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111.
People often judge it unacceptable to directly harm a person, even when this is necessary to produce an overall positive outcome, such as saving five other lives. We demonstrate that similar judgments arise when people consider damage to owned objects. In two experiments, participants considered dilemmas where saving five inanimate objects required destroying one. Participants judged this unacceptable when it required violating another’s ownership rights, but not otherwise. They also judged that sacrificing another’s object was less acceptable as a means than as a side-effect; judgments did not depend on whether property damage involved personal force. These findings inform theories of moral decision-making. They show that utilitarian judgment can be decreased without physical harm to persons, and without personal force. The findings also show that the distinction between means and side-effects influences the acceptability of damaging objects, and that ownership impacts utilitarian moral judgment. 相似文献
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Elias Robles Noah N. Emery Perla A. Vargas Araceli Moreno Brent Marshall Richard C. Grove 《The Journal of general psychology》2014,141(3):207-227
ABSTRACT. We explored the utility of analyzing within- and between-balloon response patterns on a balloon analogue task (BAT) in relation to overall risk scores, and to a choice between a small guaranteed cash reward and an uncertain reward of the same expected value. Young adults (n = 61) played a BAT, and then were offered a choice between $5 in cash and betting to win $0 to $15. Between groups, pumping was differentially influenced by explosions and by the number of successive unexploded balloons, with risk takers responding increasingly on successive balloons after an explosion. Within-balloons, risk takers showed a characteristic pattern of constant high rate, while non-risk takers showed a characteristic variable lower rate. Overall, results show that the higher number of pumps and explosions that characterize risk takers at a molar level, result from particular forms of adaptation to the positive and negative outcomes of choices seen at a molecular level.
Color versions of one or more of the figures in the article can be found online at www.tandfonline.com/vgen. 相似文献
114.
Evaluations of analogous situations are an important source for our moral intuitions. A puzzling recent set of findings in experiments exploring transfer effects between intuitions about moral dilemmas has demonstrated a striking asymmetry. Transfer often occurred with a specific ordering of moral dilemmas, but not when the sequence was reversed. In this article we present a new theory of transfer between moral intuitions that focuses on two components of moral dilemmas, namely their causal structure and their default evaluations. According to this theory, transfer effects are expected when the causal models underlying the considered dilemmas allow for a mapping of the highlighted aspect of the first scenario onto the causal structure of the second dilemma, and when the default evaluations of the two dilemmas substantially differ. The theory’s key predictions for the occurrence and the direction of transfer effects between two moral dilemmas are tested in five experiments with various variants of moral dilemmas from different domains. A sixth experiment tests the predictions of the theory for how the target action in the moral dilemmas is represented. 相似文献
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Choice‐making,Expectations, and Treatment Positivity: How and When Choosing Shapes Aversive Experiences
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Every day we use products and treatments with unknown but expected effects, such as using medication to manage pain. In many cases, we have a choice over which products or treatments to use; however, in other cases, people choose for us or choices are unavailable. Does choosing (versus not choosing) have implications for how a product or treatment is experienced? The current experiments examined the role of choice‐making in facilitating so‐called expectation assimilation effects—or situations in which a person's experiences (e.g., discomfort and pain) are evaluated in a manner consistent with their expectations. In Experiment 1, participants were initially exposed to a baseline set of aversive stimuli (i.e., sounds). Next, some participants were given expectations for two “treatments” (i.e., changes in screen display) that could ostensibly reduce discomfort. Critically, participants were either given a choice or not about which of the two treatments they preferred. Participants in a control condition were not provided with treatment expectations. Results revealed that discomfort experiences assimilated to expectations only when participants were provided with choice. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and provided evidence against the idea that demand characteristics and choice‐making unrelated to the core task (i.e., choices without associated expectations) could account for the results. Further, Experiment 2 showed that choosing reduced discomfort because of increased positivity about the treatment. Results are discussed in the context of extant research on choice‐making and expectation effects. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
117.
Stephen Stark Oleksandr S. Chernyshenko Fritz Drasgow Christopher D. Nye Leonard A. White Tonia Heffner 《Military psychology》2014,26(3):153-164
This article discusses 3 modern forced-choice personality tests developed for the U.S Armed Services to provide resistance to faking and other forms of response distortion: the Assessment of Individual Motivation, the Navy Computerized Adaptive Personality Scales, and the Tailored Adaptive Personality Assessment System. These tests represent the transition from Likert to forced-choice formats and from static to computerized adaptive item selection to meet the challenges of large-scale, high-stakes testing environments. For each test, we briefly describe the personality constructs that are assessed, the response format and scoring methods, and selected ongoing research and development efforts. We also highlight the potential of these tests for personnel selection, classification, and diagnostic screening purposes. 相似文献
118.
Michelle Maiese 《Philosophical Psychology》2014,27(6):807-828
Few theorists would challenge the idea that affect and emotion directly influence decision-making and moral judgment. There is good reason to think that they also significantly assist in decision-making and judgment, and in fact are necessary for fully effective moral cognition. However, they are not sufficient. Deliberation and more reflective thought processes likewise play a crucial role, and in fact are inseparable from affective processes. I will argue that while the dual-process account of moral judgment set forth by Craigie (2011) has great merit, it fails to appreciate fully the extent to which affective and reflective processes are not only integrated, but also mutually interdependent. Evidence from psychopathy indicates that when reflective processes are not assisted adequately by what I will call ‘affective framing’, and moral cognition is of the “cooler,” less emotionally-informed variety, what results is not effective cognitive functioning, but rather psychopathology. My proposed account of affective framing aims to make sense of the way in which affect plays a strictly necessary and integral role not just in intuitive moral responses, but also in reflective moral judgments, so that moral cognition is accomplished by the joint operation of affective processes and reflective reasoning processes. 相似文献
119.
Marcia L. Spetch 《决策行为杂志》2014,27(2):146-156
Whether buying stocks or playing the slots, people making real‐world risky decisions often rely on their experiences with the risks and rewards. These decisions, however, do not occur in isolation but are embedded in a rich context of other decisions, outcomes, and experiences. In this paper, we systematically evaluate how the local context of other rewarding outcomes alters risk preferences. Through a series of four experiments on decisions from experience, we provide evidence for an extreme‐outcome rule, whereby people overweight the most extreme outcomes (highest and lowest) in a given context. As a result, people should be more risk seeking for gains than losses, even with equally likely outcomes. Across the experiments, the decision context was varied so that the same outcomes served as the high extreme, low extreme, or neither. As predicted, people were more risk seeking for relative gains, but only when the risky option potentially led to the high‐extreme outcome. Similarly, people were more risk averse for relative losses, but only when the risky option potentially led to the low‐extreme outcome. We conclude that in risky decisions from experience, the biggest wins and the biggest losses seem to matter more than they should. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
120.
David Kirkby 《Philosophical Psychology》2014,27(4):475-482
Is there a cognitive faculty dedicated to the moral domain? Mark Johnson has developed a number of arguments against the existence of such a faculty. I claim that these arguments are not persuasive and that there may be a moral faculty. 相似文献