Extreme Outcomes Sway Risky Decisions from Experience

Whether buying stocks or playing the slots, people making real‐world risky decisions often rely on their experiences with the risks and rewards. These decisions, however, do not occur in isolation but are embedded in a rich context of other decisions, outcomes, and experiences. In this paper, we systematically evaluate how the local context of other rewarding outcomes alters risk preferences. Through a series of four experiments on decisions from experience, we provide evidence for an extreme‐outcome rule, whereby people overweight the most extreme outcomes (highest and lowest) in a given context. As a result, people should be more risk seeking for gains than losses, even with equally likely outcomes. Across the experiments, the decision context was varied so that the same outcomes served as the high extreme, low extreme, or neither. As predicted, people were more risk seeking for relative gains, but only when the risky option potentially led to the high‐extreme outcome. Similarly, people were more risk averse for relative losses, but only when the risky option potentially led to the low‐extreme outcome. We conclude that in risky decisions from experience, the biggest wins and the biggest losses seem to matter more than they should. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why there might be a moral faculty: A reply to Johnson

Is there a cognitive faculty dedicated to the moral domain? Mark Johnson has developed a number of arguments against the existence of such a faculty. I claim that these arguments are not persuasive and that there may be a moral faculty.     

The myth of the moral faculty: Response to Kirkby

David Kirkby argues that I have misrepresented Marc Hauser's conception of a moral faculty, in a way that invalidates my chief arguments against the existence and necessity of such a faculty. The core of Kirkby's challenge is that what Hauser lists as necessary conditions for the moral faculty to do its work are not themselves components of that faculty. I argue that there is no useful way to distinguish necessary conditions of moral judgments from the alleged moral faculty itself, and that even if we could do this, we would be left with an empty non-explanation of the supposed moral faculty that amounts to nothing more than the claim that we have a faculty that generates judgments of right versus wrong.     

Psychopaths and blame: The argument from content

The recent debate over the moral responsibility of psychopaths has centered on whether, or in what sense, they understand moral requirements. In this paper, I argue that even if they do understand what morality requires, the content of their actions is not of the right kind to justify full-blown blame. I advance two independent justifications of this claim. First, I argue that if the psychopath comes to know what morality requires via a route that does not involve a proper appreciation of what it means to cause another harm or distress, the content of violations of rules against harm will be of a lower grade than the content of similar actions by normal individuals. Second, I argue that in order to intend a harm to a person—that is, to intend the distinctive kind of harm that can only befall a person—it is necessary to understand what personhood is and what makes it valuable. The psychopath's deficits with regard to mental time travel ensure that s/he cannot intend this kind of harm.     

The role of ecological validity in hazard perception assessment

Hazard perception is one of the few quantifiable components of driving competency that can explain the high crash risk of novice drivers (see Horswill & McKenna, 2004). Some studies focused on investigating the stimulus part of hazard perception items by comparing several design features of the displayed traffic scenarios (e.g. Malone et al., 2012; Scialfa et al., 2013). Other empirical studies have been conducted to address the reaction part of hazard perception items (e.g. Vlakveld, 2014). Among others, existing hazard perception tests differ with respect to the ecological validity – the similarity to real-world demands – of the task that has to be completed by the participants (simple reaction, hazard localization, simulated driving, etc.). Based on the findings of general expertise research (see Glaser & Chi, 1988), the hypothesis of the present experiment was that an increased ecological validity of a hazard perception task has a positive effect on the magnitude of performance differences between more and less experienced drivers. 104 learner drivers and 51 experienced drivers were randomly assigned either to a less ecological valid version (multiple choice task) or a higher ecological valid version (reaction task) of a hazard perception test. In both conditions, the same 20 animated hazardous or non-hazardous traffic scenarios were presented. Overall, the experienced drivers outperformed the learner drivers. Principally, both of the applied versions of the test provided a criterion valid measure of driving expertise. However, increasing the ecological validity of the test by using a reaction task was especially beneficial for certain types of scenarios, leading to higher expertise-related differences. In addition, the reaction task provides response time measure as a further valid performance indicator. This allows the identification of those participants who are indeed able to detect a hazard in a certain scenario, but still have deficits in response time, compared to more experienced drivers. According to the present study, it is recommended to choose the reaction task over the multiple choice task to test hazard perception. Whether a further increase in ecological validity of the task would be useful, should be tested empirically in future research.     

