Adolescents' preferences for organ allocation: The role of empathy and altruism in allocation judgments

Distributive justice reasoning in adolescence, regarding the allocation of scarce medical resources, has not been thoroughly studied yet. The present study aimed to explore adolescents' preferences for organ allocation, the ethical principles that form bioethical judgments in adolescence, as well as the role of empathy and altruism in the formation of those judgments. One hundred fifty one adolescents (90 females) aged between 12 and 19 years old participated in the study. Participants were asked to suggest the criteria that should be considered in the construction of transplant waiting lists, to evaluate adults' preferable criteria and to justify their judgments. Results indicate that utilitarianism and egalitarianism were both used to form allocation judgments. Ingroup favouritism was also observed. Age differences in adolescents' preferences were witnessed, but no age effect were found regarding the principles that form participants' judgments. Aspects of empathy and altruism seemed to associate with certain allocation criteria.     

A closer look at moral dilemmas: Latent dimensions of morality and the difference between trolley and footbridge dilemmas

Although a distinction between moral-personal and moral-impersonal dilemmas (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001 Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M. and Cohen, J. D. 2001. An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgement. Science, 293: 2105–2108. doi:10.1126/science.1062872.[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) has been widely accepted as an explanation for a difference between the trolley and footbridge dilemmas (Thomson, 1985 Thomson, J. J. 1985. “The trolley problem”. In Ethics: Problems and principles, Edited by: Fischer, J. M. and Ravizza, M. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.  [Google Scholar]), its psychometric properties remain a mystery. In this study 219 participants completed 62 moral dilemma tasks used in Greene et al. (2001 Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M. and Cohen, J. D. 2001. An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgement. Science, 293: 2105–2108. doi:10.1126/science.1062872.[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), and the correlation structure among the dilemmas was analysed through factor analysis and structural equation modelling. Findings suggest that, first, moral-personal dilemmas are composed of one factor, indicating that the assumption in Greene et al. (2001 Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M. and Cohen, J. D. 2001. An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgement. Science, 293: 2105–2108. doi:10.1126/science.1062872.[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) was supported. Second, moral-impersonal dilemmas are explained by two factors that reflect procedural and consequential aspects of decision making. Third, the trolley and footbridge dilemmas fall under the same factor category; therefore the difference between the two dilemmas cannot be attributed to emotional involvement. Additionally, the results of the structural equation modelling suggest that they differ in the engagement of rational processing.     

What Accounts for Prosocial Behavior? Roles of Moral Identity,Moral Judgment,and Self-Efficacy Beliefs

Prior research suggests that moral identity influences individuals’ willingness to engage in prosocial behavior. Little attention, however, has been given to the roles of and relations between moral identity and other factors, such as moral judgment, in accounting for types of prosocial behavior in adolescence. The current study examined the extent to which moral identity, moral judgment, and social self-efficacy contribute to prosocial behaviors in adolescence. Approximately 338 adolescents (M_age?=?13.4 years) completed measures of moral identity, moral judgment, social self-efficacy, and prosocial behavior. Teachers rated adolescents’ prosocial behaviors, which largely corroborated the adolescents’ self-reports. Moral identity was found to predict most types of prosocial behavior. Moral judgment and moral identity were related and jointly predicted altruistic prosocial behaviors, but did not predict helping in front of others. Further, moral identity mediated the relationships between moral judgment and some forms of prosocial behavior (e.g., emotional, volunteering). Self-efficacy beliefs were found to predict some types of prosocial behavior (e.g., public), perhaps providing adolescents with confidence to engage in prosocial action. Overall, moral identity was especially effective in directly accounting for prosocial behavior, and may act as a mediator to bridge the moral judgment–moral action gap among adolescents.     

Are Thoughtful People More Utilitarian? CRT as a Unique Predictor of Moral Minimalism in the Dilemmatic Context

Recent theorizing about the cognitive underpinnings of dilemmatic moral judgment has equated slow, deliberative thinking with the utilitarian disposition and fast, automatic thinking with the deontological disposition. However, evidence for the reflective utilitarian hypothesis—the hypothesized link between utilitarian judgment and individual differences in the capacity for rational reflection (gauged here by the Cognitive Reflection Test [CRT; Frederick, 2005]) has been inconsistent and difficult to interpret in light of several design flaws. In two studies aimed at addressing some of the flaws, we found robust evidence for a reflective minimalist hypothesis—high CRT performers’ tendency to regard utility‐optimizing acts as largely a matter of personal prerogative, permissible both to perform and to leave undone. This relationship between CRT and the “minimalist” orientation remained intact after controlling for age, sex, trait affect, social desirability, and educational attainment. No significant association was found between CRT and the strict utilitarian response pattern or CRT and the strict deontological response pattern, nor did we find any significant association between CRT and willingness to act in the utility‐optimizing manner. However, we found an inverse association between empathic concern and a willingness to act in the utility‐optimizing manner, but there was no comparable association between empathic concern and the deontological judgment pattern. Theoretical, methodological, and normative implications of the findings are discussed.     

