuasive model in the western psychoanalytic tradition that is a response to tragic loss, namely, the one that we find in Freud’s little essay entitled ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ (1917). I then use a well-known Buddhist folk tale about the plight of a young woman named Kisagotami to underscore central elements from Buddhist psychology on the subject of suffering that is a consequence of the loss of a young mother’s only child. Fortified by both traditions, I gather together the ingredients for a cross-cultural mental model that serves to explain and to justify as healthy a specific kind of response to a specific form of suffering, namely, the loss of ones’ loved one. I arrive at this model by asking a number of specific questions of both traditions. For instance, what constitutes a non-pathological response to this kind of suffering? What state of mind represents the cessation of such suffering? Is preoccupation with the dead beloved a way of escaping the fact that the person is dead? Is this a form of ignorance that needs to be removed? Is it a form of moral deficiency? Might certain forms and contexts of ignorance, in effect, put one on a path to enlightenment? 相似文献
176.
Joel Thomas Tierno 《Sophia》2008,47(2):223-230
In this essay, I respond to Nick Trakakis’ “A Third (Meta-)Critique.” This critique is directed against my argument concerning
the inadequacy of the traditional theistic argument from free will. I contend that the argument from free will does not adequately
explain the distribution of moral evil in the world. I maintain that the third critique, like Trakakis’ earlier critiques,
is unconvincing. I remain convinced that my original argument regarding the inadequacy of the traditional argument from free
will is compelling. The argument from freedom of the will, considered in itself, is unpersuasive.
相似文献
Joel Thomas TiernoEmail: |
177.
Douglas W. Portmore 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(4):369-388
In this paper, I argue that those moral theorists who wish to accommodate agent-centered options and supererogatory acts must
accept both that the reason an agent has to promote her own interests is a nonmoral reason and that this nonmoral reason can
prevent the moral reason she has to sacrifice those interests for the sake of doing more to promote the interests of others
from generating a moral requirement to do so. These theorists must, then, deny that moral reasons morally override nonmoral
reasons, such that even the weakest moral reason trumps the strongest nonmoral reason in the determination of an act’s moral
status (e.g., morally permissible or impermissible). If this is right, then it seems that these theorists have their work
cut out for them. It will not be enough for them to provide a criterion of rightness that accommodates agent-centered options
and supererogatory acts, for, in doing so, they incur a debt. As I will show, in accommodating agent-centered options, they
commit themselves to the view that moral reasons are not morally overriding, and so they owe us an account of how both moral
reasons and nonmoral reasons come together to determine an act’s moral status.
相似文献
Douglas W. PortmoreEmail: |
178.
Elise Springer 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(4):407-423
Social psychologists have evidence that evaluative feedback on others’ choices sometimes has unwelcome negative effects on
hearers’ motivation. Holroyd’s article (Holroyd J. Ethical Theory Moral Pract 10:267–278, 2007) draws attention to one such
result, the undermining effect, that should help to challenge moral philosophers’ complacency about blame and praise. The
cause for concern is actually greater than she indicates, both because there are multiple kinds of negative effect on hearer
motivation, and because these are not, as she hopes, reliably counteracted by implicit features of praise and blame. The communicative
ideal that she articulates does point us in the right direction, but it requires further elaboration. Once it is spelled out,
we find that realizing this ideal, in light of the empirical research, requires rethinking the role of verdict-like judgments
within moral feedback.
相似文献
Elise SpringerEmail: |
179.
Raffaele Rodogno 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(2):197-212
Many among philosophers and non-philosophers would claim that well-being is important in moral theory because it is important
to the individual whose well-being it is. The exact meaning of this claim, however, is in need of clarification. Having provided
that, I will present a charge against it. This charge can be found in the recent work of both Joseph Raz and Thomas Scanlon.
According to the latter the concept of well-being plays an unimportant role in an agent’s deliberation. As I will show, to
claim this much is to undermine our initial claim; and to do that is to undermine some of the most central theories in normative
ethics. I will focus on Scanlon’s discussion in particular because it affords us with two criteria for the assessment of the
importance for a person of a value-concept such as well-being. I will claim that much of Scanlon’s case rests on the idea
that well-being is an inclusive good, a good constituted by other things that are good in and for themselves. Then, I will
put forward a case against Scanlon’s challenge by (1) showing that inclusiveness, when properly understood, does not lead
to the conclusion Scanlon is led to and (2) showing that on at least the reading Scanlon prefers, his criteria are inappropriate.
相似文献
Raffaele RodognoEmail: |
180.
Hardt JJ 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2008,29(3):151-160
This article critically evaluates the conception of conscience underlying the debate about the proper place and role of conscience
in the clinical encounter. It suggests that recovering a conception of conscience rooted in the Catholic moral tradition could
offer resources for moving the debate past an unproductive assertion of conflicting rights, namely, physicians’ rights to
conscience versus patients’ rights to socially and legally sanctioned medical interventions. It proposes that conscience is
a necessary component of the moral life in general and a necessary resource for maintaining a coherent sense of moral agency.
It demonstrates that an earlier and intellectually richer conception of conscience, in contrast with common contemporary formulations,
makes the judgments of conscience accountable to reason, open to critique, and protected from becoming a bastion for bigotry,
idiosyncrasy, and personal bias.
相似文献
John J. HardtEmail: |