Neural correlates of intertemporal choice in aggressive behavior

People often have to make decisions between immediate rewards and more long-term goals. Such intertemporal judgments are often investigated in the context of monetary choice or drug use, yet not in regard to aggressive behavior. We combined a novel intertemporal aggression paradigm with functional neuroimaging to examine the role of temporal delay in aggressive behavior and the neural correlates thereof. Sixty-one participants (aged 18–22 years; 37 females) exhibited substantial variability in the extent to which they selected immediate acts of lesser aggression versus delayed acts of greater aggression against a same-sex opponent. Choosing delayed-yet-more-severe aggression was increased by provocation and associated with greater self-control. Preferences for delayed aggression were associated with greater activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) during such choices, and reduced functional connectivity between the VMPFC and brain regions implicated in motor impulsivity. Preferences for immediate aggression were associated with reduced functional connectivity between the VMPFC and the frontoparietal control network. Dispositionally aggressive participants exhibited reduced VMPFC activity, which partially explained and suppressed their preferences for delayed aggression. Blunted VMPFC activity may thus be a neural mechanism that promotes reactive aggression towards provocateurs among dispositionally aggressive individuals. These findings demonstrate the utility of an intertemporal framework for investigating aggression and provide further evidence for the similar underlying neurobiology between aggression and other rewarding behaviors.     

The effects of physical contact and decision type on moral decision making: A study of harm to save moral behavior

This study examined the relationship between physical contact and decision type in predicting “harm to save” behavior. Participants were assigned to making either a judgment or a choice involving moral dilemmas. All participants were presented with dilemmas that either required or did not require having physical contact with potential victims. Participants were asked to decide whether to sacrifice fewer people to save more (utilitarian responses) or not to do so and thus more people would die (deontological responses). The study sample included 345 participants who completed a set of self‐report measures. Results indicated an interaction between physical contact and decision type. In the choice condition only, participants reported significantly less utilitarian responses to the dilemmas that required having physical contact with the person to be harmed than to dilemmas that did not require physical contact. This difference was not found in the judgment condition. These results contribute to a greater understanding of the nature and potential malleability of human morality.     

Preference and resistance to change with constant-duration schedule components

Previous research on preference between variable-interval terminal links in concurrent chains has most often used variable-duration terminal links ending with a single reinforcer. By contrast, most research on resistance to change in multiple schedules has used constant-duration components that include variable numbers of reinforcers in each presentation. Grace and Nevin (1997) examined both preference and resistance in variable-duration components; here, preference and resistance were examined in constant-duration components. Reinforcer rates were varied across eight conditions, and a generalized-matching-law analysis showed that initial-link preference strongly over-matched terminal-link reinforcer ratios. In multiple schedules, baseline response rates were unaffected by reinforcer rates, but resistance to intercomponent food, to extinction, and to intercomponent food plus extinction was greater in the richer component. The between-component difference in resistance to change exhibited additive effects for the three resistance tests, and was systematically related to reinforcer ratios. However, resistance was less sensitive to reinforcer ratios than was preference. Resistance to intercomponent food and to intercomponent food plus extinction was more sensitive to reinforcer ratios in the present study than in Grace and Nevin (1997). Thus, relative to variable-duration components, constant-duration components increased the sensitivity of both preference and relative resistance, supporting the proposition that these are independent and convergent measures of the effects of a history of reinforcement.     

Maximizing versus matching on concurrent variable-interval schedules

Maximization and matching predictions were examined for a time-based analogue of the concurrent variable-interval variable-ratio schedule. One alternative was a variable interval whose time base operated relatively independent of the schedule chosen, and the other was a discontinuous variable interval for which timing progressed only when selected. Pigeons switched between schedules by pecking a changeover key. The maximization hypothesis predicts that subjects will show a bias toward the discontinuous variable interval and undermatching; however the obtained results conformed closely to the predictions of the matching law. Finally, a quantitative comparison was made of the bias and sensitivity estimates obtained in published concurrent variable-interval variable-ratio analogue studies. Results indicated that only the ratio-based analogue of the concurrent variable interval variable ratio studied by Green, Rachlin, and Hanson (1983) produced significant bias toward the variable-ratio alternative and undermatching, as predicted by reinforcement maximization.     

Beliefs About the True Self Explain Asymmetries Based on Moral Judgment

Past research has identified a number of asymmetries based on moral judgments. Beliefs about (a) what a person values, (b) whether a person is happy, (c) whether a person has shown weakness of will, and (d) whether a person deserves praise or blame seem to depend critically on whether participants themselves find the agent's behavior to be morally good or bad. To date, however, the origins of these asymmetries remain unknown. The present studies examine whether beliefs about an agent's “true self” explain these observed asymmetries based on moral judgment. Using the identical materials from previous studies in this area, a series of five experiments indicate that people show a general tendency to conclude that deep inside every individual there is a “true self” calling him or her to behave in ways that are morally virtuous. In turn, this belief causes people to hold different intuitions about what the agent values, whether the agent is happy, whether he or she has shown weakness of will, and whether he or she deserves praise or blame. These results not only help to answer important questions about how people attribute various mental states to others; they also contribute to important theoretical debates regarding how moral values may shape our beliefs about phenomena that, on the surface, appear to be decidedly non‐moral in nature.