The portrait of a hedonist: The personality and ethics behind the value and maladaptive pursuit of pleasure

Hedonism is the prioritizing of pleasure over other life values and is theorized to be independent of well-being. However, popular culture depicts hedonists as unhappy, as well as selfishly unconcerned with others’ well-being. Because the current literature has not differentiated between people’s value of pleasure and their maladaptive pursuit of it, we examined if these related, but not equivalent, dispositions had different personality and morality profiles. We found that value-based hedonists have a distinct moral profile (i.e., they are less likely to endorse moral foundations associated with social conservatism) and, yet, they differ little from others in regard to personality traits. We also found that people’s maladaptive hedonism (i.e., excessive pleasure-seeking) was best predicted by their personality traits (i.e., being less agreeable, less conscientious, and more neurotic) rather than by their conceptions of right and wrong. We discuss how these results contribute to our understanding of hedonism and why some people pursue their value of pleasure into over-indulgence.     

Cruel nature: Harmfulness as an important,overlooked dimension in judgments of moral standing

Entities that possess moral standing can be wronged and deserve our moral consideration. Past perspectives on the folk psychology of moral standing have focused exclusively on the role of “patiency” (the capacity to experience pain or pleasure) and “agency” (usually defined and operationalized in terms of intelligence or cognitive ability). We contend that harmfulness (i.e., having a harmful vs. benevolent disposition) is an equally if not more important determinant of moral standing. We provide support for this hypothesis across four studies using non-human animals as targets. We show that the effect of harmfulness on attributions of moral standing is independent from patiency and intelligence (Studies 1–2), that this effect pertains specifically to an animal’s harmful disposition rather than its capacity to act upon this disposition (Study 3), and that it primarily reflects a parochial concern for human welfare in particular (Study 4). Our findings highlight an important, overlooked dimension in the psychology of moral standing that has implications for real-world decisions that affect non-human animals. Our findings also help clarify the conditions under which people perceive patiency and agency as related versus truly independent dimensions.     

Desire for a positive moral self-regard exacerbates escalation of commitment to initiatives with prosocial aims

Across three experiments, people escalated commitment more frequently to a failing prosocial initiative (i.e., an initiative that had the primary aim of improving the outcomes of others in need) than they did to a failing egoistic initiative (i.e., an initiative that had the primary aim of improving the outcomes of the decision-maker). A test of mediation (Study 1b) and a test of moderation (Study 2) each provided evidence that a desire for a positive moral self-regard underlies people’s tendency to escalate commitment more frequently to failing prosocial initiatives than to failing egoistic initiatives. We discuss the implications of these findings for the resource-allocation decisions that people and organizations face when undertaking initiatives with prosocial aims.     

Unfairness begets unfairness: Victim derogation bias in employee ratings

This research investigated criterion contamination in human resource evaluations, specifically victim derogation in which third parties (e.g., managers, co-workers) systematically undervalue the performance and potential of individuals who have previously suffered organizational injustices. A policy capturing design (Study 1) found that managers rated job applicants who had been treated unfairly by their previous employers as less suitable than fairly treated applicants, after objective performance information was controlled. In Study 2, the effect of unfair treatment on job applicant ratings was found to be moderated by managers’ just world beliefs, with applicant ratings reflecting more derogation among managers with higher (vs. lower) Belief in a Just World. In Study 3, the pattern of results from Study 2 was replicated in a performance evaluation context using peers as raters. Moreover, in Study 3 an intervention that activated raters’ moral identity was found to attenuate victim derogation bias.     

Children's Sensitivity to Ulterior Motives When Evaluating Prosocial Behavior

Reasoning about ulterior motives was investigated among children ages 6–10 years (total N = 119). In each of two studies, participants were told about children who offered gifts to peers who needed help. Each giver chose to present a gift in either a public setting, which is consistent with having an ulterior motive to enhance one's reputation, or in a private setting, which is not consistent with having an ulterior motive. In each study, the 6‐ to 7‐year olds showed no evidence of understanding that the public givers might have ulterior motives, but the 8‐ to 10‐year olds rated the private givers more favorably. In 3. , the older children were more likely than the younger children to refer to impression management when explaining their judgments of the givers. The younger children who mentioned impression management did so to justify a preference for public givers (e.g., by explaining that public givers are nicer because more of their peers will know that they are nice). Results from 4. suggest that developmental change in children's reasoning about intentions and social outcomes contributes to their understanding of ulterior motives.