On the Alleged Connection between Moral Evil and Human Freedom: A Response to Trakakis’ Third Critique

In this essay, I respond to Nick Trakakis’ “A Third (Meta-)Critique.” This critique is directed against my argument concerning the inadequacy of the traditional theistic argument from free will. I contend that the argument from free will does not adequately explain the distribution of moral evil in the world. I maintain that the third critique, like Trakakis’ earlier critiques, is unconvincing. I remain convinced that my original argument regarding the inadequacy of the traditional argument from free will is compelling. The argument from freedom of the will, considered in itself, is unpersuasive.

Assuming a Position: Women and Men as Moral Critics in Their Own War Zone

In their search for an authentic moral self, women and men may at some time in their lives assume a position of resistance. Men are most likely to assume this position in the sphere of war. It is not clear, however, where or when women would be expected to assume such a position or what the nature of that position might be, and how far it could be likened to that of the resisting man. This paper explores the idea that choosing to be a single mother can be a position by and from which women can voice their moral criticism. Such position is comparable to the (known and well-studied) position taken by men who show their moral criticism by refusing to participate in a specific battle during a morally controversial war. The paper begins with an examination of the philosophical and psychological concepts of separate and connected moral positions available to resisting men and women in the spheres of war and family. The conclusions are based on data from two samples of resisters in the spheres of war and the family: 36 soldiers (30 years old on average) who decided to take a stand as selective conscientious objectors (SCOs) during a morally controversial war and 50 (biologically) mature single women (over age 30) who chose to become pregnant and to remain unwed mothers. The conceptual and methodological questions regarding this comparison are discussed.     

Limits of morality: A sociological approach to higher moral stages

Grounded in the wider framework of Kohlberg's (1984) stage theory of moral development and Habermas' (1981; Habermas &; Luhmann, 1971) theory of discourse, this article addresses the question: Is a moral stage 6 society possible? Toward answering this question, a sociological approach to moral stage 6 is employed that complements the usual psychological approach to moral development. The article posits that a moral stage 6 society is impossible. Therefore, lower-stage institutions cannot be abolished; they have to be controlled and supervised. This calls for a new and structurally different type of discourse, the metadiscourse. The article postulates that such metadiscourse has the property of moral stage 7 according to the general stage model (Commons &; Richards, 1984a, 1984b). Finally, several strategies for controlling lower-stage institutions are considered, with bureaucracy serving as example of a lower-stage institution.     

Schools as promoters of moral judgment: the essential role of teachers’ encouragement of critical thinking

The assumption that high level functioning is characterized by a great deal of autonomy is central to some major theories of moral development [Kohlberg (in T. Lickona (ed.) Moral development and behavior: Theory, research and social issues, 1976); Piaget (The moral judgment of the child, 1932)] and to the self-determination theory of motivation [Ryan and Deci (The American Psychologist, 55, 68–78, 2000)]. Based on these theories, we hypothesized that students’ perceptions of their teachers as autonomy supportive, mainly in the form of encouragement of critical thinking, and perhaps also choice, would be positively associated with students’ advanced moral judgment. Data collected from 12th grade students in two regular schools and two democratic schools supported this hypothesis. Results also showed that being a student in a democratic school (as opposed to a regular one) was associated with autonomous moral judgment, and that this association was mediated by students’ perceptions of teachers as encouraging criticism, but not choice. A possible implication is that programs of moral education should explicitly promote teachers’ inclination to encourage critical thinking in their students.

Children's and adolescents' intuitive judgements about distributive justice: Integrating need,effort, and luck

This study investigated the principles that children and adolescents rely on when allocating a resource fairly. In a series of three experiments, 51 Swiss children (aged 7 and 9 years) and 309 German children (aged 6, 9, and 15 years) participated. A different situational context was presented in each experiment, where luck, need and effort of two protagonists were systematically varied. Primary-school children relied mainly on need when making distributive justice judgements. Effort became more prominent as the allocation principle in adolescence. Equality occurred rarely in all age groups. Integrational capacity and the ability to differentiate between the three situational contexts increased from childhood to adolescence. The data suggest the conclusion that the development of distributive justice decisions has both generalized and context-specific components.     

小学数学真实性问题解决的调查研究

在常规课堂上对来自北京市两所小学148位10-12岁的小学生进行真实性问题的测验,研究结果表明:1)被试中对真实数学问题作出真实性解答的人数比例约为四分之一,高于国外同类研究中比例.2)作出常规解答的人数比例约为一半,显著高于作出真实解答的人数比例.3)六年级被试作出真实解答的人数比例普遍高于四年级,但是在某些问题上,六年级被试中作出常规解答的人数比例反而高于四年级.4)被试对不同真实问题的反应存在一定的差异,这可能与真实问题的特点有关.     

Moral dilemmas and moral rules

Recent work shows an important asymmetry in lay intuitions about moral dilemmas. Most people think it is permissible to divert a train so that it will kill one innocent person instead of five, but most people think that it is not permissible to push a stranger in front of a train to save five innocents. We argue that recent emotion-based explanations of this asymmetry have neglected the contribution that rules make to reasoning about moral dilemmas. In two experiments, we find that participants show a parallel asymmetry about versions of the dilemmas that have minimized emotional force. In a third experiment, we find that people distinguish between whether an action violates a moral rule and whether it is, all things considered, wrong. We propose that judgments of whether an action is wrong, all things considered, implicate a complex set of psychological processes, including representations of rules, emotional responses, and assessments of costs and benefits.     

Identity, Reasoning, and Emotion: An Empirical Comparison of Three Sources of Moral Motivation

Prior research on moral motivation has primarily emphasized moral reasoning and moral emotion; however, identity may also play an important role. Therefore, the purpose of the present study was to examine the relative importance of prosocial identity, prosocial moral reasoning, and empathy in predicting prosocial behavior. The sample included 91 university students, ages 19–35 years (M=21.89; SD=3.01; 80% European American; 65% female). Prosocial identity and empathy, but not prosocial moral reasoning, were positively associated with overall prosocial behavior. Exploratory analyses examined how these three sources of prosocial motivation differentially related to six forms of prosocial behavior. Results suggest the importance of considering the roles of all three sources of moral motivation.     

论《周易》的道德谱系

《周易》是一部人学著作,也是一部道德著作。《周易》构建了一种特殊的道德谱系,这种道德谱系由本能无意识、文化无意识、社会意识、自我意识道德化四个层面构成。《周易》的道德谱系把“人”与“道”联系起来,从而有了“人道”,也把“道”与“德”联系起来,从而有了“道德”。《周易》在性命之理的基础上探讨了人的形成、演化及人性的内容;又在“人”与“道”的基础上构建了“成人”与“做人”的道德谱系。《周易》的道德谱系把“人”与“道”联接起来是人学,把“道”与“德”联接起来是伦理学。天道、人道等统一于性命之理的命题之中,成为了道德谱系的奇特内容,从而人也就成为了道德谱系的本体。     

Crime and punishment: distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment

Recent research in moral psychology has attempted to characterize patterns of moral judgments of actions in terms of the causal and intentional properties of those actions. The present study directly compares the roles of consequence, causation, belief and desire in determining moral judgments. Judgments of the wrongness or permissibility of action were found to rely principally on the mental states of an agent, while judgments of blame and punishment are found to rely jointly on mental states and the causal connection of an agent to a harmful consequence. Also, selectively for judgments of punishment and blame, people who attempt but fail to cause harm more are judged more leniently if the harm occurs by independent means than if the harm does not occur at all. An account of these phenomena is proposed that distinguishes two processes of moral judgment: one which begins with harmful consequences and seeks a causally responsible agent, and the other which begins with an action and analyzes the mental states responsible for that action.